C. Coakley Relocation v. City of Milwaukee

• Decision Date: 14 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006AP2292.,2006AP2292.
• Citation: 740 N.W.2d 636,2007 WI App 209
• Parties: C. COAKLEY RELOCATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,<SMALL><SUP>&#x2020;</SUP></SMALL> v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

740 N.W.2d 636

2007 WI App 209

C. COAKLEY RELOCATION SYSTEMS, INC., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,^† v. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 2006AP2292.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs June 05, 2007.

Opinion Filed August 14, 2007.

On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Donald J. Murn, Michelle E. Martin and Monica L. Walrach of Murn & Martin, S.C. of Waukesha.

On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the brief of Grant F. Langley, City Attorney and Gregg C. Hagopian, Assistant City Attorney of Milwaukee.

Before CURLEY, P.J., WEDEMEYER and KESSLER, JJ.

¶ 1 KESSLER, J

C. Coakley Relocation Systems, Inc. (Coakley) appeals from a judgment and an order dismissing its amended complaint which sought relocation payments and other damages from the City of Milwaukee. The trial court dismissed Coakley's amended complaint because it concluded that Coakley was entitled only to relocation payments authorized by WIS. STAT. ch. 32 and that the complaint seeking those payments was barred by the statute of limitations set out in WIS. STAT. § 32.20 (2003-04).¹ We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Roadster LLC, an affiliated company to Coakley, owned a parking lot which it leased to Coakley. On January 30, 2002, the City acquired the property leased to Coakley. On October 10, 2002, the City obtained a writ of assistance giving it the right to possession of the property. Coakley vacated the property on October 14, 2002.

¶ 3 The City had not made comparable property available to Coakley when it obtained the writ of assistance, nor had it tendered other relocation payments, because the City took the position that under WIS. STAT. § 32.19(2)(e), Coakley was not a "displaced person" and thus not entitled to relocation payments. Coakley appealed. On May 13, 2003, in City of Milwaukee v. Roadster LLC, 2003 WI App 131, 265 Wis.2d 518, 666 N.W.2d 524, we rejected the City's contention that Coakley was not a "displaced person" under § 32.19(2)(e)2.b., Roadster, 265 Wis.2d 518, ¶ 14, 666 N.W.2d 524, and concluded that under the statutes, Coakley was "entitled to a comparable replacement property" before the writ of assistance could be granted, id., ¶ 19, 666 N.W.2d 524. On remand, by stipulation between the City and Coakley, the case was dismissed without prejudice.

¶ 4 The City and Coakley negotiated, but did not reach agreement. On October 5, 2004, the City offered Coakley $30,000 to resolve the "lease of comparable replacement parking." Coakley refused the offer, and on December 13, 2004, served a notice of claim under WIS. STAT. § 893.80(1). The City did not respond. Coakley began this new action on September 29, 2005.

¶ 5 The City successfully moved to dismiss the first complaint. At that time, the trial court described the history of the litigation, observing that after remand from this court, the "invalid Writ of Assistance was of little, if any, importance to the City and . . . Coakley sought no relief directly related to the Writ of Assistance." On August 29, 2005, a release was signed by Coakley and its attorneys for the benefit of the City. The City was released from:

any and all litigation and other expenses claimable under Wis. Stat. § 32.28 and Wis. Stat. Ch. 814, arising out of, or relating to, (a) the case of Roadster LLC v. City of Milwaukee . . . and/or (b) to valuation for "just compensation" purposes of the . . . parking-lot property . . . and/or any diminution in or effect on value of either of those parcels due to . . . the City's exercise of eminent domain.

This release does not include any relocation benefits under Wis. Stat. § 32.19 to which Coakley may be entitled . . . as a result of 2003 WI App 131, 666 N.W.2d 524² . . . or to any litigation expenses or costs . . . arising out of or relating to said 2003 WI App 131, 666 N.W.2d 524 . . . or the issue of comparable replacement property under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(8)[ ], to all of which Coakley expressly reserves and retains its rights.

(Footnote added.)

¶ 6 The trial court described the three claims alleged in the first complaint in this action first as "declaratory and injunctive relief that the City has failed to provide relocation assistance and benefits as required by Roadster," second as "damages from the City's failure to provide relocation benefits and assistance," and third as "damages resulting from wrongful ejectment." The City moved to dismiss on the ground that a two-year statute of limitations found in WIS. STAT. § 32.20³ barred all claims. The trial court agreed, but only as to claims under WIS. STAT. § 32.19 and WIS. STAT. § 32.195. The trial court made the following findings:

I find that the City took physical possession of the property on October 14, 2002. . . . Coakley took no steps to undo the City's physical possession. . . . Under Section 32.20, all claims for itemized damages under 32.19 and 32.195 must actually accrue and must be asserted within two years of actual physical possession. Thus, the Statute of Limitations ran on October 14, 2004. . . .

. . . .

To the extent that the complaint asserts a claim for itemized damages under either 32.19 or 32.195, such claims are barred by 32.20. However, to the extent that the complaint asserts other damages . . . or seeks other relief, the Motion to Dismiss is denied.

¶ 7 The trial court analyzed relevant case law⁴ discussing these statutes, and concluded that nothing in prior decisions limited Coakley's rights under WIS. STAT. § 32.05 "to itemized damages under [WIS. STAT. § ]32.19." The trial court held that if Coakley "asserts claims for relief . . . under [WIS. STAT. § ]32.25,⁵ the two[-]year limitation does not apply," and permitted Coakley to file an amended complaint.

¶ 8 Coakley filed an amended complaint. The City filed another motion to dismiss. The amended complaint, after alleging the general history of the condemnation proceedings, the appeal, and the conduct between the parties after remand, set out five claims for relief.⁶ Coakley requested:

1. "Possession of the Third Street Parcel" (the parking lot Coakley leased from Roadster) based upon the City's violation of WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8)(b)-(c);

2. "Damages for Failure to Make Comparable Replacement Property Available" as required by § 32.05(8)(b)-(c);

3. "Damages for Wrongful Ejectment" from the parking lot;

4. "Declaratory and Injunctive Relief" pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 806.04 declaring the City violated § 32.05(8)(b)-(c) and ordering the City to provide comparable replacement property and relocation assistance benefits; and

5. A declaration that the City is estopped from relying on the requirement of WIS. STAT. § 32.20—which requires that a claim for relocation benefits under WIS. STAT. §§ 32.19 and 32.195 is to be filed with the condemning authority within two years of the date the authority takes possession of the property—because the City acknowledged its obligations as to replacement property and relocation benefits after remand, negotiated with Coakley as to those benefits, and did not advise Coakley that it would assert the two-year statute of limitations bar.

¶ 9 The trial court noted that it had earlier held that WIS. STAT. § 32.05(8) (referred to by the court as the writ of assistance statute) and cases interpreting that statute established that the statute "grants no rights, no substantive rights, beyond what the legislature has authorized in the relocation assistance statutes that are a part of Chapter 32." The trial court had also earlier held that the writ of assistance statute "does not otherwise create a cause of action for damages or for relief other than to the extent that such rights exist elsewhere in Chapter 32." The trial court reminded the parties that it dismissed the first complaint because "any claims under 32.19 and 32.195 were barred by the Statute of Limitations" set out in WIS. STAT. § 32.20. The trial court reviewed the amended complaint to determine whether any additional claims authorized by WIS. STAT. ch. 32, and not barred by the two-year limitation of § 32.20, were alleged. The trial court concluded that claims one through four (return of the property; damages for failure to comply with § 32.05(8); damages for wrongful ejectment; and an injunction requiring compliance with § 32.05(8)) all assert claims for damages described in WIS. STAT. §§ 32.19 or 32.195 and are barred by § 32.20. The fifth claim, for estoppel to bar the City from asserting the § 32.20 statute of limitations, the trial court interpreted as "essentially a request that [the court] revisit the Statute of Limitations' issue" or "a Motion to Reconsider on this ground of estoppel."

¶ 10 The trial court observed that the estoppel argument does not depend on the Roadster case or on the unusual circumstances here, but rather is an argument anyone entitled to relocation assistance could make; namely, that "if the City acknowledges a right to [the] assistance and works with the party to provide [the] assistance, [then the City] assumes the burden of notifying that party of the Statute of Limitations." The trial court rejected that argument, and instead applied the traditional criteria used to analyze an equitable estoppel claim. In discussing the equitable estoppel involving a statute of limitations, the trial court relied upon Johnson v. Johnson, 179 Wis.2d 574, 582, 508 N.W.2d 19 (Ct.App.1993), where we said: "[O]ur supreme court has stated that the elements necessary to apply equitable estoppel include fraud or inequitable conduct by the party asserting the statute of limitations and that the aggrieved party failed to commence an action within the statutory period because of reliance on the wrongful conduct." The trial court concluded that the elements of equitable estoppel have not been met because:

There's simply a claim that the City was working with Coakley, was acknowledging its...