Cache Auto Co. v. Central Garage

• Decision Date: 13 December 1923
• Docket Number: 3993
• Citation: 63 Utah 10,221 P. 862
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: CACHE AUTO CO. v. CENTRAL GARAGE et al

221 P. 862

63 Utah 10

CACHE AUTO CO. v. CENTRAL GARAGE et al

No. 3993

Supreme Court of Utah

December 13, 1923

Appeal from District Court, First District, Cache County; M. C Harris, Judge.

Replevin by the Cache Auto Company against the Central Garage and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

AFFIRMED.

L. E Nelson, of Logan, for appellant.

E. T Young, of Logan, for respondent.

THURMAN, J. WEBER, C. J., and GIDEON, FRICK, and CHERRY, JJ., concur.

OPINION

THURMAN, J.

On July 20, 1921, plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendants, other than Central Garage Company, a certain automobile for the sum of $ 300, payable at a later date and retained title within itself as security for the purchase price. The title retaining agreement provided that in default of payment of the sums therein mentioned plaintiff might retake possession of the car. On December 7, 1921, the defendant Carlisle, one of the purchasers, took the car to the defendant Central Garage Company for repairs with instructions to put the machine in thorough repair, which was afterwards done in accordance with said instructions. Said repairs, consisted in overhauling the machine, furnishing material and accessories therefor, and bestowing labor thereon amounting in value to the sum of $ 99.14. At the time the repairs were made the defendant Central Garage Company had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, that plaintiff held a title retaining note or agreement for the car, but believed it belonged to the above-named purchasers; that defendant Carlisle so represented when he took the car to the garage for repairs; that said defendant Central Garage Company never knew that plaintiff claimed an interest in the car until June, 1922. In addition to the foregoing facts, which were stipulated by the parties, it was further stipulated that there was due plaintiff on the purchase price $ 205.63; that the car was reasonably worth the sum of $ 225; and that the Central Garage Company retains possession thereof, claiming a lien thereon to secure the account for repairs.

The action is in claim and delivery and for value of the property in case delivery cannot be had. Defendant Central Garage Company in addition to its answer in which it set up its claim of lien for repairs also filed a cross-complaint for the same amount against its codefendants who requested the repairs to be made.

The Logan city court, in which the action was commenced, found the issues in favor of the defendant Central Garage Company and against the plaintiff on the claim of lien and ordered a sale of the car. The court also found for defendant Central Garage Company against its codefendant, Myron C. Carlisle, for the sum charged for repairs and for a deficiency judgment.

Plaintiff appealed to the district court for Cache county, in which court judgment was entered for the plaintiff. From the judgment so entered defendant Central Garage Company prosecutes this appeal.

The findings of the court are in accordance with the facts above set forth, as to which there is no dispute.

The question is as to the priority of appellant's lien for repairs as against the lien of respondent for the amount due on the purchase price. This precise question has never been determined by this court in any previous case.

Appellant bases its claim of lien upon Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 3773, which reads as follows:

"Any mechanic or other person who shall make, alter, repair, or bestow labor upon any article of personal property, at the request of the owner of such property, shall in like manner have a lien upon such articles for his reasonable charges for the labor performed and for any materials furnished and used in making such alteration, repair, or improvement."

No question is made by the parties as to the reasonableness of the charge for repairs.

The question as to the right of a vendor of personal property who retains title until the purchase price is paid to hold such title and maintain an action therefor as against the vendee, in default, or third person claiming under such vendee, was determined by this court in a very early case. Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P. 865. The headnote, consisting of a single paragraph, sufficiently states the facts and the holding of the court:

"The plaintiff delivered to P. and F. certain machinery upon the conditions that the title thereto should remain in the plaintiff until certain notes, taken for the purchase price thereof, were paid and on such payment should rest in P. and F., that the plaintiff could take possession of the machinery on default in the payment of any note or when it deemed itself insecure, could sell the same and credit the proceeds on the notes and hold P. and F. for the residue. P. and F. sold and delivered the machinery to defendant and then failed to pay one of the notes; the contract between plaintiff and P. and F. lacked the statutory requisites of a chattel mortgage; held that the transaction between plaintiff and P. and F. was a conditional sale and that the plaintiff was entitled to the property as against the defendant."

