Cabrita Point Dev., Inc. v. Evans
| Decision Date | 30 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | 2006–109.,Civil Nos. 2006–103 |
| Citation | 52 V.I. 968 |
| Parties | CABRITA POINT DEVELOPMENT, INC. f/k/a K.R. Development Corp., Plaintiff, v. William Houston EVANS and James Alderman Evans, Jr, their heirs, successors, representatives and assigns, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, or interest in Parcel No. 6D–8 Estate Nazareth, No. 1 Red Hook Quarter, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Defendants. William Houston Evans, individually, and Tewatennietha Evans, as trustee for the James A. Evans Family Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs, v. Cabrita Point Development, Inc. f/k/a K.R. Development Corp., it heirs, successors, representatives and assigns, and Cabrita Grand Estates, LLC, it heirs, successors, representatives and assigns, and First Bank Puerto Rico, and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in Parcel No. 6D–8 Estate Nazareth, No. 1 Red Hook Quarter, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
James Bernier Jr. Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for William Houston Evans, Tewatennietha Evans, and the James A. Evans Family Revocable Trust.
Susan Bruch–Moorehead, Esq., Henry C. Smock, Esq., Kyle Waldner, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Cabrita Point Development, Inc. f/k/a K.R. Development Corp.
Maria T. Hodge, Esq., Mark D. Hodge, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for Cabrita Grand Estates.
Before the Court is the motion of Cabrita Point Development, Inc. f/k/a K.R. Development Corp. (“Cabrita Point”) to reconsider, vacate, or reopen summary judgment. William Houston Evans and Tewatennietha Evans as trustee for the James A. Evans Family Revocable Trust (collectively, the “Evans”) oppose the motion. The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 27, 2009. At that time, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental evidence. (Oral order April 27, 2009.) The parties timely complied.
In 1976, the Evans purchased Parcel No. 6, Estate Nazareth, No. 1 Red Hook Quarter, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands (“Parcel 6”). Parcel 6 was later subdivided into several other parcels, including Remainder of Parcel 6 (“Remainder 6”), Remainder of Parcel No. 6D (“Remainder 6D), Parcel Nos. 6D–1, 6D–2, 6D–3, 6D–4, 6D–5, 6D–6, 6D–7, Parcel 6D–8 (“Parcel 6D–8”), Parcel Nos. 6A, 6B 6C, 6E, 6F, 6G, 6H, 6I, 6J, 6K, 6L, 6N, 6O, No. 6P, and 6Q.
In 1982, the Evans conveyed Remainder 6, along with Remainder Parcel 6D, Parcel No. 6D–1, Parcel No. 6D–2, Parcel No. 6D–3, Parcel No. 6E, and Parcel No. 6Q, which had been surveyed out of Parcel 6 by a surveyor named Leonard Lawrence (“Lawrence”), to Peninsula Development Limited Partnership (“PDLP”). At some point, the exact date of which is not clear from the record, PDLP conveyed all of its assets to its general partner Peninsula Development, Inc. (“Peninsula”). Peninsula was a corporation formed by the Evans, along with others, in 1980. In 1984 Peninsula conveyed “Remainder Parcel 6M (formerly known as Parcel No. 6),” Remainder 6D, Parcel 6D–1, Parcel 6D–2, Parcel 6D–3, Parcel 6E, Parcel 6L, and Parcel 6Q, all of Estate Nazareth, No. 1 Red Hook Quarter to K.R. Development (“K.R.”). (Ex. 4 Mot. for Summary J.) K.R. later changed its name to Cabrita Point. Thereafter Cabrita Point conveyed Parcel 6D–8 to Cabrita Grand Estates (“Cabrita Grand”).
On March 3, 2006, Cabrita Point filed a five-count complaint against the Evans. In its complaint, Cabrita Point sought to quiet title and to obtain a declaratory judgment that it owns Parcel 6D–8. Cabrita Point also alleged claims of adverse possession, bad faith slander of title, and deliberate interference with contractual relations. The Evans filed an answer to Cabrita Point's complaint in which they raised four counterclaims. The Evans sought to quiet title and to obtain a declaratory judgment with regard to the ownership of Parcel 6D–8. The Evans also raised counterclaims of bad faith slander of title and deliberate interference with contractual relations.1
On July 12, 2006, the Evans filed a separate action in this Court alleging identical claims to their counterclaims. Thereafter, the cases were consolidated.
