C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 15 August 1978
• Citation: 176 Conn. 11,404 A.2d 864
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: C & H ENTERPRISES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Page 864

404 A.2d 864

176 Conn. 11

C & H ENTERPRISES, INC. v.COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 8, 1978.

Decided Aug. 15, 1978.

Stanley Cohen, Hartford, for appellant(plaintiff).

John F. Gill, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellee(defendant).

COTTER, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and PETERS, JJ.

COTTER, Chief Justice.

Pursuant to a hearing, the defendant commissioner found that the plaintiff had violated § 14-66 ¹ of the General Statutesand§ 14-63-35² of the regulations of the motor vehicle department by engaging in the business of operating a wrecker for the purpose of towing, for compensation, a disabled motor vehicle when it did not have on file with the defendant a schedule of rates and charges.As a result of its decision, the defendant ordered that the plaintiff's repairer's license be suspended for a period of three days and that it post a $1000 bond.Following a dismissal of its appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, the plaintiff has appealed to this court.

Judicial review of the commissioner's action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act(General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted.Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, 372 A.2d 110.Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.Id., 707-708, 372 A.2d 110;General Statutes § 4-183(g).The credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual matters are within the province of the administrative agency, and we cannot disturb the commissioner's decision if it is reasonably supported by the evidence printed in the appendices to the briefs.

The testimony and the exhibits presented at a departmental hearing disclose the following facts: At approximately 12:45 a. m., on January 21, 1975, a state capitol police officer observed the operator of a Fiat automobile driving into a parking space on the grounds of the state capitol and revving up the motor.The operator left the car, and the officer, upon inspecting the vehicle, called the state police.At approximately 2:30 a. m., a state trooper arrived and examined the car, which was an older model Fiat with Vermont registration plates.The inside of the vehicle was "littered with junk," it was without taillights and was "pretty well smashed up," and there was a key in its ignition.The trooper was unable to start the vehicle and thereupon he radioed his department for a wrecker to tow the vehicle from the state capitol grounds.A wrecker belonging to the plaintiff arrived at the scene and towed the Fiat to the plaintiff's service station in Hartford.Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted a bill to the state police department in the amount of $87 for the towing and storage of the automobile at the request of the police.³

Since the plaintiff, in its brief, does not dispute the fact that it did not have a schedule of rates and charges on file with the defendant on the date in question, it is apparent that the above-recited facts amply support the conclusion that the plaintiff had violated § 14-66 of the General Statutesand§ 14-63-35 of the department's regulations and thereby warranted the suspension of the plaintiff's license as authorized by § 14-64(1) of the General Statutes.⁴SeeDemma v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 165 Conn. 15, 17, 327 A.2d 569.

The principal claim of the plaintiff is that § 14-66 of the General Statutesand§ 14-63-35 of the regulations of the motor vehicle department violate the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions because they require persons who engage in the business of operating wreckers for compensation to file with and for the defendant's approval of a schedule of rates to be charged for the storing of motor vehicles, but do not require such a filing by those not engaged in the business of operating wreckers for compensation but who also charge for storage of motor vehicles in the ordinary course of their business.Both provisions of the federal and state constitutions have substantially the same meaning and impose the same constitutional limitations;Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 639, 376 A.2d 359;they do not prevent the legislature from dealing differently with different classes of persons provided the statute and regulation do not constitute invidious discrimination;Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45;Karp v. Zoning Board, 156 Conn. 287, 294, 240 A.2d 845;they do not demand identical treatment for all persons without consideration of differences in relevant circumstances.Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254.

In C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 167 Conn. 304, 307-308, 355 A.2d 247, we upheld the constitutionality of § 14-66(a) as a valid exercise of the police power of the state insofar as it permits only licensed repairers and dealers to operate wreckers on the highways of this state.Likewise, the portion of § 14-66(a) and of the corresponding regulation challenged in the present case bears a rationale relationship to the preservation and promotion of the public welfare by protecting motorists who sustain breakdowns on the highways of this state against overcharges by those who engage in the business of towing disabled motor vehicles for compensation.Since those who, like the plaintiff, engage in the business of operating wreckers for compensation frequently pick up motor vehicles and transport them to storage areas without the knowledge or consent of the owners, the required filing of rates and charges serves the need of the public welfare "in a reasonable and impartial way."Id., 308, 355 A.2d 250.

In applying the equal protection clause to social and economic legislation, courts give great latitude to the legislature in making classifications.Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, reh. den., 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 65, 21 L.Ed.2d 185;State v. Kieveman, 116 Conn. 458, 467-68, 165 A. 601.The statute and regulation in question have a rational relationship to the...