C. v. Floyd Fruit Co. v. Florida Citrus Com'n

Decision Date31 May 1937
Citation128 Fla. 565,175 So. 248
PartiesC. V. FLOYD FRUIT CO. et al. v. FLORIDA CITRUS COMMISSION et al.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Suit by the C. V. Floyd Fruit Company and others against the Florida Citrus Commission and another. From an adverse decree, the complainants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Polk County; H. C Petteway, judge.

COUNSEL

James R. Cooper, of Miami, for appellants.

E Glenn Grimes and W. M. Smiley, both of Bradenton, Doyle E Carlton, of Tampa, and Cary D. Landis, Attorney General, and James B. Watson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

The appeal brings for review an order denying injunction and dismissing the bill of complaint.

The bill of complaint was filed by the appellants and sought to enjoin the appellees, defendants in the court below, from collecting the so-called advertising tax on oranges grapefruit, and tangerines from the complainants, and from each of them, and from requiring the complainants, or either of them, to place upon their fruit a stamp tax showing the payment of such advertising tax and from interfering with the complainants or their said fruit, or molesting them in any way in the handling thereof on account of the absence of such stamp or other evidence showing payment of such advertising tax, and for other relief not necessary to be discussed here.

The tax sought to be enjoined was that levied by the Legislature under the provisions of chapters 16856-16858, Acts of 1935, sections 3254(84), 3254(100), and 3254(116), Compiled General Laws of Florida, Permanent Supplement, vol. 3.

Section 6 of the act, the provisions of which are carried forward in the sections of the Permanent Supplement of C.G.L. herein first above referred to (section 3254(84), is that 'there is hereby levied and imposed until July 1, 1937, an excise tax of one cent on each standard-packed box of oranges grown in the State of Florida.' Section 6 of chapter 16857, and section 6 of chapter 16858, Acts of 1935 (sections 3254(100), 3254(116), apply respectively to tax on grapefruit and tangerines, the only difference being in the amount of the tax levied.

Section 10 of chapter 16857, supra, section 3254(104), C.G.L., Permanent Supplement, provides as follows:

'All taxes levied and collected under the provisions of this law shall be paid into the State treasury on or before the 15th day of each month. Such moneys shall be kept in a special fund to be known as the 'grapefruit advertising fund' which is hereby created, and all moneys coming into said special fund are hereby appropriated and made available for defraying the expenses of the administration and enforcement of this law. All money levied and collected under this law over and above the necessary administrative expense as provided for in this law shall be spent exclusively for the advertising of grapefruit as herein provided: Provided, further, that in cases where grapefruit are advertised jointly with tangerines, oranges, or both such tangerines and oranges, the grapefruit advertising fund shall only bear its pro rata share of such joint advertising. All taxes levied hereunder and collected through sale of said stamps by the commission shall be paid to the Comptroller of the State of Florida for payment into said grapefruit advertising fund. Funds expended under this law for advertising shall be expended through an established advertising agency within the State of Florida.'

Section 11 of the Act (C.G.L.Supp. § 3254(105) provides as follows:

'All costs, expenses and obligations incurred under the provisions of this law shall be paid out of the grapefruit advertising fund upon warrant of the Comptroller when vouchers therefor are exhibited, approved by the commission.'

Section 9 of the act (C.G.L.Supp. § 3254(103) provides as follows:

'All taxes levied and imposed under and pursuant to the provisions of this law shall be due and payable and shall be paid when the grapefruit covered by this law is first handled in the primary channel of trade. All such taxes shall be paid to the commission by the person first handling the grapefruit covered by this law in the primary channel of trade. The payment of such taxes shall be evidenced by stamps to be known and designated as 'grapefruit advertising stamps,' with the amount paid for such stamps indicated thereon, which stamps shall in every instance be affixed to the grade certificate or certificates showing the grade of the grapefruit covered thereby when such grapefruit is required by law to be inspected for grade and certification thereof, and in all other cases such stamps shall be affixed to the returns provided for in section 3254(102). The Comptroller of the State of Florida shall cause to be prepared and delivered to the commission suitable stamps denoting the taxes hereunder levied. The commission shall cause such stamps to be distributed for payment of the taxes prescribed in this law and shall prescribe such method for the affixing and cancellation of said stamps as shall be necessary to carry out and comply with the intent and purpose of this law.

