Caceres v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey

• Decision Date: 19 June 2009
• Docket Number: No. 06 Civ. 1558(JGK).,06 Civ. 1558(JGK).
• Parties: Joseph CACERES, Plaintiff, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

646 F.Supp.2d 412

Joseph CACERES, Plaintiff, v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants.

No. 06 Civ. 1558(JGK).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

June 19, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Brett Harris Klein, Leventhal & Klein, LLP, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff.

Scott Charles Occhiogrosso, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.

This is a case of an arrest based on mistaken identity.

On August 4, 2004, the plaintiff, Joseph Caceres, reported to the Port Authority Police Building at the George Washington Bridge (the "Station") in order to retrieve his car, which had been towed earlier that day because it was parked illegally. At the Station, located on the New Jersey side of the Bridge, the plaintiff was mistaken by police officers employed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (the "Port Authority") for the subject of an outstanding felony narcotics warrant issuing out of Bronx County, New York. The plaintiff was arrested as a fugitive from justice. The officers made the arrest after being informed by the Port Authority Central Police Desk (the "CPD") of a match in the database of criminal history records maintained by the New York State Department of Criminal Justice Services (the "DCJS") between the plaintiff's name and date of birth and the warrant, which was for an unidentified subject, "John Doe." The plaintiff was arrested despite protesting that he was not the subject of the warrant and despite several inconsistencies between the plaintiff's physical characteristics and those of the subject described in the warrant, including a discrepancy between the plaintiff's race and the race of the subject described in the warrant.

After the plaintiff was arrested and placed in a holding cell at the Station, the officers involved in the arrest continued to investigate whether the plaintiff was in fact the subject of the warrant. The plaintiff remained in custody, first at the station and, following a judicial proceeding, at the Bergen County Correctional Facility, until August 6, 2004. On that date, due to information obtained by certain of the officers after being prodded into further investigation by the plaintiff's father, it became clear that the plaintiff was not the subject of the warrant on which he was being held, and the plaintiff was released from custody.

The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the Port Authority and three police officers employed by the Port Authority who participated in his arrest and the related investigation: Lieutenant Roenzo Sangiorgi, Sergeant Michael Barry, and Officer Michael Lydon (the "investigating officers").¹ The plaintiff alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey State law against the Port Authority and the investigating officers, including false arrest claims under federal and state law against the investigating officers, a failure to intervene claim under federal law against the investigating officers, a failure to train claim under federal law against the Port Authority, and false arrest, illegal strip search, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims under state law against the Port Authority based on a theory of vicarious liability.² After a trial lasting approximately two weeks, the jury returned a special verdict form finding Lieutenant Sangiorgi liable for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Jersey state law, and the Port Authority vicariously liable for false arrest under New Jersey state law. The jury awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in compensatory damages. The jury found that Lieutenant Sangiorgi was not liable for punitive damages. The jury did not find the other investigating officers liable on any claim, and did not find Lieutenant Sangiorgi or the Port Authority liable on any claim other than false arrest. Following the return of the special verdict form, the Court distributed to the jury a series of special interrogatories to assist the Court in its determination as a matter of law whether Lieutenant Sangiorgi was entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest claims.

At the close of the trial, after the jury had returned its verdict and answered the special interrogatories, Lieutenant Sangiorgi and the Port Authority (the "defendants") jointly moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) to set aside the jury verdict against them.³ Lieutenant Sangiorgi also moved separately for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court reserved decision on the motions and the parties proceeded to brief them. The defendants now renew their respective motions and also move in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.⁴

For the reasons explained below, the defendants' joint motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 or a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 is denied. However, Lieutenant Sangiorgi's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified immunity is granted.

I

It is well-established that a district court should deny a Rule 50 motion unless "viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, `the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.'" Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir.1970)) (alteration in original); see also SEC v. Zwick, No. 03 Civ. 2742, 2007 WL 831812, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007); Fowler v. N.Y. Transit Auth., No. 96 Civ. 6796, 2001 WL 83228, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001); Dailey v. Societe Generale, 915 F.Supp. 1315, 1321 (S.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd in relevant part, 108 F.3d 451, 457-58 (2d Cir.1997).

A trial court considering a motion under Rule 50(b) "must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury might have drawn in its favor." Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir.1993). A jury verdict should be set aside only when "there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or [where there is] such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded [persons] could not arrive at a verdict against [the movant]." Logan v. Bennington Coll. Corp., 72 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir.1996) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Zwick, 2007 WL 831812, at *2.

In the alternative, the defendants move for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). In determining whether a new trial is appropriate under Rule 59(a), a court applies a less stringent standard than on a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 244-45 (2d Cir.2003); Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir.1987). "[F]or a district court to order a new trial under Rule 59(a), it must conclude that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or . . . the verdict is a miscarriage of justice, i.e., it must view the jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence." Manley, 337 F.3d at 245 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

II

There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from which the jury could reasonably have found as follows.

On August 4, 2004, the plaintiff, who worked as a seasonal bridge painter at the George Washington Bridge (the "Bridge"), arrived late to work and parked his car illegally. (Tr. 69-70, 77-78.) The Port Authority towed the plaintiff's car to the Station on the New Jersey side of the Bridge. (Tr. 80.) At approximately 4:30 p.m., the plaintiff reported to the station to retrieve his car. (Tr. 81, 249.) He presented his driver's license and employee photo identification card to Officer Lydon. (Tr. 83.) The card reflected that the plaintiff was a Port Authority contract employee. (Tr. 83, 250.) The plaintiff explained to Officer Lydon that he worked as a painter at the Bridge and that his car had been towed. (Tr. 83.) The plaintiff was cooperative and polite and did not seem nervous. (Tr. 249-50.) Officer Lydon told the plaintiff that the plaintiff's car would be retrieved "right away." (Tr. 83.)

In the course of arranging for the release of the plaintiff's car, Officer Lydon communicated the plaintiff's name and date of birth over the phone to CPD, the communications hub and headquarters of the Port Authority Police Department (Tr. 240-41), in order to determine whether the plaintiff's driver's license was valid. (Tr. 251-52, 314.) CPD informed Officer Lydon over the phone that the plaintiff's license was valid but there was an outstanding warrant for the plaintiff's arrest. (Tr. 261.) Officer Lydon immediately informed Lieutenant Sangiorgi, who was functioning as Officer Lydon's direct supervisor at the time (Tr. 600), that the plaintiff was possibly the subject of an outstanding warrant. (Tr. 262.) Lieutenant Sangiorgi assigned Sergeant Barry to assist Officer Lydon in arresting the plaintiff because Officer Lydon was inexperienced in processing arrests on the New Jersey side of the Bridge. (Tr. 644, 890.)

Approximately two hours elapsed between the plaintiff's initial exchange with Officer Lydon upon entering the Station and the detention of the plaintiff in a holding cell at the Station. (Tr. 83, 270.) The plaintiff waited patiently for those two hours for the retrieval of his car. (Tr. 83.) During that time, CPD faxed to Officer Lydon a document confirming the information that CPD had conveyed over the phone regarding the "warrant hit." (Tr 272, 359-60.) The document was a printout of the warrant (the "warrant...