Cabeen et al. v. Campbell et al.
| Decision Date | 01 January 1858 |
| Parties | Cabeen et al. versus Campbell et al. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Gibbons, for the plaintiffs in error.—The question is, whether the garnishees so far represented the vendee, as to make the delivery of the blooms to them, a full, effective, and final delivery to him. If not, the vendor had a right to stop them. That it was not such a delivery as to take away the right of stoppage in transitu is shown by Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 186; Coates v. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422; Bartram v. Farebrother, 4 Bingh. 585; Jackson v. Nichol, 5 Bingh. N. C. 508; 2 Kent Comm. 545; Hays v. Mouille, 2 Harris 48; Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Barr 301.
There was neither aetual nor constructive delivery to the vendee, except as to the 85 pieces forwarded to Trenton by the garnishees, unless delivery of a part was delivery of the whole, as was intimated by TAUNTON, J., in Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & Ell. 57. But it is now settled that, where part of the goods are taken out from the rest, and delivered separately, the right of stoppage in transitu continues as to the rest: Miles v. Gorton, 2 C. & M. 504; Tanner v. Scovell, 14 M. & W. 28; Buckley v. Furniss, 17 Wend. 504.
No rights of third parties have intervened. The foreign attachment does not defeat the right to stop in transitu: Smith v. Goss, 1 Camp. 282; Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 42; Hays v. Mouille, 2 Harris 48.
Lex, for the defendants in error.—The authority of Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175, has never been questioned. It is cited with approbation in the opinion of this court in Bolin v. Huffnagle, 1 Rawle 9, and in Covell v. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. 611; and in England in Dodson v. Wentworth, 4 Mann. & Gran. 559.
There are numerous cases in which a constructive delivery had been held to destroy the right of stoppage in transitu: Hays v. Mouille, 2 Harris 48, 51, 53; Donath v. Broomhead, 7 Barr 301; Lucas v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278; Hammond v. Anderson, 2 Camp. 243; Stonard v. Dunkin, 2 Camp. 344; Harry v. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452; Rowe v. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83; Fraser v. Hilliard, 2 Strobh. L. 309; Langer v. Golin, 20 Verm. 172; Allen v. Gripper, 2 Crompt. & Jerv. 218; Dodson v. Wentworth, 4 Mann. & Grang. 555; Valpy v. Gibson, 4 Mann. Grang. & Scott 835.
The right of a vendor to arrest goods sold, while they are in transitu to the vendee, is a right eminently favoured by the law. So strongly is it maintained that the vendor is permitted to resume his possession by any means not criminal, while the property is on the transit. No intervening attachment or execution against the vendee will defeat the right; or be allowed to interpose any obstacle to the vendor's resumption of possession. Nor is this indulgence to the seller without substantial reason. It is grossly inequitable that his goods, before having reached the hands of the vendee, and before payment, should be appropriated to the satisfaction of other creditors, when the vendee becomes insolvent. In accordance with this obvious dictate of natural justice, therefore, so long as the goods are on their way to the vendee, and while they are in the hands of a middleman, or a carrier, the equitable lien of the vendor remains a lien which he may enforce by arresting the further transit in any way, even by a simple notice.
But when the transit is once at an end, and the delivery is complete, the lien of the vendor is gone. Therefore the right to arrest the goods ceases. The question therefore ever is, where does the transit end? The answer to this question would be attended with no difficulty, were it not that the law recognises a constructive delivery as sufficient to defeat the vendor's lien. What is, and what is not, a constructive delivery, is often not easy to determine. Until the goods have arrived at the place of ultimate destination, understood as such between the buyer and seller, they are ordinarily liable to stoppage. But when an intermediate delivery occurs, before they reach their ultimate destination, if the party to whom they are delivered has authority to receive them, and give to them a new destination not originally intended, the transitus is at an end. They have then reached the ultimate destination intended by both buyer and seller. But if the middleman be a mere agent to transmit the goods in accordance with original directions, the vendor's right continues. The rule may be stated as follows: — If in the hands of the middleman they require new orders to put them again in motion, and give them another substantive destination; if without such new orders they must continue stationary, then the delivery is complete, and the lien of the vendor has expired. This is the doctrine of Dixon v. Baldwen, 5 East 175, which is a leading case, and such is the recognised law of this state.
What then was the character of the agency of Cabeen & Co., the middlemen, in this case? Were they agents for custody alone, or were they agents for transmission? If the latter, then Seidel's right to stop the blooms continued until they should reach Trenton, where the buyer lived, or until they should come into Chevrier's actual possession. We think...
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Lewis v. Sharvey
...to forwarding the goods, will not affect a vendor's right of stoppage. Harris v. Pratt, supra. The general rule is well stated in Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa. 254, thus: in the hands of the middleman, they require new orders to put them again in motion and give them another, substantive desti......
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In re M. Burke & Co.
...for goods, and is insolvent, the vendor's right of stoppage in transit is one highly favored on account of its intrinsic justice. Cabeen v. Campbell, 30 Pa. 254. Under the proofs we are of opinion these goods were, at time of the notice, still in transit. The general rule is that, so far as......