C. v. C. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 11 January 1973
• Citation: 29 Cal.App.3d 909,106 Cal.Rptr. 123
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: C.V.C. et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Respondent; DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE OF the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 13748.

Page 123

106 Cal.Rptr. 123

29 Cal.App.3d 909

C.V.C. et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, Respondent DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE OF the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 13748.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 11, 1973.

Frederick W. Stephenson, Sacramento, for petitioners.

Karlton, Blease & Vanderlaan, Sacramento, amicus curiae for American Civil Liberty Union.

John Heinrich, Sacramento County Counsel, Sacramento, for real party in interest.

FRIEDMAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

This mandate proceeding poses novel questions as to the rights of prospective adoptive parents whose status is terminated by the placement agency's demand for the child's return--whether the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles the prospective parents to pre-termination notice and hearing; whether judicial review entails a de novo decision supported by the weight of the evidence or a narrower inquiry into the agency's abuse of discretion.

In November 1971 the Sacramento County Department of Social Welfare, a licensed adoption agency, placed in 18-month-old girl with Mr. and Mrs. C (the petitioners in this action) as prospective adoptive parents. In July 1972 the department notified petitioners that the placement 'is hereby cancelled.' Thereafter it demanded the child's return and filed a habeas corpus petition in the Sacramento Superior Court to enforce its demand. Mr. and Mrs. C filed a mandate petition, seeking review of the agency's decision. The two actions were consolidated for hearing. After receiving evidence the superior court on October 10, 1972, entered an order finding that the county agency had not abused its discretion and directing Mr. and Mrs. C to return the child.

The Cs filed a notice of appeal. The court refused to stay enforcement of its order and the child was taken from the Cs on October 13, 1972. Mr. and Mrs. C then petitioned this court for a writ of supersedeas. We refused supersedeas (see Superior Court v. Dist. Court of Appeal (1966) 65 Cal.2d 293, 54 Cal.Rptr. 119, 419 P.2d 183), but chose to regard the petition as one for a writ of mandate seeking annulment of the superior court's order. In adoption cases appellate courts grant relief by mandate in order to accelerate the child's ultimate placement in a permanent and stable environment. (San Diego County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 1, 9, 101 Cal.Rptr. 541, 496 P.2d 453.) We issued an order to show cause addressed to the superior court as respondent and the county Department of Social Welfare as real party in interest. ¹ We ordered incorporation of the superior court proceedings as part of the record before us.

Several years earlier petitioners had received a male child from the same agency and had successfully completed the adoption process. They also had two natural children. Apparently the second placement was accompanied by an agreement that no adoption petition would be filed until the child had spent a year in the family. In July 1972 an anonymous telephone call resulted in the discovery that Mr. C had engaged in drinking and was attending therapy sessions at the Sacramento County Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center. ² Several months earlier, when the adoption case worker asked if he had a drinking problem, Mr. C had replied in the negative. There was no evidence that he was habitually intoxicated or intoxicated in the children's presence. He held a responsible job which required much overtime. There was evidence to support the belief that petitioners were conscientious parents and maintained a wholesome family environment.

After receiving the information concerning Mr. C's participation in therapy at the center, the social worker in charge of the case met with her supervisor and the psychiatrist who served as the agency's mental health consultant. As a result of that conference the supervisor sent Mr. and Mrs. C the letter announcing cancellation of the adoption arrangement. A meeting with the Cs took place but without any change in the agency's decision.

In the trial court the social worker testified that the adoption placement was terminated because petitioners had withheld information; that 'we couldn't trust what they had said to us in the past, and we didn't feel that we would have trust or confidence in what they would tell us in the future.' The adoption supervisor testified that the conference with petitioners following the letter of cancellation reinforced the decision to terminate the adoption 'in that (petitioners) had withheld information and we did feel that they were operating under stress.' She testified that petitioners admitted withholding information that Mr. C had been attending the alcoholic rehabilitation center.

The administrative and judicial proceedings included no investigation into Mr. C's current use--if any--of alcohol, no prognosis, no inquiry whether his job or family life had been affected. The employee of the alcoholic rehabilitation center who had orally referred to Mr. C as an 'alcoholic' was not called as a witness; the hearsay evidence of his statement hung in midair, without verification or cross-examination. In adoption proceedings the child's best interest is the primary concern. (San Diego County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 9, 101 Cal.Rptr. 541, 496 P.2d 453.) The judicial proceeding included no inquiry into the physical and emotional health of the child. The trial court expressed the view that its function was limited to determining whether the agency had abused its discretion; that its function did not extend to a trial de novo. Findings of fact relative to the child's best interest were neither requested nor made. (See Code Civ.Proc. § 632.)

Subject to overriding constitutional limitations, the guiding authority is Civil Code section 224n. ³ Notably, the statute expresses no requirement for investigation, hearing or findings as the basis for the placement agency's removal of the child before a petition for adoption is filed. Nor does it provide for judicial review to guard against the possibility of arbitrary action. Troubled by this statutory hiatus, a California decision declares: 'The manifest importance of an adoption to the welfare of a child, as well as the importance to the prospective parents and to the state, impel us to conclude that the administrative action of the agency in a pre-adoption placement should be subject to judicial review. Although no provision for such review is found in section 224n and relevant sections of the Civil Code, we hold that an order by an adoption agency to terminate an adoptive parent-child placement status is a reviewable administrative order within the ambit of sections 1084 and 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure.' (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 510, ceedings supplied judicial review of the 513, 95 Cal.Rptr. 923, 924.)

In this case the superior court proplacement agency's action. Petitioners, nevertheless, had a status entitling them to procedural due process. The lack of hearing on the merits at the agency level and the narrowness of review at the judicial level did not comply with due process demands. It is necessary to explicate the review concept described in Rodriguez, supra.

The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an individual suffers governmental deprivation of a fundamental interest. Entitlement to procedural protections depends upon the extent to which 'grievous loss' is threatened; it requires the court to weigh the individual's interest in avoiding the loss against the governmental interest in summary adjudication. ⁴ The opportunity for hearing must precede, not follow, the deprivation, except for extraordinary occasions where some valid governmental interest justifies summary deprivation. ⁵ The formalities and procedural requisites for the hearing may vary according to the quality of the governmental function, the character of the private interest and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. ⁶

In determining whether a status or right is fundamental, the courts consider its effect in human terms and its importance to the individual's life situation. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.) Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parent's most cherished hopes. The event marks the onset of a close and meaningful relationship. The emotional investment does not await the ultimate decree of adoption. Love and mutual dependence set in ahead of official cachets, administrative or judicial. ⁷ The placement initiates the "closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child." (Adoption of Barnett (1960) 54 Cal.2d 370, 377, 6 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566, 354 P.2d 18, 22.) To characterize enforced removal of the child as a 'grievous loss' is to state the obvious.

The governmental interest is weightly. The statutory ststem for relinguishment to the agency, for agency placement and anency approval, bespeaks a state policy to promote the child's welfare in derogation of all other value. Civil Code section 224n (fn. 3, Ante), distinctly expresses the state's ongoing interest in terminating an agency placement whenever the child's welfare is endangered. It expresses a legislative design to give the prospective parents only provisional and tentative status until they file an adoption petition. Unitl then, the licensed adoption agency is entitled to custody and control 'at all times;' the placement may be terminated 'at any time' at the agency's discretion; upon termination the child is to be returned 'promptly' to the physical custody of the agency. These firm legislative expressions were designed to elevate the placement agency's discernment of danger above the interests of the prospective parents.

This...