A.C. v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:22CV336–HEH |
| Citation | 610 F.Supp.3d 857 |
| Parties | A.C., a minor, BY AND THROUGH R.C., as parent and next friend, Plaintiff, v. HENRICO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Jason Meyer Krumbein, Krumbein Consumer Legal Services Inc., Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.
John David McChesney, Henrico County Attorney's Office, Henrico, VA, for Defendant.
(Granting Motion to Dismiss in Part and Granting Leave to Amend)
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Henrico County School Board's ("Defendant" or the "School Board") Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion") (ECF No. 3) filed on May 5, 2022. The School Board asks the Court to dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 1-2) filed by Plaintiff A.C., a minor, by and through R.C., as parent and next friend ("Plaintiff" or "A.C.")1 The parties have submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions. On June 23, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on the issues, and the Motion is now ripe for review. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will deny the Motion as to Count I and grant the Motion as to Count II with leave for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint.
Defendant's Motion is premised on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Mot. at 1, ECF No. 3.) A Rule 12(b)(6) motion "does not resolve contests surrounding facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Tobey v. Jones , 706 F.3d 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin , 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) ). "A complaint need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Ray v. Roane , 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Tobey , 706 F.3d at 387 ). However, a "complaint must provide ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Turner v. Thomas , 930 F.3d 640, 644 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). "Allegations have facial plausibility ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Tobey , 706 F.3d at 386 (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). A court, however, "need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Turner , 930 F.3d at 644 (quoting Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart , 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012) ).
While a motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, courts may consider documents that are either "explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference" or "those attached to the complaint as exhibits." Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd. , 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). A court may consider a document not attached to the complaint, when "the document [is] integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity." Id. at 166. "[I]n the event of conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached, ... the exhibit prevails." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fayetteville Invs. v. Commercial Builders, Inc. , 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991) ). In considering a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are taken as true, and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc. , 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions enjoy no such deference. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Viewed through the lens of Rule 12(b)(6) review, the relevant facts are as follows. On January 29, 2019, when A.C. was about 7 or 8 years old, she began attending one of Defendant's schools, Pinchbeck Elementary School. (Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-2.) Around that time, A.C. was often hyperactive, impulsive, and had trouble focusing her attention on tasks. (Id. ¶ 7.) These behaviors are common among children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). (Id. ) At the same time, A.C. did not perform well academically and received failing grades in most classes. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 16.) On May 9, 2019, after some alleged delays, the School Board determined that A.C. needed an individualized education program ("IEP") to ensure she made academic progress despite her mental disabilities. (Id. ¶ 13.) On June 25, 2019, the School Board developed A.C.’s IEP without her parents present. (Id. ¶¶ 17–19.)
After the summer break, in August 2019, the School Board and A.C.’s parents met to review the IEP. (Id. ¶ 26.) At the meeting, A.C.’s parents alerted the School Board that A.C. was diagnosed with dyslexia over the summer, but the School Board refused to consider that diagnosis. (Id. 22–25, 37.) The School Board refused many of the parents’ other requests. (Id. ¶¶ 28–41.) Instead, the School Board's IEP recommended that A.C. receive 150 minutes of special reading instruction per week. (Id. ¶ 42.) Despite their reservations, A.C.’s parents consented to the IEP proposed by the School Board. (Id. ¶ 44.) Her parents, however, funded outside tutoring for A.C. starting in September 2019. (Id. ¶ 43.)
In September 2019, the School Board agreed to have an independent expert evaluate A.C. to determine what disabilities she had. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) The independent expert concluded that A.C. had ADHD, dyslexia, and auditory processing disorder ("APD"). (Id. ¶¶ 54–55.) Over the fall of 2019, A.C. continued to perform below her peers, her parents continued to request changes to her education, and the School Board continued to refuse any changes. (Id. ¶¶ 56–61.)
On December 19, 2019, the parties met to discuss a new IEP. (Id. ¶ 63.) At this meeting, A.C.’s parents requested that the IEP include more goals in order to address her disabilities, but the School Board refused to change or add to the IEP in any way. (Id. ) The School Board continued to only offer 150 minutes of special reading instruction per week. (Id. ) Again, despite their continuing reservations, A.C.’s parents consented to the IEP on February 18, 2020. (Id. ¶ 66.) After schools closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, A.C. stopped receiving special reading instruction. (Id. ¶ 70.) In July 2020, an expert evaluated A.C.’s reading skills and concluded that her skills remained well below her peers. (Id. ¶ 72.)
On December 17, 2020, and January 14, 2021, A.C.’s parents and the School Board met to update the IEP, but the School Board did not approve any changes that the parents requested. (Id. ¶¶ 96, 108.) On January 22, 2021, the parties met again, and the parents requested that A.C. be placed in a private school to address her disabilities. (Id. ¶ 112.) However, Defendant refused. (Id. ) After a combined 15 hours of negotiation, in February 2021, A.C.’s parents refused to consent to the new IEP proposed by the School Board. (Id. ¶ 117.) Instead, the parents enrolled A.C. in a private school called the New Community School. (Id. ¶ 119.) Plaintiff still attends the New Community School and is thriving there. (Id. ¶ 121.)
On March 26, 2021, A.C.’s parents asked for a due process hearing because of the School Board's failure to provide a free appropriate public education to A.C. from January 2019 onward. (Id. ¶ 122.) After eight days of testimony and presentations in June 2021, the Hearing Officer released a short, three-page Decision. (Decision, ECF No. 17-1.)2 In the Decision, the Hearing Officer concluded that the School Board had "not complied with the requirements of [the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")] in regard to providing a [f]ree and [a]ppropriate [e]ducation ("FAPE") to [A.C.]" (Id. at 2.) The Hearing Officer described A.C.’s witnesses, including her mother, as more credible than the School Board's. (Id. ) However, the Hearing Officer went on to dismiss "each and all other requests by the student." (Id. at 3.) He elaborated that A.C.’s requests for reimbursement or monetary damages were not appropriate and not available under the law. (Id. ) Moreover, he decided that there was no evidence that private school placement was appropriate for A.C. (Id. ) Thus, although the Hearing Officer agreed with A.C. and her parents that the School Board violated the IDEA and denied her a free appropriate public education, the Hearing Officer did not believe any relief that he could provide to A.C. was appropriate. (See id. at 2–3.)
Based on these facts, Plaintiff now brings two claims against Defendant including one claim under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. (Count I), and another claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Count II). (Compl. at 21–23.) As a remedy, Plaintiff requests reimbursement for her tuition at the New Community School, future private education costs as the Court deems appropriate, other "compensatory education service[s]" provided by Defendant, and compensatory damages.3 (Id. at 22–23.) Defendant moves to dismiss both claims. (Mot. at 1.)
The Court first considers Plaintiff's IDEA claim brought in Count I. A brief overview of the IDEA helps place Plaintiff's claim in context. When a local school system receives certain federal funds offered, the IDEA in turn gives children in that school system a right to a "free appropriate public education," sometimes referred to as FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) ; Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 580 U.S. 386, 137 S. Ct. 988, 993, 197 L.Ed.2d 335 (2017). FAPE includes special education and related services for disabled children at no extra cost to the child's family. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). Moreover, FAPE must be provided to the child "in conformity with the individualized education program [or IEP] required" under the statute. Id.
An IEP is "the centerpiece of the [IDEA's] education...
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