Cadle Co. v. D'Addario

• Decision Date: 28 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 28948.,28948.
• Citation: 111 Conn.App. 80,957 A.2d 536
• Parties: CADLE COMPANY v. David D'ADDARIO et al.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

957 A.2d 536

111 Conn.App. 80

CADLE COMPANY v. David D'ADDARIO et al.

No. 28948.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 15, 2008.

Decided October 28, 2008.

Michael G. Albano, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Gary S. Klein, with whom was Susan R. Briggs, Stamford, for the appellees (defendants).

BISHOP, GRUENDEL and FOTI, Js.

BISHOP, J.

The plaintiff, the Cadle Company, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, David D'Addario and Lawrence D'Addario, both individually and as executors of the estate of F. Francis D'Addario (decedent). The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of its determination that the claims were unripe for adjudication. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to the resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. The decedent died in 1986, and the defendants were appointed executors of his estate. Subsequently, on September 23, 1994, the plaintiff purchased a promissory note from a creditor of the decedent and filed a notice of a claim in excess of $1 million against the decedent's estate. The plaintiff's claim is still pending in the Probate Court.¹

In July 2006, the plaintiff filed this action in seven counts alleging breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing, unjust enrichment, conversion, statutory theft and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act; General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; and seeking an accounting pursuant to General Statutes § 52-401. On August 21, 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action and that its claims are not yet ripe for review. In a memorandum of decision filed April 12, 2007, the court determined that although the plaintiff had standing, it was premature for the plaintiff to bring this action without the resolution of its underlying probate claim. The court, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In a supplemental memorandum of decision issued in response to the plaintiff's motion to reargue, the court reiterated its conclusion that the plaintiff's claims were not ripe for adjudication.² This appeal followed.

"[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter." Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 569, 858 A.2d 709 (2004). "Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power ... and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.... Finally, because an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 568-69, 858 A.2d 709.

"A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 91, 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). "[B]ecause an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review [of the defendants' ripeness claim] is plenary." Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, at 569, 858 A.2d 709.

"[T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.... Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 86-87, 952 A.2d 1 (2008).

In this case, the existence of the plaintiff's injury is contingent on a determination of the priorities of the creditors of the decedent's estate, the final settlement of the estate and the absence of sufficient funds in the estate to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. In other words, any injury sustained by the plaintiff stemming from the allegations of the defendants' misconduct are, at this point, hypothetical.³ This case is distinguishable from those cases in which only the amount of damages is in question, thereby affecting the plaintiff's ability to prove its case, and not the court's jurisdiction. In those cases, in which the injury had already occurred, the...