Caba v. Barker, CC 0107-07280.
Decision Date | 19 October 2006 |
Docket Number | CA A118089.,SC S51769.,CC 0107-07280. |
Parties | Sandra CABA and Floy Jones, Respondents on Review, v. Anthony J. BARKER, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Brian R. Talcott, Dunn Carney Allen Higgins & Tongue LLP, Portland, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the briefs were Thomas H. Tongue and Madeleine S. Campbell.
Thomas W. Sondag, Lane Powell PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review.
Before CARSON,** Chief Justice, and GILLETTE, DURHAM, RIGGS,*** DE MUNIZ,† BALMER, and KISTLER, Justices.††
In this case, two residual legatees1 of a will brought an action against the lawyer who drafted it. Plaintiffs assert that, in addition to their status as residual legatees, they are the intended third-party beneficiaries of what they characterize as an "implied" promise that they allege that defendant made to testator in connection with that will. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant failed to carry out the terms of his implied promise to testator, that they suffered damages as a result of that failure, and that they have either a viable breach of contract claim or a viable negligence claim (or both) against defendant as a result. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for failing to state claims for either breach of contract or negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under Hale v. Groce, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289 (1987), plaintiffs sufficiently had alleged that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of promises associated with the drafting of testator's will and that they had alleged legally sufficient claims for losses suffered as a result of defendant's failure to perform in conformance with his implied promise. Caba v. Barker, 193 Or.App. 768, 93 P.3d 74 (2004). We allowed review and, for the reasons that follow, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Because this is an appeal from a trial court order dismissing a complaint under ORCP 21 A(8),2 we assume that all well-pleaded facts are true and give plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from those factual allegations. See, e.g., Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 333 Or. 401, 407, 40 P.3d 1059 (2002) ( ). Plaintiffs' third amended complaint alleges that, in October 1999, Laura Carnese (testator) was suffering from the effects of a stroke. Charles Carnese (Carnese), testator's relative by marriage and a friend and former colleague of defendant, arranged for defendant to prepare testator's will. The resulting will designated Carnese as executor of the estate and named him as both a beneficiary of a cash gift and as a residual legatee along with plaintiffs and three others. Testator executed that will on October 22, 1999; she died the following month. Shortly after the court admitted the will to probate, a will contest was filed. The estate subsequently settled that will contest. The settlement diminished each residual legatee's share of the estate by $103,569.50.
Plaintiffs then filed the present breach of contract and professional negligence action against defendant. In addition to the facts recited above, plaintiffs alleged the following facts in support of their breach of contract claim:
(Emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs incorporated the above-mentioned allegations in their negligence claim, in which they also alleged that defendant had been negligent in several particulars related to exposing testator's estate plan to a will contest and "failing to otherwise minimize the chances of a will contest being filed or the success of a will contest."
Defendant moved to dismiss both plaintiffs' claims, arguing that plaintiffs did not allege that defendant had made a specific contractual promise to render the will invulnerable to a contest. Defendant argued that an implied promise to do so is legally insufficient to support either of plaintiffs' claims or to establish that plaintiffs were intended third-party beneficiaries of defendant's contract with testator. The trial court agreed, concluding that an implied promise to make a will impervious to attack alleges only a professional duty that a lawyer owes to a client and not a duty that runs to nonclients.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Caba, 193 Or.App. at 783, 93 P.3d 74. That court concluded that, under Hale, plaintiffs were classic "intended" third-party beneficiaries of defendant's promises, including the implied promise to act in a professionally competent manner. Id. at 779, 93 P.3d 74. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs properly had pleaded their breach of contract and negligence claims by alleging that defendant had breached "a promise to prepare a will that is `invulnerable' to challenge." Id. at 782, 93 P.3d 74. We allowed defendant's petition for review.
Defendant argues to this court, as he did before the Court of Appeals, that plaintiffs must allege a specific and express promise before they may proceed against a lawyer in a third-party, nonclient action for either breach of contract or negligence. With respect to plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, however, defendant also argues that a promise to render the will invulnerable to a will contest alleges only a general standard of care that cannot support a contract action. Finally, defendant argues that plaintiffs have failed to state any basis for relief.
Plaintiffs' case — and, as noted, the Court of Appeals opinion — relied heavily on this court's decision in Hale, 304 Or. 281, 744 P.2d 1289. We therefore turn first to that case as an essential step in analyzing plaintiffs' claims in the present action.
In Hale, the defendant lawyer had promised the testator that he would include in the testator's will a specific bequest to the plaintiff. The lawyer then unaccountably failed to carry out that promise. The plaintiff, after unsuccessfully attempting to reform the will, brought an action against the lawyer for breach of contract and negligence. This court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated claims both for breach of contract and for negligence but, as we shall show, our analysis in that regard demonstrates why the same may not be said for plaintiffs' complaint here.
304 Or. at 283-84, 744 P.2d 1289 (citations omitted). The court then turned to the question whether the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint were sufficient to permit him to assert "third-party beneficiary" status. The court stated:
The court in Hale considered a will beneficiary to be a classic "intended" third-party beneficiary when the facts satisfy the standards in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,...
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