C.W. v. Walgreen Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:17-CV-1488 CAS,4:17-CV-1488 CAS |
| Parties | C.W., a Deceased Minor, by Nina Gray, Personal Representative, and NINA GRAY, Plaintiffs, v. WALGREEN CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Walgreen Co.'s ("Defendant Walgreen") motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and alternative motion to strike plaintiffs' prayers for punitive damages and attorney's fees. Plaintiff C.W., a deceased minor, by and through his personal representative and natural mother, Nina Gray ("Plaintiff C.W."), and plaintiff Nina Gray, individually ("Plaintiff Gray"), oppose the motion. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. For the following reasons the Court will dismiss Plaintiff C.W.'s claims and strike Plaintiff Gray's prayer for attorney's fees.
C.W., a fifteen-year-old African-American young man, was shopping at a Walgreens store in December 2015. C.W. had recently under gone heart transplant surgery. C.W. put his cell phone and money in his pants pocket as he reached for an item on a shelf with his other hand. C.W. was suddenly confronted by four Walgreens employees who demanded to know what he had put down his pants. The Walgreens employees marched C.W. to the front of the store and searched him in front of other shoppers putting their hands in his pockets and turning the pockets inside out, as well as lifting his shirt, exposing C.W.'s transplant scar. The employees found nothing on C.W.'s person to suggest he was doing anything other than shopping. C.W. passed away on July 4, 2016, allegedly as a result of having suffered from heightened physical and mental stress levels due to the incident at Walgreens.
On March 14, 2017, plaintiff C.W., a deceased minor, by and through his next friend, Nina Gray, C.W.'s natural mother, filed this action in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri against Defendant Walgreen, seeking money damages arising from the incident in Defendant Walgreen's store. The Petition asserted state law claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Walgreen removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, and this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
On June 4, 2017, Plaintiff C.W., a deceased minor, by and through his personal representative, Nina Gray, filed a First Amended Complaint which added Count IV, alleging a state law claim for wrongful death, and Count V, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Defendant Walgreen filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff C.W. filed a response to Defendant Walgreen's motion to dismiss and also sought leave to amend the complaint a second time, which this Court granted.
On August 2, 2017, Plaintiff C.W. and Nina Gray, individually, filed a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff C.W. alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count I), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count II), and § 213.065, Missouri Revised Statutes (Count III), and Plaintiff Gray alleged wrongful death (Count IV).
Defendant Walgreen filed a motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and III for failure to state a claim and an alternative motion to strike Plaintiff C.W.'s prayers for punitive damages andattorney's fees. Defendant Walgreen additionally seeks to strike Plaintiff Gray's prayer for attorney's fees in Count IV.
Courts must satisfy themselves that a plaintiff has standing to bring a claim. "'Where a plaintiff lacks standing, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction.'" Brooks v. City of Des Moines, Ia., 844 F.3d 978, 979 (8th Cir. 2016) ).
The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff need not provide specific facts in support of its allegations, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam), but "must include sufficient factual information to provide the 'grounds' on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above a speculative level." Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. at 562 (quoted case omitted). This standard "simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim or element]." Id. at 556.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that "actual proof of those facts is improbable," Twombly,550 U.S. at 556, and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Materials attached to the complaint as exhibits may be considered in construing the sufficiency of the complaint. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
Upon review of the pleadings and the parties' briefs, this Court finds that Plaintiff C.W. lacks standing to assert Count I.
In its motion to dismiss Count I, Defendant Walgreen argues that the Missouri survival statutes, Missouri Revised Statutes §§ 537.020 and 537.030 (2010), governing the survival and abatements of claims at the death of the plaintiff, only permit survival of claims that were filed prior to the plaintiff's death. Defendant Walgreen argues that because Plaintiff C.W.'s claim was not on file at the time of his death, this Court must dismiss Count I. In response, Plaintiff C.W. argues that § 537.020 specifically contemplates the survival of Plaintiff C.W.'s cause of action, but does not address whether the statute requires that the claim be pre-existing to survive.
Upon review, this Court holds that Plaintiff C.W., through his personal representative, Nina Gray, does not have standing to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Missouri's survival statute, provides, in relevant part:
1. Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by reason of his death, nor by reason of the death of the person against whom such cause of action shall have accrued; but in case of the death of either or both such parties, such cause of action shall survive to the personal representative of such injured party, and against the person, receiver or corporation liable for such injuries and his legal representatives, and the liability of the measure of damages shall be the same as if the death or deaths had not occurred ...2. The right of action for death or the right of action for personal injury that does not result in the death shall be sufficient to authorize and to require the appointment of a personal representative by the probate division of the circuit court upon the written application therefore by one or more of the beneficiaries of the deceased ...
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.020 (emphases added).
The survival statute "unambiguously authorizes the survival of claims that arise from non-fatal personal injuries where the injured party later dies of unrelated causes." Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Although the statute requires that such personal injury claims must be pursued by the personal representative of the decedent's estate, "[t]he statute's language clearly limits its application to cases where the personal injury did not cause the decedent's death." Id.
Where the personal injury caused the decedent's death, the survival statute does not apply. Here, Plaintiff Gray has asserted that the same personal injuries alleged by Plaintiff C.W. in Count I resulted in C.W.'s death. (Doc. 16 ¶¶ 62-69.) It is these injuries that form the basis for Plaintiff Gray's Wrongful Death claim in Count IV. "The Missouri Supreme Court has declared the wrongful death statute to be the sole source of a cause of action in Missouri where the injuries sustained by the decedent caused the decedent's death." Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1058 (citing Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)). The survivorship statute and the wrongful death statute are mutually antagonistic. Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) ().
Because the Missouri survival statute does not apply as a result of Plaintiff Gray's allegation that Defendant Walgreen caused C.W.'s death, Plaintiff C.W. does not have standing to pursue a § 1983 claim for injuries caused by Defendant Walgreen. See Andrews, 253 F.3d at 1057-58 (). Because Plaintiff C.W. lacks standing to bring Count I, the Court must dismiss Count I...
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