A. C. E. Equipment Co. v. Erickson

• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: NELSON
• Citation: A. C. E. Equipment Co. v. Erickson, 152 N.W.2d 739, 277 Minn. 457 (Minn. 1967)
• Decision Date: 25 August 1967
• Docket Number: No. 40501,40501
• Parties: A.C.E. EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Donald A. ERICKSON, Chief Building Inspector of City of Minneapolis, Respondent.

Page 739

152 N.W.2d 739

277 Minn. 457

A.C.E. EQUIPMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Donald A. ERICKSON, Chief Building Inspector of City of Minneapolis, Respondent.

No. 40501.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 25, 1967.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The grant of power contained in Minn.St.1961, § 462.18, permits the governing body of the city of Minneapolis to regulate zoning by ordinance. Under the circumstances, the city has the power from the legislature to pass ordinances within the sphere of the grant in the manner provided by the city's Home Rule Charter. In purely local matters, such as zoning, the charter provisions prevail over general statutes regulating state-wide problems.

2. The general rule is that in matters of municipal concern home rule cities have all the legislative power possessed by the legislature of the state, save as such power is expressly or impliedly withheld. Such charter shall always be in harmony with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state, and when these requirements are met, the provisions of home rule charters upon all subjects proper for municipal regulations prevail over the general statutes relating to the same subject matter.

Affirmed.

Lewis L. Anderson, St. Paul, for appellant.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., D. J. Shama, Raymond Hegner, Asst. City Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

NELSON, Justice.

This is a declaratory judgment action wherein A.C.E. Equipment Company of Minnesota, Inc., seeks a determination that it is entitled to a building permit to construct a high-rise apartment building on its property in the city of Minneapolis.

For plaintiff to be permitted to construct a high-rise, multidwelling unit on its property, it is necessary that the property be rezoned. On May 8, 1964, the city council amended its zoning ordinance in such a way as to permit such construction. This amending ordinance was vetoed by the mayor of Minneapolis on May 15, 1964. Subsequent to the veto, the council repassed the ordinance by a vote of 7 to 5 but Minneapolis City Charter, c. 3, § 1, requires a two-thirds vote of the council to override a veto by the mayor. Defendant, Donald A. Erickson, the city's chief building inspector, has not issued a building permit to plaintiff because it is his view that the amendment to the zoning ordinance failed because of the mayor's veto. The trial court agreed and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether Minn.St.1961, § 462.18, the enabling legislation in force when this amendment was attempted, takes precedence over the Home Rule Charter provision for adopting zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. Plaintiff's argument is that § 462.18 requires a majority vote of the council for matters involving zoning and that the mayor had no power to veto the ordinance.

Section 462.18 provides as follows:

'* * * (a)ny city of the first class * * * acting by and through its governing body, may by ordinance regulate the location, size, and use of buildings * * * and may thereafter alter the regulations * * *, such alterations, however, to be made only * * * after the affirmative vote in favor thereof by a majority of the members of the governing body of any such city * * *.'

The grant of power contained in this section permits the governing body to regulate zoning by ordinance. Presumably, the city has the power from the legislature to pass ordinances that are within the sphere of the grant. The question ultimately then must be whether the language of the above-quoted statute is intended to displace the manner in which ordinances are passed as provided by the Home Rule Charter. Defendant contends that since the legislature granted the power and provided that its exercise should be by ordinance no further construction of § 462.18 is required. Secondly, defendant argues that in purely local matters, such as zoning, the charter provisions prevail over general statutes regulating state-wide problems.

Plaintiff, however, contends that § 462.18 sets forth the required procedure for passing zoning ordinances in Minneapolis. If this view is correct, then it would seem that the mayor has no veto power with respect to zoning ordinances.

We cannot accept plaintiff's view since § 462.18 grants to municipalities through their governing bodies the power to regulate zoning by local ordinance. This constitutes an explicit grant of power. Said statute does not dictate the method that the local body should utilize while exercising that power. Rather, the legislature has bestowed upon Minneapolis a charter which specifies how Minneapolis must operate in order to pass an ordinance, and the general statute must give way to the specific legislation. The Minneapolis City Charter is such specific legislation and as such its provisions control in the instant case.

2. In State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W.2d 81, we considered the charter of the city of Crookston, which provided that every resolution to be effective must be approved by the mayor. The city council of Crookston adopted a resolution calling for an election on an annexation petition which the mayor failed to approve until after the election had been held. Minn.St. 1957, § 413.12, in effect then, provided that 'the governing body' might call an election where an annexation petition had been filed, but we held that the charter provision prevailed and the annexation proceedings therefore were void.

The relator there contended that the pertinent charter provisions were mandatory and prevailed over the general statutes relating to that matter, while respondent city's position was that the provision of the charter requiring the approval of the mayor on all resolutions was contrary to the annexation statute and therefore ineffective. This court stated (252 Minn. 528, 91 N.W.2d 83):

'The general rule is that, in matters of municipal concern, home rule cities have all the legislative power possessed by the legislature of the state, save as such power is expressly or impliedly withheld. The adoption of any charter provision contrary to the public policy of the state, as disclosed by general laws or its penal code, is also forbidden. The power conferred upon cities to frame and adopt home rule charters is limited by the provision that 'such charter shall always be in harmony with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state.' Minn.Const. art. 4, § 36. But these limitations do not forbid the adoption of charter provisions as to any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of municipal affairs, although they may differ from those of existing general laws. The adoption of such a charter is legislation. Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940, 1133; Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627; State ex rel. Ryan v. District Court, 87 Minn. 146, 91 N.W. 300; State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. District Court, 90 Minn. 457, 97 N.W. 132.

'The provisions of home rule charters upon all subjects proper for municipal regulations prevail over the general statutes relating to the same subject matter, except in those cases above referred to. As stated in American Elec. Co. v. City of Waseca, 102 Minn. 329, 333, 113 N.W. 899,...