All revenue laws in the State of Florida relating to the assessment and collection of taxes are hereby extended to and made a part of this law, so far as applicable, for the purpose of collecting taxes on grapefruit omitted through mistake, fraud or other reason.'

It is contended by the appellants (1) that the tax levied is a property tax; is not based upon uniform and equal rate of taxation, and contravenes section 1 of article 9 of the Florida Constitution.

It is next contended (2) that even though the tax be held to be an excise tax, it would contravene section 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution because such tax would be a tax assessed upon the right to acquire, possess, and protect oranges, grapefruit, and tangerines.

It is next contended (3) that though it be held to be an excise tax and not to contravene section 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution, yet such tax would be a burden on interstate commerce and would invade the exclusive legislative field of the Congress.

It is next contended (4) that the tax contravenes clause 5, § 9, article 1, of the Constitution of the United States.

It is next contended (5) that the tax contravenes section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution in that it violates the equal protection clause and the due process clause of that section of the Constitution.

It is next contended (6) that the tax contravenes section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution inasmuch as such tax would be taxing property without due process of law because the tax is not for a public purpose.

It is next contended (7) that the tax contravenes section 5 of article 9 of the Constitution because it is levied for the benefit of the Citrus Commission, a corporation.

The act here involved is one of a series of legislative acts passed for the benefit of the citrus fruit industry of Florida, being chapters 16854 to 16862, both inclusive, of the Session of 1935. These acts were designed to regulate the marketing of citrus fruit. A Citrus Commission was created and provisions were made for the inspection, grading, and processing of citrus fruit to the end that the marketing of immature or unfit fruit may be prevented, and provision was also made for advertising Florida citrus fruit, that the buying public might be informed of the superior quality of citrus fruits being marketed from Florida, that the demand therefor might be increased thereby. To accomplish all this, taxes are levied and collected on a per box basis to be used for the general expense incident to the execution of the provisions of the several acts. Section 9 of the Act (section 3254(87), supra, it will be observed, provides that 'all taxes levied and imposed under and pursuant to the provisions of this law shall be due and payable and shall be paid when the oranges covered by this law are first handled in the primary channel of trade.' Other sections make the same application to the tax on grapefruit and tangerines.

These provisions are important because upon these provisions rests largely the determination of the class of the tax.

While the appellant has stated seven contentions, such contentions may be reduced to three questions. The first is, 'Is the tax levied a property tax or an excise tax?' The second question is, 'Does the tax levied constitute a burden on interstate commerce, or lay an impost or excise duty on the exports?' The third question is, 'Is the tax imposed for a public purpose?'

If the tax is an excise tax and is not a tax on the right to protect, possess, and acquire property and does not deprive the taxpayers of their property without due process of law, or deny to them the equal protection of the law, then it is valid; provided, of course, it is levied within the legislative power for a public purpose.

The Legislature declared the tax to be an excise tax. It further provided, as heretofore shown:

'All taxes levied and imposed under and pursuant to the provisions of this law shall be due and payable and shall be paid when the oranges covered by this law are first handled in the primary channel of trade.' Section 3254(87).

'All such taxes shall be paid to the commission by the person first handling the grapefruit covered by this law in the primary channel of trade.' Section 3254(103).

'Oranges shall be deemed to be delivered into the primary channel of trade when any such oranges are sold, or delivered for shipment, or delivered for canning and/or processing into byproducts.' Section 3254(81).

So it is that under the provisions of the act, it is defined as an excise tax. It is...

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