Cable v. Eicon
| Decision Date | 09 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 43402.,43402. |
| Citation | 127 P.3d 528 |
| Parties | Maria A. CABLE; Timothy Cristilli; Jeanette M. Diserio; Theresa J. Harvey; Frances A. Hunter; Henry J. James; Timothy Jones; Karen Kloepfer; Sharon Kodak; William C. Mitchell; William A. Mulholland; Monica C. Pike; Christine A. Romero; Robert Andres; Barbara M. Arnal; Irene Artz; Eve Buckingham; Luisa Carpenelli; Janice Doering; Cheryl Fleming-Wolfe; Merl Fullenwider; Mark Gangestad; Susan Haas; Nancy Jennings; David Johnson; Audrey Klatkiewicz; Susan Larmouth; Susan Meyer; John P. Morgan; Roger Mowbray; Victoria Pierce; Lawrence A. Preston; Laela Pullin; Kristine M. Reber; Raeann Reinke; Gayle M. Sherman; Arthur C. Thurner; Bertha Don Thurston; Diane P. Tierney; and Jennifer M. Wattles, N/K/A Jennifer Christiansen, Appellants, v. The STATE of Nevada ex rel. ITS EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEVADA, Its General Manager, Douglas D. Dirks, in His Official Capacity; Employers Insurance Company of Nevada, A Private Corporation, its Chief Executive Officer, Douglas D. Dirks, in His Official Capacity; Its Board of Directors Richard W. Blakey, M.D., Robert J. Kolesar, Katherine Won Ong, Phillip C. Peckman, Samuel J. Routson, Michael D. Rumbolz, and Sharon K. Zadra, in Their Official Capacities, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
and Richard G. McCracken, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
George Chanos, Attorney General, and Daniel Wong, Chief Solicitor General, Carson City, for Respondent State of Nevada.
Lemons Grundy & Eisenberg and Alice G. Campos Mercado, Reno, for Respondents Employers Insurance Company of Nevada and its officers and directors.
Before the Court En Banc.
In this appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment, we consider whether the privatization of the state's industrial insurance system made its former employees eligible for a statutory buyout of retirement service credit. We conclude that appellants, all former employees of the State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS), were entitled to a retirement service credit purchase under NRS Chapter 286, since they were terminated from state employ upon the privatization of SIIS, if they were eligible to retire at full or reduced benefits.
In 1999, the Nevada Legislature enacted Senate Bill 37, a bill that called for the privatization of the State Industrial Insurance System (SIIS).1 On January 1, 2000, upon proclamation by the Governor, SIIS became a private mutual insurance company, Employers Insurance Company of Nevada (EICON). When SIIS' assets were transferred to EICON, EICON expressly assumed "all debts and liabilities, known and unknown," of SIIS.2 All persons who were employed by SIIS on December 31, 1999, automatically became employees of EICON on January 1, 2000. As EICON employees they were no longer in state employ or eligible for service credits under Nevada's Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS).3
EICON also assumed control of SIIS operations; thus, specifically, under section 138 of SB 37 those SIIS employees, as of the date of transfer to EICON, were deemed "terminated" from state employ, and therefore, entitled to the benefits and privileges of terminated state employees under NRS Chapter 286.4 Additionally, the bill provided certain EICON workers with a special benefit if EICON experienced layoffs during the first year and a half of its existence. Under section 134 of SB 37, EICON was required to pay the full cost of up to five years' worth of service credits for any workers who could thereby be made eligible for full benefits retirement, if those employees agreed to retire.5
On December 29, 1999, fourteen of the appellants filed a complaint against EICON and the State of Nevada, SIIS, arguing that, because in three days they would be terminated from their SIIS jobs, they were entitled to participate in a separate, but similar, NRS Chapter 286 buyout program that requires a state agency to subsidize the purchase of retirement service credits for certain employees who are terminated.6 The district court ordered joinder of all similarly situated employees as plaintiffs. The parties crafted a notice that was sent to all who had been employed by SIIS for at least five years, instructing them to file a Notice of Appearance if they chose to be joined in the action. Thirty more former SIIS employees joined the action, bringing the total number of plaintiffs to forty-four.
The State of Nevada moved to dismiss the action against it for failure to state a claim because the state agency named was no longer in existence and had been statutorily replaced by EICON, which had assumed all SIIS' debts and liabilities. The district court initially denied the State's motion to dismiss, but later, upon reconsideration, the court granted the dismissal with prejudice.
Thereafter, both EICON and the plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment. The district court determined that there "were no real disagreements over the facts of th[e] case." The court framed the legal issue as how to define the phrase "eligible for retirement." To answer that question, the district court compared language from NRS 286.5107 to language from SB 37. Ultimately, the district court granted EICON's summary judgment motion, concluding that the Legislature did not intend for employees such as the plaintiffs to be able to take advantage of the employee-reduction buyout provided in section 134 of SB 37. The district court's order did not address the applicability of the NRS Chapter 286 buyout program to employees such as the plaintiffs.