In Passow et al. v. Emery, 37 Utah 49, 106 P. 935, the court again had occasion to pass upon a question substantially similar to the question determined in Russell v Harkness. In the opinion in that case, at page 59 of 37 Utah at page 938 of 106 P., of the report, the court says:

"Where, as in the transaction in question, the title is retained by the vendor, this court, as appears from the cases cited by Mr. Justice Straup, beginning with Russell v.Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P. 865, to Freed, etc., Co. v. Sorenson, supra, has consistently and persistently held that a third person cannot acquire any interest in the property from the vendee by reason of his possession adverse to the vendor, without his consent, either express or implied. Whether such a rule, in all cases and under all circumstances, reflects the most equitable results is not a material question now. Those who transact business in this state have the right to rely upon the law as declared in the decisions of this court, and are entitled to the full legal effects of contracts respecting conditional sales. Nor are the legal effects of such contracts to be avoided by false or unnatural constructions."

These cases clearly determine the ownership of personal property by a vendor who retains title in himself until the purchase price is paid, whether against the conditional vendee or third person claiming under him.

The statute, Section 3773, above quoted, authorizes the lien of a repairman only "at the request of the owner of such property," and that appears to be the nub of the entire controversy.

Appellant contends for the priority of its lien upon either one of two theories: (1) That the vendor by permitting the property to remain in the control of the purchaser gives the purchaser implied authority to have the necessary repairs made therefor and to afford the repairman a superior lien for the payment of the amount; (2) that the seller constitutes the buyer his agent to have necessary repairs made, and thereby consent of the owner is implied.

The two theories are based upon the holdings of two lines of authority, both reaching the same result. Each of these theories involves the necessity of changing the literal meaning of the statute by an interpretation which at least violates a fundamental rule of construction. The plainest and perhaps the most important rule of construction is that unless technical terms are used the words employed must be given their usual and ordinary meaning. This is not only a general rule recognized in every jurisdiction of the country, but is, in effect, the rule declared by statute. Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 5847.

Appellant, however, in a carefully prepared brief, refers us to many cases which more or less appear to support its contention. Among the many authorities cited, reference is made to Huddy on Automobiles (5th Ed.) § 877, and Berry on Automobiles (3d Ed.) § 1329, all of which authorities uphold the mechanic's lien as against the owner of the car. Huddy cites the following cases which we will briefly review, making special reference to the statutes by which the cases are controlled:

Weber Implement & Automobile Co. v. Pearson, 132 Ark. 101, 200 S.W. 273, L.R.A. 1918D, 327, was a case in which an automobile was sold on condition--the vendor retaining title until the purchase price was paid. The case involved priority of liens as between the vendor and the repairman who repaired the car at the request of the conditional vendee. The statute relied on by the repairman provided that blacksmiths and wheelwrights who perform work or labor for any person, if unpaid for, the same shall have an absolute lien on the product of their labor on the property described and for all material used in making the repairs. Nothing whatever is said as to the owner or person ordering the repairs.

Davenport v. Grundy Motor Sales Co., 28 Cal.App. 409, 152 P. 932, was also a conditional sales case of an automobile in which the vendor retained title until payment of the purchase price. The conditional vendee left the car with the defendant for repairs, and, his repairs having been made and not paid for, defendant retained the car, claiming a lien thereon as security for the amount due for repairs. Plaintiff sued in claim and delivery. The question involved was priority of liens. The California statute controlling the case provides that--

"A person who makes, alters or repairs any article of personal property, at the request of the owner, or legal possessor of the property, has a lien on the same for his reasonable charges," etc. (Italics supplied.)

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