C.C. v. J.A.H.

Citation463 N.J.Super. 419,232 A.3d 505
Decision Date04 May 2020
Docket NumberDOCKET NO. A-4425-18T3
Parties C.C., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.A.H., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court – Appellate Division

J.A.H., appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

Before Judges Accurso, Gilson and Rose.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSE, J.A.D.

In this case of first impression, we examine the meaning of a "dating relationship" under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, where the parties never experienced a traditional, in-person "date." Instead, their relationship was demonstrated by the intensity and content of their communications, including the exchange of nearly 1300 highly personal text messages. We conclude the proliferate and exceedingly intimate communications between the parties constituted a dating relationship within the meaning of the Act and supported entry of the final restraining order (FRO). We therefore affirm.

I.

The facts were established at the two-day bench trial, during which both parties were represented by counsel. The evidence was largely based on plaintiff C.C.'s testimony and the compilation of the parties' text messages that was admitted over the objection of defendant J.A.H.2

In the mid-summer of 2018, the parties met at a fitness center where plaintiff was employed as the general manager and defendant was a new member. Defendant had transferred his membership to that location when he moved to the area from Pennsylvania. Nearly every time he exercised at the gym – about three to five times per week – defendant sought plaintiff's attention, engaging her in intimate conversations about her personal life. Plaintiff was twenty-two years old; defendant was almost twenty years her senior.

At some point, defendant gave plaintiff his cellphone number, but plaintiff did not text him until the end of September. During the ensuing five weeks, the parties exchanged text messages at all hours of the day and night. Many of the messages were sexually explicit and suggestive in nature. The parties discussed in graphic detail: their sexual preferences; their prior dating experiences; their recreational drug and alcohol use; and the traits they desired in a partner. Plaintiff testified about a sampling of the text messages.

On October 20, defendant sent plaintiff a message, apparently declaring his romantic interest in her:

I think the fact that I put in work for literally several months should give you a clue and that I wasn't some older dude giving you my number just to hit. I don't think I've ever waited so long in my entire life. And, yeah, I know you keep your walls up, hence why I let you call the shots and come around to me all while you were doing your thing with other dudes. But I mean if you want to just be friends, that's on you, you're driving the bus, always have.

Later that day, defendant sent plaintiff a message stating, "you would/will be the youngest I've hooked up with." Plaintiff explained the phrase, "hooked up," meant an "[i]ntimate relationship, sex generally." Plaintiff did not discourage defendant's advances. Rather, the parties had several discussions about "meeting up," which plaintiff defined as getting together "[i]n person, outside of work, on a date."

On October 22, defendant cancelled their plans; the parties continued their discourse; four days later, plaintiff cancelled their date. Plaintiff testified she had other plans, but also "felt uncomfortable meeting up with him outside of work." Apparently, plaintiff did not share her feelings with defendant.

The following day, the parties exchanged more than thirty text messages.

Plaintiff explained some of the messages, which she characterized as "flirting." For example, defendant sent a message that read:

Look, neither one of us is good with the feeling shit, right? You act confused and I act like someone who I'm not. The lame texts I send to put in work make me look soft, and that's not me, and I hate it, but think you also hate it, too, so let's cut through the chase and fuck not tonight but soon.

Plaintiff said she believed that message meant the parties should "just meet up and continue along th[e] line of a relationship." But, the parties did not meet outside the gym.

By November 1, the parties had exchanged 1097 text messages and continued to speak in person at the gym. On November 4 – after plaintiff sent defendant messages indicating she no longer "s[aw] the need for further communication" other than "as a friend" – the tenor of defendant's messages changed completely. What followed can only be described as a barrage of six rapid-fire messages from 11:37 p.m. to slightly before midnight, followed by several lengthy messages from 12:23 a.m. to mid-afternoon on November 5. Many of the messages contained vulgar, insulting, and threatening language, the details of which we need not recount here.

In essence, defendant threatened to contact plaintiff's employer in an effort to have her fired for taking – what he belatedly claimed was – an unauthorized photograph of him at the gym. Defendant also threatened to institute a civil lawsuit against plaintiff, knowing her finances prevented her from hiring counsel to defend it. In one particularly notable example, defendant wrote, "you really don't know who I am which is so shocking because I thought you would have known by now."

After awakening and reading defendant's barrage of harassing messages on November 5, plaintiff conducted an internet search of defendant's name. Among other things, plaintiff discovered defendant had been convicted of stalking and harassing a woman he dated in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff introduced in evidence the unreported decision of a Pennsylvania appellate court, affirming defendant's convictions in that matter. According to plaintiff, certain facts of that case bore striking similarities to her own. For example, someone attempted to access plaintiff's cellphone account without authorization after she ended her relationship with defendant, which happened to the woman in the Pennsylvania case as well.

That same morning, plaintiff reported the incident to the local police and her employer, who terminated defendant's gym membership. In doing so, plaintiff discovered someone had accessed defendant's electronic membership account earlier that morning and changed his address on file to her home address. At some point, the detective assigned to her case advised plaintiff to seek a restraining order. On November 17, plaintiff filed her initial complaint, upon which a TRO was granted that same day by a municipal court judge. A criminal complaint also was filed against defendant on that day.3

Apparently, the TRO was dissolved in December when the court was unable to contact plaintiff to appear for an FRO hearing. Plaintiff testified she had not received any notices to appear in court and was unaware the matter had been dismissed until March 17, 2019, when she ultimately learned defendant had been served with the TRO.4 It is unclear from the record whether police advised plaintiff they were unable to serve defendant until that date. The following day, plaintiff sought a second TRO, alleging the same claims as in her initial TRO. On April 15, plaintiff amended her complaint and TRO to include additional allegations of harassment that allegedly occurred between November 2018 and a "few weeks" prior to her amended pleadings.5

Defendant did not testify at the hearing. He moved to dismiss the complaint and dissolve the TRO, arguing plaintiff failed to establish the parties had been involved in a dating relationship. The trial judge denied the motion, finding the "peculiar set of facts" established a dating relationship. The judge concluded defendant had committed harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, a predicate act of domestic violence under the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). The judge entered the FRO, and thereafter denied defendant's pro se motion for reconsideration. This appeal followed.

Representing himself, defendant appeals, maintaining: (1) the parties did not have a dating relationship; (2) an FRO is not needed to protect plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiff's documentary evidence was improperly admitted. Despite plaintiff's failure to file a response, we are not persuaded by any of defendant's arguments.

II.

Our scope of review is limited when considering an FRO issued by the trial judge at the conclusion of a bench trial. We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are "specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482, 25 A.3d 1045 (2011). We will "not disturb the ‘factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.’ " S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 429, 2 A.3d 412 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412, 713 A.2d 390 (1998) ). Despite our deferential standard, a judge's purely legal decisions are subject to our de novo review. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194, 928 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 2007).

It is well settled that to obtain an FRO under the Act, a plaintiff must not only demonstrate defendant has committed a predicate act of domestic violence as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(1) to (19), but also that a restraining order is necessary for his or her protection. J.D., 207 N.J. at 475-76, 25 A.3d 1045 (citing Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126-27, 903 A.2d 446 (App. Div. 2006) ). Relevant here, the Act's definition of a "[v]ictim of domestic violence" includes "any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has had a dating relationship." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d). The term "dating...

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