Appellants appeal the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of EICON, challenging as well the dismissal of the claims against the State of Nevada.
This court's review of a district court order granting summary judgment is de novo.8 Likewise, we review de novo a district court's statutory interpretation.9
Appellants contend that the district court erred in basing its ruling on the language of SB 37's buyout program. Appellants argue that their claims were brought instead under NRS Chapter 286, which requires any state agency reducing the number of its employees to offer employees who are "eligible to retire" a subsidized buyout of service credits. Appellants further argue that under SB 37, they were "terminated" from state employ and that this termination equals a reduction in work force for the purposes of NRS Chapter 286, thus making them eligible to participate in the statutory buyout program.
Respondents argue that appellants were not eligible for the NRS Chapter 286 buyout provision, since their employment continued and the state agency they previously worked for no longer exists. Respondents further argue that appellants were not "eligible to retire" under that provision, since they could not retire at full unreduced benefits, even with the purchase of up to five years of service credit.
"[W]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the legislature's intent."10 However, "[w]hen a statute is ambiguous, `the plain meaning rule has no application,' and the statute can be construed `in line with what reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended.'"11
This court presumes that the Legislature, when enacting statutes, is aware of other similar statutes.12 Therefore, we can presume that the Legislature, when enacting SB 37, was aware of the buyout provision of NRS Chapter 286, which has been in effect since 1985. There is no indication that the Legislature sought to replace or repeal that provision when enacting SB 37. Thus, in considering appellants' arguments, the district court should have determined whether they are entitled to proceed under the NRS Chapter 286 buyout provision, as asserted. The NRS Chapter 286 buyout provision is located at NRS 286.3007, which reads in pertinent part:
3. If a state agency is required to reduce the number of its employees, it shall purchase credit for service pursuant to NRS 286.300 for any member who:
(a) Is eligible to purchase credit;
(b) Is eligible to retire or will be made eligible by the purchase of the credit;
(c) Agrees to retire upon completion of the purchase; and (d) Has been employed by the agency for 5 or more years.
4. If a state agency is required to purchase credit pursuant to subsection 3, it shall pay 5 percent of the cost of purchasing the credit and an additional 5 percent of the cost for each year that the person has been employed by the agency in excess of the minimum requirement of 5 years.
The pertinent issue here is whether NRS 286.3007 applies to appellants, who were transferred from public to private employment. In particular, we must determine whether the privatization of SIIS constituted a reduction-in-force under NRS 286.3007(3). If so, we must then determine if appellants are entitled to the benefit of that provision, based on the definition of "eligible to retire" as used in NRS 286.3007(3)(b).
The language of NRS 286.3007(3) applies to those whose jobs are "reduced" by a state agency. In SNEA v. State, Employment Security Department, this court held that NRS 286.3007(3) obligated the state to purchase service credit for any eligible employee who was subject to a state agency's reduction-in-force termination.13 Under the plain language of SB 37, section 138, all EICON employees were "terminated" from state employ for the purposes of NRS Chapter 286. Although none of the appellants ultimately lost jobs, they did lose their state jobs; SIIS did in fact "reduce the number of its employees." Therefore, we conclude that NRS 286.3007(3) is an NRS Chapter 286 right or privilege to which appellants, if eligible, are entitled under the terms of SB 37.
Respondents argue that even if appellants were terminated for the purposes of NRS 286.3007(3), appe...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
High Noon At Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass'n, Nonprofit Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State
...this court will consider reason and public policy to determine legislative intent. Cable v. State ex rel. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 122 Nev. 120, 124–25, 127 P.3d 528, 531 (2006). When interpreting an ambiguous statute to give effect to the Legislature's intent, we will look to the legislati......
-
Sonia F. v. Dist. Ct.
...this court will construe a statute by considering reason and public policy to determine the Legislature's intent. Cable v. EICON, 122 Nev. 120, 124-25, 127 P.3d 528, 531 (2006). Nevada's rape shield statute, codified under NRS 50.090, In any prosecution for sexual assault or statutory sexua......
-
Double Diamond v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State
...this court will consider reason and public policy to determine legislative intent. Cable v. State ex rel. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 122 Nev. 120, 124–25, 127 P.3d 528, 531 (2006). In addition, this court assumes that when enacting a statute, the Legislature is aware of related, statutes. Id.......
-
Las Vegas Police Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev.
...the statutes in a manner consistent with the enforceability of those rights." Id. ; see also Cable v. State ex. rel. Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Nev., 122 Nev. 120, 125, 127 P.3d 528, 531 (2006) ("This court presumes that the Legislature, when enacting statutes, is aware of other similar statutes.")......