C.T. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.

Decision Date30 December 2022
Docket Number2:21-cv-05022
PartiesC.T., an individual, Plaintiff, v. RED ROOF INNS, INC., et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Elizabeth P. Deavers Magistrate Judge

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before this Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (ECF No. 162). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED. In accord with this Court's February 16, 2021 Opinion and Order (ECF No. 127), this matter is hereby TRANSFERRED to the Middle District of Florida.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

Plaintiff C.T. alleges she was trafficked for sex from approximately 2008 to 2010 at Days Inn, Travelodge, Best Western, La Quinta, and Red Roof Inn properties in the Fort Myers, Florida area. (ECF No. 65, ¶ 143). At the relevant time, these hotels were owned, supervised, or and/or operated by Defendants Red Roof Inns, Inc. (Red Roof), Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Inc. (“Wyndham”), Best Western International, Inc. (“BWI”), La Quinta Holdings, Inc. (“LQH”), La Quinta Franchising, LLC (“LQF”), and La Quinta Management, LLC (“LQM”). (Id., ¶¶ 11-14) Plaintiff now seeks to hold these hotels liable under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).

Plaintiff alleges that these hotel Defendants knew that sex trafficking occurred frequently on their properties and failed to prevent it, and that they knew or should have known of C.T.'s trafficking. Plaintiff points to behavior that she alleges hotel staff should have recognized as signs of her trafficking: physical signs including physical deterioration, bruising, and lack of eye contact, and common indicators of commercial sex activity. (Id., ¶¶ 148-153). C.T. alleges that these hotels and their parent companies did not take adequate measures to prevent human trafficking and demonstrated “actual and/or constructive knowledge of the rampant culture of sex trafficking.” (Id., ¶¶ 135, 138(o), 139(1), 140(k), 141(1)).

Plaintiff also argues that the Hotel Defendants have been participating in an industry-wide conspiracy to respond inadequately to sex trafficking. She alleges that state and national trade associations, such as Defendants Ohio Hotel Lodging Association (“OHLA”) and American Hotel & Lodging Association (“AHLA”), served as a forum for the alleged co-conspirators to discuss efforts related to human trafficking and avoiding compliance with federal trafficking laws. (Id., ¶¶ 55-56, 58). She also alleges that Defendants' employees exchanged emails related to sex trafficking during the relevant time period. (Id., ¶ 50). C.T. contends that the collective failure of Defendants “to articulate a policy, process, or procedure that would measure the extent of the trafficking problem at their branded locations” is the result of the industry wide conspiracy. (Id., ¶ 62). She maintains that the Hotel Defendants “collectively conspired and declined to implement policies that would likely have the effect of reducing the billions of dollars in sex trafficking profits.” (Id., ¶ 63).

B. Procedural Background

C.T. filed her Complaint against the Hotel Defendants on December 8, 2019. (ECF No. 1). In early 2020, the Hotel Defendants filed motions to dismiss the action. (ECF Nos. 19, 23, 24, 51).

C.T. then sought leave to file an amended complaint, which the Magistrate Judge granted. (ECF Nos. 54, 64). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint added conspiracy allegations against the Hotel Defendants and added OHLA and AHLA as additional defendants. (ECF No. 65). Subsequently, the Hotel Defendants and OHLA filed renewed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint and alternative Motions to Transfer. (ECF Nos. 73, 79, 80, 103).

On February 16, 2021, this Court issued its Opinion and Order on the Motions to Dismiss, finding that it did not have general or specific personal jurisdiction over BWI and Wyndham, the out-of-state defendants, on the facts alleged. (ECF No. 127 at 13). In reaching its holding on personal jurisdiction, this Court found that C.T. had not adequately alleged “conspiracy jurisdiction.” (Id. at 11-13). Further, this Court determined that the word “extraterritorial” in § 1596 of the TVPRA, the provision Plaintiff argued provided independent grounds for nationwide service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(C), served only to allow Plaintiff to bring suit for conduct occurring outside the United States. (Id. at 7). Rather than dismiss BWI and Wyndham as parties to the litigation, this Court granted their motions to transfer venue to the Middle District of Florida. (Id. at 13-15).

That same day, C.T. filed a Notice of Intent to File for Reconsideration and/or Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (ECF No. 128), which she subsequently filed on March 2, 2021 (ECF No. 129). Plaintiff specifically sought clarification of this Court's previous opinion insofar as it did not directly address Plaintiff's argument that the TVPRA provides for nationwide service of process. (ECF No. 134 at 12). This Court held in abeyance the transfer of the case while it considered Plaintiff's Motion. On July 1, 2021, this Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification, Reconsideration, and/or to Amend the Complaint and transferred the case to the Middle District of Florida. (ECF No. 134). This Court disagreed with Plaintiff's argument that § 1595 of the TVPRA provided for nationwide service of process, reasoning that such a reading directly contradicted basic principles of statutory interpretation because the provision actually provided for a grant of subject-matter jurisdiction over potential perpetrators of offenses committed extraterritorially already present in a U.S. jurisdiction. (Id. at 18). Also, the construction of this provision of the TVPRA was inapposite with the majority of other federal statutes cited in which Congress specifically provided for nationwide service of process. (Id. at 20).

The case was transferred to the Middle District of Florida on July 1, 2021. (ECF No. 136). On July 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal concerning this Court's July 1, 2021 order. (ECF No. 149 at 3). Plaintiff filed a notice with the Middle District of Florida that she had filed an appeal with the Sixth Circuit (ECF No. 142), and that court stayed the matter pending further order and notification that the appeal in the Sixth Circuit was resolved. (ECF No. 143). On August 3, 2021, C.T. filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of that appeal, which motion was granted by the Sixth Circuit. See C.T. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc. et al., No. 2:19-cv-5384, 2021 WL 2942483 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-3635, 2021 WL 4739619 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2021). On August 5, 2021, without informing the Middle District of Florida that the appeal had been dismissed (ECF No. 156 at 4), C.T. filed a Motion to Change Venue back to the Southern District of Ohio to allow this Court to consider “permitting the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to review the Nationwide Service of Process issue under the TVPRA.” (ECF No. 149). On September 30, 2021, the Middle District of Florida granted Plaintiff's motion to transfer the case back to the Southern District of Ohio to allow this Court to consider C.T.'s petition for interlocutory appeal. (ECF No. 156). The case was transferred on October 1, 2021. (ECF No. 157).

On June 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) asking this court to certify for appeal the following question: “Whether Section 1596 of the TVPRA authorizes nationwide service of process.” (ECF No. 162). Defendants BWI, Red Roof, and Wyndham responded in opposition and Plaintiff replied. (ECF Nos. 165, 166, 167, 168). Therefore, this matter is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Interlocutory appeals are generally disfavored and are reserved for “exceptional cases.” In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2002). As [a]ttractive as it may be to refer difficult matters to a higher court for advance decision, such a course of action is contrary to our system of jurisprudence.” U.S. ex rel. Elliott v. Brickman Group Ltd., LLC, 845 F.Supp.2d 858, 863 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Alexander v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 627, 639 (E.D. Tenn. 2009)). As the Sixth Circuit long has held, the legislative history of § 1292(b) makes it “quite apparent” that the statute should be “sparingly applied,” as it is “not intended to open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory orders in ordinary litigation.” Kraus v. Bd. of Cnty. Road Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966). A party seeking certification “has the burden of showing exceptional circumstances exist warranting an interlocutory appeal.” Alexander v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 663 F.Supp.2d 627, 639 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2009).

Under § 1292(b), this Court may certify an interlocutory appeal only when three criteria are satisfied: (1) the “order involves a controlling question of law”; (2) “there is substantial ground for difference of opinion”; and (3) “an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); Cook v. Erie Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1056626, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2021). If any of these factors is absent, the certification cannot issue. Additionally, “doubts regarding appealability should be resolved in favor of finding that the interlocutory order is not appealable.” In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 2020 WL 3547011, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 30, 2020) (internal quotation omitted).

[E]ven where the statutory criteria are met,” the Court still retains “broad...

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