C.N. Robinson & Co. v. Green

• Citation: 148 Ala. 434,43 So. 797
• Parties: C. N. ROBINSON & CO. ET AL. v. GREEN. [*]
• Decision Date: 28 April 1906
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

43 So. 797

148 Ala. 434

C. N. ROBINSON & CO. ET AL. v. GREEN. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 28, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, Limestone County; Paul Speake, Judge.

Action by Adam Green against C. N. Robinson & Co. and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

The case made by the pleadings is that the appellee went to the plantation of appellants under a presumed contract to herd and drive some cattle from this plantation to Decatur, and after reaching the plantation was detained under guard by the agent in charge of the place for more than two years, and caused to work and labor without pay for a period of time named in the complaint. The third count was for false imprisonment. The pleas were not guilty and the statute of limitations for six years. Replication was filed to the plea of statute of limitations, setting up that at the time the right of action accrued the plaintiff was a minor, and brought his action within three years after obtaining his majority. A good many exceptions were reserved to evidence touching the question of the agency of Peebles, who it is alleged was the agent of defendants and detained the plaintiff. There was considerable evidence introduced to show that the plaintiff had an opportunity of leaving at any time during the two years, and that he remained there as a farm laborer. There was also evidence tending to show that Robinson was there two or three times a week, and knew the condition surrounding the farm, and, when any complaint was made, directed him to go to Peebles. The facts of the case are set out in the opinion. The following charges were requested by the defendants, and refused: "(7) I charge you that the fact that Buster Peebles was the agent or overseer of defendants' farm on the island would not bind defendants for any act of said Peebles outside of the scope of his authority; and if you believe that it was not within the scope of his authority to arrest plaintiff and detain him against his will, defendants would not be liable for such acts, unless they knew of them and ratified them. * * * (9) I charge you that the employment by defendants of Buster Peebles as an agent or farm overseer did not render them liable for the unlawful acts of said Peebles, unless such unlawful acts were expressly authorized by the defendant, or known and ratified by them. (10) I charge you that it is not within the scope of an agent's authority as a farm overseer to unlawfully imprison a man or detain him against his will, and defendants would not be liable for the unlawful detention or arrest of plaintiff, unless they expressly authorized such an arrest or detention, or knew of and ratified it. (11) I charge you that every agency is presumed to be lawful, and the principal is not liable for the unlawful acts of the agent, unless such acts were expressly authorized by him, or known of and ratified by him; and the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in this case to show that the acts of Peebles were authorized or ratified by defendants, and, unless you believe from the evidence that the acts complained of were authorized or ratified by defendants, plaintiff cannot recover. * * * (16) If the jury believe the evidence, they must find for the defendants under the first count of the complaint." (17) Affirmative charge as to the second count. (18) Affirmative charge as to the third count. Charge 23, given at the request of defendants, was as follows: "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the defendants are not liable for the unauthorized act of Peebles, done or committed outside the scope of his employment, unless you believe from the evidence that such unlawful acts were known to and ratified by the defendants." It was shown in the testimony, and not disputed, that plaintiff was taken away from the farm by the sheriff under arrest on a process gotten out for his release. There was a jury, and verdict for plaintiff for the sum of $1,500, and defendant appeals.

T. C McClellan and Cooper & Foster, for appellants.

W. R Walker and Callahan & Harris, for appellee.

HARALSON J.

We consider the assignments of error as presented by defendants' counsel.

If the fact of agency or the authority of an agent and its extent is not evidenced by a written instrument, but rests in parol and is a matter of dispute, it becomes a question of fact to be determined by the jury from the evidence. Whatever evidence tends to prove the agency is admissible. Birmingham M. R. R. Co. v. T. C. I. & R. Co., 127 Ala. 137, 28 So. 679; S. & N. A. R. R. Co. v Henlein, 52 Ala. 610, 23 Am. Rep. 578.

It is not necessary to a principal's liability in false imprisonment, that the agent's authority should be expressly conferred, or that the particular act complained of should have been authorized. The authority would be implied from his relation to the principal, the nature of his employment, and the mode in which he was permitted to conduct the business. Talladega Insu. Co. v. Peacock, 67 Ala. 264; 12 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 771, and authorities there cited.

Charge 7, asked by defendants, was not improperly refused. It assumes that Peebles arrested and detained plaintiff. There is no evidence that Peebles arrested plaintiff, and the charge is abstract and misleading in this particular. Furthermore, the defendants had the full benefit of this charge, in the one given for them numbered 23, a substantial duplication of this charge.

Charges 9, 10 and 11 lay down the proposition, that defendants would not be liable for the acts of their agent, unless his acts were expressly authorized. As has been shown, the principal is liable for the acts of his agent, if impliedly authorized. Authorities supra. See, also, charge 23, given for defendants.

The evidence was in conflict and the general charge numbered 1, asked by defendants, was properly refused, as will more fully appear hereafter.

The second charge is argumentative and lays stress on one particular fact. Besides, this is but a substantial duplication of charge 4, given for defendants.

Charges 16, 17 and 18 are not insisted on in argument, and objections to them are, therefore, waived.

The defendants had the full benefit of charge 22, and when most favorably construed for defendants, was substantially duplicated in charge 23, given for defendants. Besides, the charge ignores the ratification by defendants, of which there was evidence.

The evidence tended to show, that plaintiff was induced to go to the defendants' island in May, 1897, to drive, or help to drive some cattle back to Decatur; that Peebles was there in charge of the island and farm, and defendants were not there at the time; that the party, consisting of plaintiff and three other negroes, and the driver of the hack, one Brooks arrived at the island about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Plaintiff, on his examination was asked by his attorney, "What conversation did you have with Peebles, the morning after you went to the island?" The question was objected to on many grounds, among them, that it did not appear that either of the defendants were present; that it did not appear that Peebles was acting within the scope of his employment as agent. The answer was, that next morning he asked Peebles, "Where were the cattle he was to drive over to Decatur?" that the reply was, the cattle would be up about noon, and for plaintiff to go to work until that time, and plaintiff worked till noon, and then again asked Peebles about the cattle, and he replied with an oath, "that he had better get a hoe and cut them corn stalks." The object of the evidence called for by the question was, to show the authority of Peebles, and his participation in the...