C.C. v. L.J. (In re L.J.)

• Decision Date: 30 September 2014
• Docket Number: 1121462.
• Parties: Ex parte L.J. (In re C.C. v. L.J.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

176 So.3d 186

Ex parte L.J.

(In re C.C.

v.L.J.)

1121462.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 30, 2014.

Michael C. Sizemore of The Sizemore Law Group, Athens, for petitioner.

Anne G. Burrowsof Hand Arendall LLC, Athens, for respondent.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This Court granted certiorari review to address the issue whether a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12–15–114, Ala.Code 1975, a provision of the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act of 2008, § 12–15–101 et seq., Ala.Code 1975(“the 2008 AJJA”), over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the grounds for the termination do not involve a child alleged “to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision.”

Facts and Procedural History

In July 2012, L.J. (“the mother”) filed a petition in the Limestone Juvenile Court to establish paternity of the child at issue in this case. In that same petition, the mother also sought to terminate the parental rights of C.C. (“the father”). In the petition, the mother stated that the father had previously filed an action in the circuit court and that that court had ordered a DNA test that established the father's paternity but that the father had withdrawn the petition before the court had issued an order establishing paternity. In her petition, the mother alleged that the father had abandoned the child.

The father, initially acting pro se, filed an answer generally denying the allegations in the mother's petition, except for the paternity of the child. Because the issue was not in dispute, the juvenile court entered an order determining that the father was the biological father of the child. The father, acting through counsel, filed an amended answer and a counterclaim seeking joint legal custody of the child, with physical custody awarded to the mother; visitation rights; and establishing child support pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R. Jud. Admin.

Following ore tenus proceedings, at which the mother, the father, and the mother's mother testified, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the father had “abandoned” the child as that term is defined in § 12–15–301, Ala.Code 1975, and by § 12–15–319, Ala.Code 1975. The juvenile court terminated the father's parental rights, implicitly denying the father's counterclaim. The father timely appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. The juvenile court certified the record as adequate for an appeal pursuant to Rule 28(A)(1)(a), Ala. R. Juv. P.

A majority of the Court of Civil Appeals held that, under § 12–15–114, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over a termination-of-parental-rights claim except insofar as that claim arises out of a proceeding involving an allegation that the child as to whom parental rights are being terminated is dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. C.C. v. L.J.,176 So.3d 183 (Ala.Civ.App.2013). Because the mother's petition for the termination of the father's parental rights did not arise out of a dependency, delinquency, or child-in-need-of-supervision proceeding, the Court of Civil Appeals held that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that its judgment was void. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals held that when the legislature repealed what was § 12–15–30(b), Ala.Code 1975, removing language giving juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings and replacing it with more limited jurisdiction over only certain types of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings (i.e., those arising out of dependency, delinquency, or child-in-need-of-supervision proceedings), the legislature intended to narrow the juvenile court's jurisdiction in termination-of-parental-rights cases. Because the mother, who was the legal custodian of the child, had not alleged that the child was dependent, i.e., without a parent willing to provide for the care, support, or education of the child, the Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over her petition. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as being from a void judgment.

Two members of the Court of Civil Appeals dissented, opining that the enactment of the 2008 AJJA did not alter the formerly prevailing law under which a parent could seek to terminate the parental rights of the other parent in the juvenile court. C.C. v. L.J.,176 So.3d at 185(Pittman, J., dissenting, with Thompson, P.J., joining). The dissent notes that former § 26–18–5, Ala.Code 1975, a provision of the Child Protection Act (“the CPA”), which was amended and carried forward in the 2008 AJJA as § 12–15–317, Ala.Code 1975, now provides that “ ‘any ... parent... may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of a parent or parents of a child,’ ” 176 So.3d at 185, and that, although the proper forum is not set out in § 12–15–317, the remaining sections of the 2008 AJJA evidence an intent by the legislature to provide the juvenile court with jurisdiction over termination-of-parental-rights proceedings filed by a parent seeking to terminate the rights of the other parent. The dissent states:

“Did the enactment of the [2008] AJJA alter the formerly prevailing law under which parents could seek termination of parental rights in the juvenile court? Former § 26–18–5 has been carried forward into the [2008] AJJA and codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 12–15–317, which states that ‘any ... parent ... may file a petition to terminate the parental rights of a parent or parents of a child.’ Although the proper forum for filing such a petition is not therein stated, the Code sections that follow leave no doubt that the legislature intended that juvenile courts maintain their former exclusive jurisdiction to hear such matters. Taken together, the succeeding sections of the [2008] AJJA provide (a) for service of process by publication to be ordered in particular circumstances by the juvenile court(§ 12–15–318), (b) that termination of parental rights may be ordered by the juvenile courtupon a proper showing of grounds therefor (§ 12–15–319), and (c) that additional actions are authorized to be undertaken by the juvenile courtupon a determination that parents are unwilling or unable to act as parents (§ 12–15–320). I glean from the [2008] AJJA's repetitious references to the juvenile court in connection with disposition of cases in which termination of parental rights is sought, including cases in which a parent seeks such termination, that the legislature had no intent to deprive the juvenile court of its former exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate a termination-of-parental-rights claim such as that advanced by the mother in this case.”

176 So.3d at 185–86(Pittman, J., dissenting). The mother petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We reverse and remand.

Discussion

The 2008 AJJA, which became effective January 1, 2009, revised and reorganized the CPA, § 26–18–1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975. The CPA governed cases involving the termination of parental rights. The 2008 AJJA also revised and renumbered an earlier version of the Juvenile Justice Act. Former § 12–15–30(b)(2), for example, has been revised and is currently set out in § 12–15–115(a)(1)and (a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. Essentially, the 2008 AJJA merged the CPA and the former Juvenile Justice Act.

Under the former Juvenile Justice Act, § 12–15–30(a)provided that the juvenile court had exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings in which a child was alleged to be dependent, delinquent, or in need of supervision. Former § 12–15–30(b)(6) further provided that the juvenile court also had exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings for the “termination of parental rights.”

The CPA was enacted “to provided meaningful guidelines to be used by the juvenile court in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” § 26–18–2 (repealed). Under the CPA, § 26–18–5set out who could file a petition to terminate parental rights: “A petition may be filed by any public or private licensed child-placing agency or parent, with permission of the court, or any interested party.” § 26–18–5(repealed). The CPA was the first time the legislature had allowed a parent to initiate such an action. In Ex parte Johnson,474 So.2d 715 (Ala.1985), this Court held that former § 26–18–5 evidenced a legislative intent to allow a parent to initiate a termination petition:

“[T]here is no logical reason to allow only the state to file a petition to have parental rights terminated. Why should a parent, who has direct knowledge and familiarity with a situation, be required to go to the state to obtain such a result, when it would be more direct for the parent to file the petition?”

474 So.2d at 717.

Under the CPA, a finding of dependency was not required when one parent sought to terminate the parental rights of another parent. In Ex parte Beasley,564 So.2d 950, 954 (Ala.1990), we stated:

“[W]hen one parent seeks to terminate the other parent's parental rights, a ‘finding of dependency’ is not required. As stated above, if a ‘finding of dependency’ were a requisite element of proof, the following illogical result could arise: The petitioning parent, who is adequately caring for the child, would have to prove that he or she is not providing adequate care for the child and, therefore, could then be estopped from bringing such an action. We hold, therefore, that, when one parent seeks to terminate the other parent's parental rights, a ‘finding of dependency’ is not required, and the trial court should determine whether the petitioner has met the statutory burden of proof and whether that termination is in the child's best interest, in light of the surrounding circumstances.

“The two-prong test that a court must apply in a parental rights termination case brought by a custodial parent consists of the following: First, the court must find that there are grounds for the termination of parental rights, including, but not limited to, those specifically set forth in § 26–18–7 [now repealed]. Second, after the court has

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