C.T., In Interest of, 82-1722

• Decision Date: 29 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1722,82-1722
• Citation: 458 N.E.2d 1089,120 Ill.App.3d 922,76 Ill.Dec. 435
• Parties: , 76 Ill.Dec. 435 In the Interest of C.T., a minor. (The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.T., a minor, Respondent-Appellee.)
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1089

458 N.E.2d 1089

120 Ill.App.3d 922, 76 Ill.Dec. 435

In the Interest of C.T., a minor.

(The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C.T., a minor, Respondent-Appellee.)

No. 82-1722.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fourth Division.

Dec. 29, 1983.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County (Michael E. Shabat, Bruce A. Cardello, Denise O'Malley, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for petitioner-appellant.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County (Kathleen M. McGinnis, Asst. Public Defender), for respondent-appellee.

ROMITI, Presiding Justice:

This case represents an appeal by the State of a juvenile court's orders which denied the State's request for a continuance and dismissed its petition for adjudication of wardship of a minor, C.T., on the grounds that an additional continuance would constitute a violation of due process. The sole issue presented for review is whether a juvenile court has the authority to dismiss such a petition, and if so whether dismissal was justified in the action under consideration here. We find that although a juvenile court has the power to dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship, the facts in this case do not support the court's action. We therefore reverse and remand.

The State filed its petition for adjudication of wardship in the Cook County Juvenile Court on January 12, 1982, alleging that the minor had committed three offenses in violation of certain provisions of the Illinois Criminal Code. A hearing on this petition was scheduled for March 2, 1982.

On that date, the State amended its petition to delete two of the allegations of delinquent conduct made therein and to add in their stead two new offenses. The minor's attorney requested a continuance of the hearing in order to prepare a defense against the new charges, which the court granted. The new hearing date was set for April 1, 1982, and marked "final" for both parties on that day.

The minor's attorney was unable to appear in court on April 1, however, because of illness. The court therefore granted the motion for a continuance presented by substituting counsel, who also informed both the court and opposing counsel of the minor's intention to file a motion to suppress certain evidence. The court scheduled the hearing regarding both the motion to suppress and the petition for May 17, 1982 and again marked the action final for both sides. The written motion to suppress evidence was subsequently filed before that date.

On May 17, the State requested a continuance because one of its principal witnesses, the police officer who had taken the statements of the victims of the minor's allegedly delinquent conduct, had not appeared to testify. The minor's attorney made an oral motion to the court to dismiss the petition. In response, the State informed the court that the officer had been present on each previous hearing date and had been advised that the next hearing was to take place on May 17. The State also stated that the officer had originally requested that she be served with a subpoena to testify on May 17; when counsel for the State advised her that this would likely be very difficult, the officer suggested that counsel telephone her at the stationhouse on the morning of May 17 to advise her that the hearing was still scheduled for that date, and that she would then appear in court to testify on the matter. Counsel for the State informed the court that the officer could not be found at the stationhouse, that the particular day in question was apparently the officer's day off, and that telephone calls to the officer's residence went unanswered. The court offered to allow the State to strike the petition with leave to refile, which the State refused. The court then passed the case to allow additional time to locate the witness. When the case was subsequently called, counsel for the State did not appear. The court thereupon dismissed the petition.

Four days later, on May 2, the court granted the State leave to file a motion to reconsider its dismissal order. At the hearing on this motion on June 18, the court heard oral arguments from both parties based on the State's written petition in support of its motion. The court found that it had the authority to deny the State's request for a continuance and that any further delay would have amounted to a violation of due process, and denied the State's motion to reconsider its dismissal order. The State thereupon filed a timely appeal to this court.

The court below relied on People v. Lawson (1977), 67 Ill.2d 449, 10 Ill.Dec. 478, 367 N.E.2d 1244, in reaching its conclusion that it had the authority to dismiss the petition on the grounds that additional delay would have violated due process. In Lawson, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a trial court may dismiss a criminal complaint or indictment where delays have actually and substantially prejudiced the defendant in clear violation of due process requirements. (67 Ill.2d at 456, 10 Ill.Dec. 478, 481, 367 N.E.2d 1244, 1247.) The State contends alternatively that Lawson is inapplicable to the case under review here, or if applicable, that its standard for dismissal on due process grounds has not been satisfied.

The recognition that the guarantees of due process of law apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings is too well established to be open to dispute. (Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; In re Urbasek (1967), 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716. See generally Scott, "Delinquency and Due Process: A Review of Illinois Law," 59 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 123 (1982).) This recognition is itself founded on the equally well established notion that the juvenile court's primary function is to ensure that the best interests of the minor respondent, his family, and society are served (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 37, par. 701-2 (purpose and policy of Juvenile Court Act); see also In re Beasley (1977), 66 Ill.2d 385, 389, 6 Ill.Dec. 202, 204, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016, 98 S.Ct. 734, 54 L.Ed.2d 761; People v. Hackman (1971), 1 Ill.App.3d 1030, 1032, 275 N.E.2d 488, 489-90), and that this result obtain in a manner that comports with the concepts of fairness and impartiality. (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1985, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 659; People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill.2d 289, 298, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 109, 391 N.E.2d 366, 372. See also In re Peevy (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 579, 581, 2 Ill.Dec. 101, 103, 357 N.E.2d 78, 80.) It is elemental that this spirit of fairness which is the linchpin of the juvenile delinquency process is the same notion of fairness of trial which forms the fundamental basis for the processes of adult criminal justice. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 365, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 376. To hold that under Lawson a criminal court has the authority to dismiss a complaint or indictment because of a due process violation, while a juvenile delinquency court lacks the power to dismiss a petition on identical grounds, would effectively undermine the juvenile court's duty to ensure that such proceedings are conducted in accordance with this essential notion of fairness. This court therefore rejects the State's contention that People v. Lawson is not applicable to the case at bar.

That Lawson differs on its facts from the action under consideration here does not alter this result, as the State contends. The facts in Lawson pertained to the period of time intervening between the commission of an alleged offense and the defendant's indictment therefor; the court determined that a substantial delay between these two events could result in substantial prejudice to a defendant in violation of due process which would warrant a trial court's dismissal of the indictment. The State claims that because Lawson dealt with pre-indictment delay as a due process violation, it is distinguishable from the present action and therefore inapposite. This argument is spurious, however, as it is based on an assumption that due process guarantees are applicable only during a period of pre-indictment delay but not subsequent thereto. "The obligation of a court to insure due process, and its inherent authority to dismiss an indictment to remedy a violation thereof, cannot be made to depend upon whether the violation occurred before or after the indictment was issued." People v. Adams (1978), 59 Ill.App.3d 590, 593, 16 Ill.Dec. 786, 788, 375 N.E.2d 893, 895.

In addition, we reject the State's claim that Lawson is inapplicable because it was an interpretation of section 114-1 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 114-1) which the State argues is not applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Lawson was not an expansion of the grounds for dismissal beyond those listed in section 114-1, as the State contends. Rather, it stands for the proposition that the listing of grounds set forth in this section leaves undiminished a court's inherent authority to dismiss an action for violations of due process, and recognized that such authority exists independently from the power granted the courts through section 114-1 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure. (People v. Rodgers (1982), 92 Ill.2d 283, 65 Ill.Dec. 929, 442 N.E.2d 240; People v. Wolfe (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 841, 70 Ill.Dec. 633, 449 N.E.2d 980; People v. Mack (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 164, 62 Ill.Dec. 869, 437 N.E.2d 396; People v. Tomasello (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 588, 54 Ill.Dec. 35, 424 N.E.2d 785; People v. Marbly (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 935, 41 Ill.Dec. 223, 407 N.E.2d 721; People v. Stuckey (1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 1085, 34 Ill.Dec. 422, 398 N.E.2d 97; People v. Lipp (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 1034, 20 Ill.Dec. 798, 380 N.E.2d 1007.) As we have already determined, a juvenile court possesses a similar inherent authority to dismiss a...