Ca. Teachers Assoc. v. Gov. Bd. of the Golden Valley Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 13 May 2002
• Docket Number: F037363,5
• Citation: Ca. Teachers Assoc. v. Gov. Bd. of the Golden Valley Unified School Dist. (Cal. App. 2002)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. GOVERNING BOARD OF THE GOLDEN VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. F037363 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT Filed

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants v GOVERNING BOARD OF THE GOLDEN VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents

F037363

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Filed 5/13/02

(Super. Ct. No. CV05840)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Thomas L. Bender, Judge.

Tuttle & McCloskey, Ernest H. Tuttle, III, and Kay M. Tuttle, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Stroupe & de Goede, and Bryan G. Martin, for Defendants and Respondents.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Ardaiz, P.J.

The California Teachers' Association (CTA) and Tiffani Curran (Curran) filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate after Curran was informed in a letter dated August 3, 1999, that she would not be employed as a teacher by the Golden Valley Unified School District (Golden Valley) for the 1999-2000 school year. The trial court denied the petition and ruled a teacher with only an emergency permit may not be classified as a probationary employee and, therefore, the statutory procedures of notice and a hearing do not apply to the dismissal of such a teacher.

Curran appealed, contending (1) she was a probationary employee during the 1998-1999 school year who was not given a non-reelection notice under Education Code section 44929.21¹ and, therefore, was automatically rehired for the following school year; (2) by virtue of her written contract with Golden Valley classifying her as a probationary employee, she was entitled to the statutory procedures applicable to the dismissal of probationary employees; (3) if, alternatively, she should have been classified as a temporary employee instead of a probationary employee, Golden Valley was required to follow the statutory procedures applicable to the dismissal of a temporary employee; and (4) Golden Valley was estopped from denying Curran employment for the 1999-2000 school year because she relied upon its written offer and contract.

We hold Curran's contract properly classified her as a probationary employee and she was entitled to prior written notice of dismissal and the right to a hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2000, CTA and Curran filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate against Golden Valley and its governing board requesting payment to Curran of back pay and benefits for the 1999-2000 school year, declaratory relief that Curran was wrongfully terminated, and attorneys fees. Curran filed declarations and points and authorities in support of her petition. Golden Valley filed an answer, as well as declarations and points and authorities in opposition to the petition.

On June 14, 2000, and July 12, 2000, counsel presented oral argument to the trial court; no witnesses testified before the court. After the presentation of oral argument on July 12, 2000, the trial court stated on the record the reasons for its denial of the petition. CTA and Curran filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision.

FACTS

During the 1998-1999 school year, Curran was employed by the Madera Unified School District under a written contract that classified her as a probationary employee. Her qualification to teach was based on an "Emergency Long Term Multiple Subject Teaching Permit" issued by the Commission on Teacher Credentialing of the State of California (CTC), which was valid from August 1, 1998, to September 1, 1999. She was assigned to teach sixth grade math and science at Webster Elementary School.

During the school year, Madera Unified School District underwent reorganization and Webster Elementary School became a part of the newly created Golden Valley Unified School District. Golden Valley began teaching operations as of July 1, 1999, the first day of the 1999-2000 school year.² On May 27, 1999, Golden Valley presented Curran with a letter and a "Certificated Employee Notice/Offer of Employment" relating to employment for the 1999-2000 school year. Curran saw the base salary in the offer was incorrect and told Golden Valley that she should have been placed in class 5, station 2, of the salary schedule. Golden Valley changed the salary amount and presented Curran with a revised offer dated June 15, 1999. Curran accepted the revised offer by signing and returning it to Golden Valley.

The contract formed by the parties listed Curran's status as "PROBATIONARY (2)"³ and contained the following provision:

"Contingent upon fulfilling the requirements to obtain a valid California Teaching Credential or evidence that I have fulfilled all P18L requirements of my current credential and am enrolled in an approved CTC, college or university program, am enrolled in coursework that will qualify me for a Multiple Subjects Credential, and/or PASS The MSAT prior to August 16, 1999."

In July 1999, after Curran returned from her summer vacation, she met with the principal of Webster Elementary School to begin preparing for the new school year. The principal told Curran that she did not know if Curran would be working there because Curran had not fulfilled the contingencies in the contract. Subsequently, Curran received a letter from Golden Valley scheduling a meeting with the superintendent and the principal for July 27, 1999. The letter stated the purpose of the meeting was to establish if Curran had met the requirements of the contract and requested her to bring to the meeting (1) her test results from the Multiple Subject Assessments for Teachers (MSAT) of June 5, 1999, (2) a copy of her spring 1999 coursework, (3) her application for fall 1999 coursework at California State University at Fresno, (4) a receipt of tuition paid, and (5) the name of her credential advisor at the university.

At the July 27, 1999, meeting, Curran presented the requested documents and told the superintendent that she had not passed the MSAT test. The superintendent then stated Curran had not fulfilled the requirements of the contract and that Golden Valley could not hire any teacher with an emergency permit until teachers with full credentials had been interviewed. When the superintendent was told the contract did not require Curran to pass the MSAT, he asked for 72 hours to think about it and talk to the governing board.

On August 3, 1999, Golden Valley sent Curran a letter stating (1) Golden Valley decided not to employ her for the 1999-2000 school year, (2) "the District's offer of employment to you was contingent upon your fulfilling the requirements to obtain a California teaching credential," (3) Curran did not complete many of the basic requirements to obtain a teaching credential, "including student teaching, additional coursework, passage of the [MSAT] and passage of the reading initiative objective test (RICA)," and (4) Golden Valley concluded it would not be in the best interest of Golden Valley to continue Curran's employment on an emergency certificate in light of the availability of fully credentialed applicants.

An attorney representing Curran sent a letter to Golden Valley expressing the view that Curran had fulfilled the contingencies in the contract and, as a result, was entitled to employment for the 1999-2000 school year. The dispute was not resolved and Curran filed her petition for a writ of mandate in March 2000.

DISCUSSION

When school districts are reorganized, the employment rights of "certificated employees" are protected under section 35555. When such employees are probationary, they "shall be employed by the district which thereafter maintains the school" where the employee worked prior to the reorganization and their "classification by such district shall be the same as it would have been had the school ... continued to be maintained by the district [that] formerly maintained it." ( 35555.)

In this case, the reorganization of Madera Unified School District and the creation of Golden Valley School District had progressed to the point where Golden Valley had entered into a written contract with Curran and the 1999-2000 school year had began. Therefore, even if Curran was a certificated employee within the meaning of the provisions of section 35555, those provisions would no longer directly govern the employee/employer relationship between Curran and Golden Valley at the time of Curran's dismissal. By then, that relationship was defined by the written contract and the provisions of the Education Code generally applicable to the employment of teachers. Therefore, the issue presented is whether the dismissal of Curran violated her contractual or statutory rights. Curran's statutory claims center on section 44915 and whether it required or permitted Golden Valley to classify her as a probationary employee.

I STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ordinarily, a trial court's findings and judgment on a petition for writ of mandate are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 618.) However, the trial court's construction of a statute is purely a question of law and is subject to de novo review on appeal. (Id. at p. 619.) The principles governing the proper construction of a statute are well established and are set forth in Neumarkel v. Allard (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 457, 461:

"Courts must ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate a law's purpose. [Citations.] 'In the construction of a statute ... the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is ... contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; ...' [Citation.] Legislative intent will be determined so far as possible from the language of statutes, read as a whole, and if the words are reasonably free from ambiguity and uncertainty, the courts will look no further to ascertain its meaning. [Citation.] '"The court should take into account matters such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislati...