C. & J. Commercial Driveway, Inc. v. Fid. & Guar. Fire Corp.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 149.,149. |
| Citation | 258 Mich. 624,242 N.W. 789 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | C. & J. COMMERCIAL DRIVEWAY, Inc., v. FIDELITY & GUARANTY FIRE CORPORATION. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Ingham County; Leland W. Carr, Judge.
Action by C. & J. Commercial Driveway, Inc., against the Fidelity & Guaranty Fire Corporation. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before the Entire Bench.Smith, Searl & Strawhecker, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Shields, Silsbee, Ballard & Jennings, of Lansing (Harris E. Thomas, of Lansing, of counsel), for appellee.
This is an action on an insurance policy to recover loss from injury to an automobile while it was being transported on a truck from Lansing, Mich., to Nashville, Tenn.
The truck was one of a number rented by the plaintiff for that purpose. It was loaded in the usual way with the front end of the forward automobile elevated above and at the rear of the cab. While the truck was passing over an old-fashioned, wooden, covered bridge near Bardstown, Ky., the front end of the forward automobile came in contact with an overhanging plank and was damaged. When requested to make good the loss, the defendant company denied liability on the ground that it was not covered by the policy. Hence this suit.
The issue involved the construction of a clause in the policy relative to an ‘accidental collision of the truck with any other automobile, vehicle or object.’ The truck proper did not come in contact with the bridge, but the plaintiff contended that a collision between the load on the truck and the bridge was a collision with the truck within the meaning of the policy. The defendant contended that by the clear and plainly expressed language of the policy its liability was limited to a collision of the truck itself with some other object. The trial court accepted the plaintiff's construction and entered a judgment in its favor for the full amount of the loss. The defendant has appealed.
On the face of the policy it is stated:
‘Property Insured
‘All lawful goods and merchandise consisting principally of automobiles, the property of the assured, or of others for which the assured may be legally liable as carriers, while loaded for shipment on and/or in ordinary course of transit in or on the following described automobile trucks owned and operated by the assured within the limits of the United States and Canada.
‘This insurance covers from the time the merchandise is loaded in or on such motortruck or trucks until unloaded therefrom.’
‘It is hereby understood and agreed that this policy is hereby extended to cover against loss by theft of an entire car, but under no circumstances shall this policy be construed to cover pilferage.
‘This policy also covers all loss or damage through loading and unloading.’
On the back of the policy in fair type is printed the following:
‘This Policy Insures
‘Loss or damage caused by
‘(A) Fire and lightning, including self ignition of the conveyance.
‘(B) Flood.
‘(C) Cyclone, tornado, earthquake, and explosion.
‘(D) Accidental collision of the truck with any other automobile, vehicle or object (excluding any loss or damage caused by coming in contact with any portion of the road bed or by striking rails or ties of streets, steam or electric railroad, or any loss or damage caused by coming in contact with any stationary object in backing for loading or unloading purposes).
‘(E) Overturning of truck and collapse of bridges.
‘(F) Stranding, sinking, fire or collision, including general average or salvage charges, when being transported on or in said trucks while on any regular ferry.’
As we pointed out in our statement of facts, this controversy arises over an interpretation of the language of subdivision (D): ‘Accidental collision of the truck with any other automobile, vehicle or object.’
The defendant insists that this language cannot be construed to extend liability to a collision of the load on the truck with an object; that there is no ambiguity in the language used; that there can be no construction contrary to its plain meaning which limits liability to a collision with the truck itself.
Standing by themselves the words are plain enough, but they...
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