On April 20, 2007, the Evans moved for summary judgment on all of their claims and Cabrita Point's claims. On April 25, 2007, Cabrita Point filed a motion for an extension of time to respond to the Evans' pending motion, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That motion was granted by an order dated May 10, 2007. The order extended the response deadline to June 15, 2007. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for July 20, 2007. At some point, without leave of the Court, the parties agreed to further extend the response deadline to June 29, 2007.
On July 13, 2007, Cabrita Point filed another motion for an extension of time to file its opposition to the Evans' motion. Cabrita Point requested an extension of five business days in its motion. The extension of time as requested by Cabrita Point ended on July 20, 2007, the date of the scheduled hearing.
On July 20, 2007, this matter came on for a hearing on the summary judgment motion. On the day of the hearing, Cabrita Point still did not file its opposition brief. The Court denied Cabrita Point's motion for an extension, noting that Court-ordered deadlines are not suggestions, but are orders of the Court that require compliance.
At the hearing, the Court ruled from the bench, granting summary judgment in favor of the Evans on Cabrita Point's complaint for count I (adverse possession), II (quiet title), III (declaratory judgment), IV (slander of title), and V (deliberate interference). The Court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Evans on count I (quiet title) and II (declaratory judgment) of their complaint. The Court denied summary judgment as to counts III (slander of title) and IV (deliberate interference) of the Evans' complaint.2 Cabrita Point timely filed a motion for reconsideration.
Cabrita Point asks the Court to take into consideration matters set forth in Cabrita Point's untimely opposition to the Evans' summary judgment motion, and to: (1) to reconsider its denial of Cabrita Point's motions for an enlargement of time to file an opposition, and (2) to reconsider its order granting the Evans summary judgment on all counts of Cabrita Points complaint and granting the Evans' summary judgment motion as to counts I and II of their complaint.
In the alternative, Cabrita Point asks the Court to open the judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a) or 54(b). Cabrita Point asks the Court to take additional evidence and make new findings.
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.3 provides for motions to reconsider based upon, “1. intervening change in controlling law; 2. availability of new evidence, or; 3. the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” LRCi 7.3.
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration “is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985). Such motions are not substitutes for appeals, and are not to be used as “a vehicle for registering disagreement with the court's initial decision, for rearguing matters already addressed by the court, or for raising arguments that could have been raised before but were not.” Bostic v. AT & T of the Virgin Islands, 312 F.Supp.2d 731, 733 (D.V.I.2004).
To support a motion for reconsideration on the basis of newly available evidence, the movant must “show not only that this evidence was newly discovered or unknown to it until after the hearing, but also that it could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced such evidence [during the pendency of the motion].” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc ., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir.1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir.1963)).
In the context of a motion to reconsider, manifest injustice “[g]enerally, [ ] means that the Court overlooked some dispositive factual or legal matter that was presented to it.” In re Rose, No. 06–1818, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64622, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2007). Manifest injustice has also been defined as “ ‘an error in the trial court that is direct, obvious, and observable.’ “ Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Wells, 371 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir.2004)(quoting Black's Law Dictionary 974 (7th ed.1999)). “[M]ost cases ... use the term ‘manifest injustice’ to describe the result of a plain error.” Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1425 (5th Cir.1996).
Cabrita Point argues that the Court should have granted its motion for an extension of time to file an opposition to the Evans' motion for summary judgment. Cabrita Point represents that it complied with the substance and spirit of Rule 56(f),3 even though it failed to comply with the technical requirements of the rule.
Rule 56(f) establishes the procedure for a party to follow when seeking an extension of time to submit an opposition to a summary judgment motion. 4 When a party makes a Rule 56(f) motion instead of opposing a motion for summary judgment, the party bears the burden of proving by affidavit that the court should exercise its discretion in delaying judgment on the motion. See, e.g., Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co., 24 F.3d 508, 510–511 (3d Cir.1994) ()(footnote omitted); Radiche v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir.1989) ().
Under Rule 56(f), the affidavit in support...
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