C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 00-1072(NHP).,CIV. A. 00-1072(NHP).
• Citation: 146 F.Supp.2d 528
• Parties: C.N., individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of J.N., et al., v. RIDGEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

146 F.Supp.2d 528

C.N., individually and as Guardian Ad Litem of J.N., et al., v. RIDGEWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.

No. CIV. A. 00-1072(NHP).

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

February 15, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

F. Michael Daily, Jr., Quinlan Dunne & Daily, Merchantville, NJ, for Plaintiffs C.N., L.M., and M.E.

David B. Rubin, Metuchen, NJ, for Defendants Ridgewood Board of Education, Frederick J. Stokley, Joyce Snider, Ronald Verdicchio, Robert Weakley, John Mucciolo, Anthony Bencivenga, and Sheila Brogan.

OPINION

POLITAN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court heard oral argument on September 18, 2000. For the reasons explained below, the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. This case is now CLOSED.

BACKGROUND

It is said that no good deed goes unpunished, or, at least in this case, unlitigated. The plaintiffs in this action, all residents of the Village of Ridgewood, are the parents of three minor girls who attend Ridgewood public schools. C.N. is the mother of plaintiff J.N., age 15; L.M. is the mother of plaintiff V.M., age 12; and M.E. is the mother of plaintiff J.E., age 17.¹ At the time the events surrounding this action occurred, J.N. and J.E. were students at Ridgewood High School and V.M. was a student at the Benjamin Franklin Middle School. Defendants are the Ridgewood Board of Education and several school administrators, including Frederick J. Stokley, Superintendent of schools; Joyce Snider, Assistant Superintendent; Ronald Verdicchio, member of the central administration; Robert Weakley, Director of Human Resources; John Mucciolo, Ridgewood High School Principal; Anthony Bencivenga, Benjamin Franklin Middle School Principal; and Sheila Brogan, President of the Board of Education.

In September 1998, an organization called the Human Resources Coordinating Council ("HRCC") in Ridgewood, which is comprised of public and private social service agencies, assembled a group of community members whose purpose was to assess the needs and interests of Ridgewood's youth. The group concluded that it was necessary for Ridgewood to survey the student population to gain insight into the needs, attitudes, and behavior patterns of the town's youth.² The group met with public organizations and private citizens throughout 1999 and elicited comment regarding the survey. The HRCC created a "Vision Team" to supervise the project, which included thirty persons from every sector of the community, including school officials and one student. Prior to the culmination of the 1998-99 school year, the Superintendent, Frederick J. Stokley, notified all parents in May 1999 that the survey would be administered in the fall of 1999, and stated the reasons behind the survey. On September 1, 1999, Superintendent Stokley again notified all parents of the survey and advised that the survey was voluntary and anonymous.

The survey itself is fairly extensive but apparently was to be filled out anonymously. There is no space for a student's name or a code, and students were instructed not to place their names or make any distinguishing marks on the paper.³ The survey, produced by the Search Institute of Minneapolis, Minnesota, consisted of 156 questions. Students answered each question by using a pencil to fill the circle which corresponded to the appropriate answer, such as "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Not Sure," "Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree." Some of these questions included the following:

40. I get along well with my parents.

43. If I break one of my parent's rules, I usually get punished.

45. It is against my values to have sex while I am a teenager.

Other questions asked the students whether they had, in the past twelve months, engaged in certain activities. A student responded to these questions by similarly filling a circle corresponding to the appropriate answer, such as "Never," "Once," "Twice," "3-4 Times," or "5 or More Times." These questions included some of the following:

56. Stolen something from a store.

57. Gotten into trouble with the police.

58. Hit or beat up someone.

59. Damaged property just for fun (such as breaking windows, scratching a car, putting paint on walls, etc.).

Still other questions asked students how many times over the last two weeks they had imbibed alcohol, specific types of drugs, or had driven a vehicle after drinking alcohol. Further areas covered by the survey included violent and criminal behavior and sexual activity and proclivities.

The survey was administered to students at the Benjamin Franklin Middle School on October 13, 1999, and to students at the Ridgewood High School on November 2, 1999. On March 6, 2000, plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a deprivation of rights secured by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Family Educational Records Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g ("FERPA"), and the Protection of Pupils Rights Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232h ("PPRA"). The plaintiffs argue that the survey was highly invasive of the students' privacy and that the Board did not properly and adequately notify the parents and the students that the survey was voluntary and anonymous. Specifically, plaintiffs complain that the Board did not obtain written consent from the parent and/or parents of each student.

Additionally, plaintiffs allege that prior to the administration of the survey the defendants failed to notify parents as to how and when the survey would be administered, how students could elect not to participate, how nonparticipating students would be accommodated, whether parental consent would be required before their child could take the survey, whether parents had a right to object to their child taking the survey, how parents could object to their child taking the survey, and whether certain questions would be subject to a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs have filed for preliminary injunctive relief, while defendants have moved for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because summary judgment is appropriate, plaintiffs' preliminary injunction request is denied.

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, for which that party will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Whether a fact is material is determined by the applicable substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue involving a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Healy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1219 n. 3 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989). Once that burden has been met, the nonmoving party must set forth "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court must resolve "all inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility .... against the moving party." Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir.1972)).

Further, the nonmovant must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. An issue is "material" only if the dispute "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To defeat "a properly supported summary judgment motion, the party opposing it must present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in its favor." Groman v. Tp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995). Accordingly, the party opposing summary judgment may not merely restate the allegations of its pleadings. See Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F.Supp. 1335, 1339 (M.D.Pa.1988). Moreover, a party cannot rely upon self-serving conclusions, unsupported by specific facts in the record. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the record, as a whole, cannot "lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

II. § 1983 Action Against the Board of Education

The touchstone of a Section 1983 action against a local government body is an allegation that official policy or custom is responsible for the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). "[M]unicipal liability under § 1983 attaches where-and only where-a deliberate choice to...