C.L.D. v. Wall-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 December 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 98-694 (JRT/RLE).,CIV. 98-694 (JRT/RLE).
• Citation: 79 F.Supp.2d 1080
• Parties: C.L.D., Plaintiff, v. WALL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

79 F.Supp.2d 1080

C.L.D., Plaintiff, v. WALL-MART STORES, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV. 98-694 (JRT/RLE).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

December 30, 1999.

T Oliver Skillings, Halverson & Assoc, Mankato, MN, for C.L.D., plaintiff.

Andrew Louis Marshall, Jennifer L Hill, Bassford Lockhart Truesdell & Briggs, Minneapolis, MN, for Wal-Mart Stores Inc, defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TUNHEIM, District Judge.

Plaintiff C.L.D. brings this action against her former employer, defendant Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., alleging that one of her supervisors improperly disclosed private information to her co-workers. Plaintiff brings claims against defendant for tortious invasion of privacy, promissory estoppel, and violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. § 363.03. This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment against all claims.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for defendant in August 1995 as a cashier at one of its stores in Mankato, Minnesota. Defendant later promoted her to the position of customer service manager, in which she continued until her employment terminated in February 1997.

Upon beginning her employment defendant required plaintiff to sign two standardized documents setting forth its policies with regard to various employment matters. The first of these documents consists of a single page explaining defendant's policies and practices with regard to new employee probationary status, working hours, reductions in force, scheduling, and similar issues (the "New Associate Form"). The New Associate form also contains the following statement, which describes defendant's "Open Door Policy": "Wal-Mart has an Open Door Policy which encourages associates to discuss any matter freely, openly, and in confidence with their Store manager or other levels of Management. We encourage you to use this at anytime."

The other document that defendant required plaintiff to sign is a multi-page volume containing detailed explanations of defendant's history, policies and practices with regard to a broad range of topics including company goals, employee training, employee evaluations, transfers, personnel records, work ethics, profit sharing, on-the-job accidents and other issues related to employment (the "Associate Handbook"). The Associate Handbook further explains defendant's Open Door Policy as follows:

Our Open Door-Open Mind policy allows each of us the chance to be heard. It says that if you have an idea or problem, you can go to your Coach to talk about it without fear of retaliation. If you don't feel satisfied with the response, or if your Coach is the source of your problem, you can go to his or her supervisor.

You can go up to each level of management, including our Company's top leaders, with your idea or concern. Remember, while Open Door-Open Mind promises that you will be heard without retaliation, it cannot promise that your opinion will always prevail.

The Associate Handbook also contains a disclaimer indicating that the policies and benefits set forth therein are not terms and conditions of employment and that the handbook is not a contract. Plaintiff signed both the New Associate Form and the Associate Handbook on August 29, 1995, thereby acknowledging that she had read and understood them.

Sometime in September 1996 plaintiff learned that she was pregnant. She decided to terminate the pregnancy and scheduled an abortion in early October 1996. Plaintiff thereafter requested a medical leave of absence from defendant because it was necessary for her to take time off of work for the procedure. Plaintiff made her request to John Enright ("Enright"), an assistant manager on duty. Plaintiff met with Enright behind closed doors and told him that she needed a medical leave of absence. Although Enright approved the request without seeking further disclosure, plaintiff volunteered the fact that she was pregnant and "losing the baby." Plaintiff asserts that she made the voluntary disclosure because she felt psychological pressure from Enright to legitimize her request. Plaintiff concedes that she did not mention the Open Door Policy during her conversation with Enright or explicitly ask him to keep the matter in confidence.

Plaintiff alleges that when she returned from leave three employees at Wal-Mart knew that she had been pregnant and had an abortion, including Kay Schemmel ("Schemmel"), her immediate supervisor, Denita Blanshan ("Blanshan"), a co-worker, and Nancy McDonald ("McDonald"), another co-worker. Defendant has submitted evidence that calls this assertion into question, suggesting that the named individuals may not have learned of plaintiff's pregnancy until the following December after plaintiff admittedly began disclosing the information herself. Nevertheless, for purposes of this motion the Court views all factual disputes in the light most favorable to plaintiff. The Court for this reason assumes as true plaintiff's assertion that Schemmel, Blanshan and McDonald knew about her pregnancy when she returned to work.

In light of this assertion plaintiff contends that Enright told other Wal-Mart employees about her pregnancy and abortion, although Enright avers that he did not do so. Plaintiff concedes that she lacks direct evidence that Enright disclosed the nature of her medical leave to any other Wal-Mart employee. She asserts, however, that at the time of her return from medical leave she had only told a few individuals about her pregnancy, including Enright, her physician, and two friends whom she asked to drive her to the abortion clinic. Plaintiff thus infers that because Enright was the only Wal-Mart employee whom she told about her situation, and because other people at Wal-Mart learned of it, Enright must have been the source of their information.

Plaintiff concedes that in early December 1996 she voluntarily disclosed her pregnancy to other Wal-Mart employees. She nevertheless contends that she was forced to do so to defend herself against rumors about her that had already been spread.

Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment with Wal-Mart in February 1997. Her decision to leave followed a romantic affair in December with a Wal-Mart employee, Jeffrey Meyerhoffer ("Meyerhoffer"), who was also involved with another Wal-Mart employee, Anne Thamert ("Thamert"). Schemmel avers that, prior to quitting her job, plaintiff told her that she could no longer work with Meyerhoffer and Thamert. Schemmel further avers that plaintiff did not mention the rumors about her pregnancy as a reason for her decision to leave.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir.1980). The nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, however, but must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Burst v. Adolph Coors Co., 650 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir.1981).

II. Tortious Invasion of Privacy

The Minnesota Supreme Court recently recognized the tort of invasion of privacy to be a cognizable claim in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes four distinct causes of action falling within the scope of this tort, including intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of name or likeness, publication of private facts, and false light publicity. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A. The court in Lake recognized all of these causes of action with the exception of false light publicity. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 236. Of the remaining three classes of this tort, only publication of private facts is applicable to plaintiff's allegations.¹

Publication of private facts occurs when a party "gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another ... if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977)). Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss plaintiff's claim on the ground that she has failed to show that the information at issue was "publicized" as that term is defined in the context of this tort.

The relevant Minnesota cases offer no guidance regarding what facts an invasion of privacy tort claimant must allege in order to satisfy the burden of showing that "publicity" or "publication" of private information has occurred. Aside from recognizing the legitimacy of the invasion of privacy tort, the court in Lake declined to apply it to the case at bar. Indeed the court did not even address which, if any, of the three causes of actions recognized might apply, thus leaving the merits of the plaintiff's claims wholly for the trial court to determine on remand. See id. at 236. Lake thus conferred upon other courts the task of defining the contours of these newly recognized causes of action.

Lacking instruction on this issue from the courts of Minnesota, the Court looks to other sources for guidance. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides...