Cadle Co. v. D'addario

• Decision Date: 06 September 2011
• Docket Number: 31674,32066.,Nos. 31174,s. 31174
• Citation: 26 A.3d 682,131 Conn.App. 223
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: CADLE COMPANYv.David D'ADDARIO, Executor (Estate of F. Francis D'Addario), et al.

131 Conn.App. 223

26 A.3d 682

CADLE COMPANY

v.David D'ADDARIO, Executor (Estate of F. Francis D'Addario), et al.

Nos. 31174

31674

32066.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 25, 2011.Decided Sept. 6, 2011.

Gary S. Klein, with whom was Susan R. Briggs, Stamford, for the appellants-appellees (defendants).C. Donald Neville, West Hartford, for the appellee-appellant (plaintiff).GRUENDEL, ROBINSON and WEST, Js.GRUENDEL, J.

In these consolidated appeals, the defendants, David D'Addario and Lawrence D'Addario, as coexecutors of the estate of F. Francis D'Addario (decedent), appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Cadle Company, in connection with a jury trial of a collection action. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly (1) denied their motion to strike the plaintiff's prayer for relief, (2) granted the plaintiff's motion to strike their counterclaims, (3) denied their motion to set aside the verdict, and (4) awarded the plaintiff statutory post-judgment interest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the defendants' first three claims but reverse its award of statutory postjudgment interest. Also, on cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly held that it was not entitled to recover a delinquency charge provided for in a demand note (note) executed by the decedent.¹ We agree, and, accordingly, reverse that portion of judgment of the trial court. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In 1985, the decedent executed the note, which had a principal value of $1 million. Following his death in 1986, the defendants, the decedent's two sons, were appointed as coexecutors of the decedent's estate. In 1994, the Bank of New Haven (bank) transferred the note and all of its right, title, and interest therein to the plaintiff. In 2002, the plaintiff commenced this action to collect on the note. On March 29, 2006, the defendants filed an answer and a three count counterclaim alleging: (1) violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42–110 et seq.; (2) abuse of process; and (3) vexatious litigation, in violation of General Statutes § 52–568.² On September 1, 2006, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the counterclaim in its entirety. The court initially granted in part the plaintiff's motion to strike and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff with respect to all of the defendants' counterclaims.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Before trial, both parties filed motions in limine seeking to exclude certain evidence. The plaintiff sought to exclude evidence of the amount that it had paid to purchase the note and certain evidence relating to the defendants' counterclaim. The defendants sought exclusion of any evidence that the amount of the plaintiff's claim exceeded the principal value of the note, or $1 million.

On May 28, 2009, the court addressed those evidentiary issues and ruled that the plaintiff would be allowed to adduce evidence that its claim exceeded $1 million. The court reserved judgment on the admissibility of the purchase price, ruling that the defendants would be permitted to lay the proper foundation for their proffer of evidence relating thereto. During trial, the court again addressed the plaintiff's motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence regarding the purchase price of the note and the defendants' counterclaim. The court ultimately excluded evidence of both. In so ruling, the court reasoned that such evidence was irrelevant and had the tendency to confuse the jury.

After the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, claiming that the plaintiff had not proven a reasonable substitute interest rate for the bank's prime rate ³ and that it was not entitled to collect a “delinquency charge” of 2 percent per year ⁴ because it constituted a late fee prohibited by Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Napert–Boyer Partnership, 40 Conn.App. 434, 671 A.2d 1303 (1996). The court denied the defendants' motion regarding the reasonable substitute interest rate, ruling that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence as to a reasonable substitute interest rate to reach the jury. Nonetheless, the court granted the defendants' motion regarding the delinquency charge, ruling that the plaintiff could not collect the delinquency charge as it constituted an impermissible late charge.

On June 3, 2009, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Specifically, the jury found that the plaintiff had proven that the amount due on the note was $810,245.59, that the interest rate it sought was a fair and reasonable substitute interest rate for the bank's rate, that interest should accrue from July, 1990, and that the plaintiff was entitled to costs of collection. On June 11, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial and moved for judgment in accordance with their motion for a directed verdict. The court denied those motions.

On March 1, 2010, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, awarding it $810,245.59 as the principal amount due under the note, interest accrued from June, 1990, to June 3, 2009, in the amount of approximately $1.3 million, interest paid on the principal from June 4, 2009, to the date of the entry of judgment in the amount of $28,863.00, postjudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent from the date of judgment until the full amount is paid and costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees, in the amount of $435,369.54. On June 8, 2010 the defendants filed a motion for rectification and/or articulation concerning the court's award of postjudgment interest, and the motion was denied. These appeals followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

IDIRECT APPEAL

A

The defendants first claim that the court improperly denied their motion to strike the plaintiff's prayer for relief. Specifically, the defendants claim that the plaintiff was not entitled to obtain a money judgment under General Statutes § 45a–400 and that the judgment rendered by the court was not a money judgment under General Statutes § 52–350a (13). We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this claim. On May 13, 2004, the defendants moved to strike the prayer for relief in the plaintiff's amended complaint, filed May 10, 2004. The defendants claimed that the prayer for relief should be stricken for legal insufficiency because the statute the plaintiff brought the action under, § 45a–400, does not authorize a money judgment, damages, interest and costs, or attorney's fees. On May 27, 2004, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion to strike. On July 6, 2004, the court denied the defendants' motion, concluding that the plaintiff's prayer for relief was properly pleaded.

Before addressing the merits of the defendants' claim that the court improperly denied their motion to strike, we set forth the applicable standard of review and legal principles governing our analysis. The purpose of a motion to strike “is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 384, 650 A.2d 153 (1994). The motion to strike “contest[s] ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 214–15, 618 A.2d 25 (1992). In addition, it may test “the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint, counterclaim or cross-complaint....” Practice Book § 10–39(a)(2); see also Carchidi v. Rodenhiser, 209 Conn. 526, 531, 551 A.2d 1249 (1989).

“The standard of review in an appeal from the granting of a motion to strike is well established. Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling ... is plenary.... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted.... For the purpose of ruling upon a motion to strike, the facts alleged in a complaint, though not the legal conclusions it may contain, are deemed to be admitted.... A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metcoff v. Lebovics, 123 Conn.App. 512, 516, 2 A.3d 942 (2010).

Section 45a–400 sets out the procedure for when a claimant presents a claim to the fiduciary and the fiduciary does not disallow the claim within thirty days following the limitation period in General Statutes § 45a–395. A claimant may then give written notice that he intends to bring an action on the claim within four months. If the claimant fails to bring an action within four months of the notice, the claimant is barred from bringing an action on his claim against the fiduciary.

Although our research reveals no binding authority addressing the precise statutory issue presented by the case at bar, General Statutes § 45a–363, the equivalent statute for claims against decedents' estates for decedents dying on or after October 1, 1987, has been explicitly recognized as purely procedural and not as providing a substantive cause of action. For example, in Keller v. Beckenstein, 122 Conn.App. 438, 444–45, 998 A.2d 838, cert. granted, 298 Conn. 921, 4 A.3d 1227, 5 A.3d 486 (2010), this court held that § 45a–363 does not provide a cause of action and could not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Superior Court when it did not...