Cadwell v. Watson.

Citation60 A.2d 168,134 Conn. 640
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date03 June 1948
PartiesCADWELL et al. v. WATSON.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Windham County; King, Judge.

Action by Ella Cadwell and others against Ralph Watson to recover for injuries sustained by plaintiffs while passengers in defendant's taxicab. From a judgment for plaintiffs after trial to jury before King, J., in the superior court in Windham County, the defendant appeals.

No error.

JENNINGS, J., dissenting.

Cyril Coleman, of Hartford, for appellant.

Jacob Berman, of Hartford, for appellees.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

DICKENSON, Judge.

This is an action for damages brought against a common carrier, by passengers of his taxicab, for personal injuries arising out of a collision between the cab and another car. The defendant has appealed from a judgment for the plaintiffs, assigning error in the denial of a motion to set aside the verdict and in the finding and charge.

From the evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs, the jury could have found the following facts: The collision occurred on the night of December 20, 1942, on Main Street in Willimantic, a heavily traveled highway which runs substantially east and west and is a part of route 6 to Providence, Rhode Island. Main Street was icy and slippery, with snowbanks two or three feet wide on either side adjacent to the curb, and the temperature was well below zero. Shortly before midnight, the plaintiffs ordered a taxicab of the defendant to transport them from their residence to their place of employment. Francis Ryan also had telephoned for a taxicab, and George Freeman, the defendant's employee, drove his cab to Ryan's residence, picked him up, and then drove to the Cadwell house, where the plaintiff Ella Cadwell, her husband, the plaintiff Aldea Flynn and another passenger were taken into the cab. When Freeman arrived at Ryan's house, Ryan told him that he had ordered the cab for the purpose of pushing his car, which had stalled because of the low temperature. Freeman agreed to do this, but the plaintiffs did not know of the project. En route to the plaintiffs' place of employment, Freeman stopped the cab and then pushed Ryan's car with it for several hundred feet on Main Street. He then gave the car a sharp push so that Ryan might steer it into a filling station lot. Ryan was unsuccessful in this, Freeman backed the taxicab, and Ryan's car was maneuvered back onto the highway so that both vehicles were parallel to and about six feet from the curb and about three feet from the snowbank beside the curb with the taxicab behind the Ryan car. Freeman got ready to push the Ryan car again with the taxicab when Henry Tetreault, driving a Cadillac car, approached from the rear at a rate of speed of ten to fifteen miles an hour. Tetreault saw the taxicab at a standstill but could not see the car ahead of it. He turned out to pass and then saw the Ryan car and that both cars were starting to move. At the same time he saw another car approaching from the opposite direction, knew he could not get by the taxicab and Ryan's car in time to avoid collision, and ‘slammed on’ his brakes. The front end of his car ‘slid over’ and struck the rear mudguard of the taxi, causing the plaintiffs' injuries.

The defendant claims that the verdict should have been set aside for several reasons. He contends in the first place that the complaint alleges that the negligence of Freeman was in stopping the taxi at the point of collision, that it did not allege that the cars were in motion and that the plaintiffs cannot recover upon the theory that the taxicab and Ryan's car were in motion at the time of collision. The allegation in the complaint is that Freeman was negligent in stopping to push the Ryan car. It was broad enough to cover the point in question. Huber v. H. R. Douglas, Inc., 94 Conn. 167, 183, 108 A. 727. Both the defendant and Freeman testified that the latter had been forbidden to use a taxicab to push other cars, and Ryan, called as a plaintiffs' witness, testified on cross-examination that Freeman had informed him of this fact. If we assume that the jury found the fact to be as the defendant claimed, this would not in itself, as the defendant contends, show that Freeman was acting outside the scope of his authority, for reasons which we hereafter state.

The defendant claims that the collision was caused solely by Tetreault's negligence and that Freeman's conduct was neither negligent nor a proximate cause of the collision. The defendant was a common carrier and as such was required to use the highest degree of care and skill which reasonably may be expected of intelligent and prudent persons engaged in such a business, in view of the instrumentalities employed and the dangers naturally to be apprehended. Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 551, 1 A.2d 143. The Ryan car was directly in front of the taxicab and was hidden from Tetrault's view by it. The road was narrowed by the snowbanks and was icy. The juxtaposition of the two cars was unusual, and the jury could find that there was nothing unreasonable in Tetreault's conclusion that he had but one car to pass and that one stationary. They reasonably could find that Freeman failed to note the approach of Tetreault's car from the rear (see General Statutes, Cum.Sup.1935, § 613c) and did not see the car approaching from the other direction because of the Ryan car. The jury could draw a fair inference that Freeman, in starting to push the Ryan car over the slippery road in the restricted space without ascertaining the approach of the other cars, failed to use the requisite degree of care for the safety of his passengers. His vision was blocked in part at least by the Ryan car, and his attention diverted from the approach of the car overtaking him. His conduct could reasonably have been found to have materially contributed to the collision. ‘The bus driver's negligence, if any, as between him and his passengers, is to be measured by his duty as a common carrier, not by his duty to other users of the road.’ Washington v. City of Seattle, 170 Wash. 371, 378, 16 P.2d 597, 600, 86 A.L.R. 113. There was no error in the denial of the motion to set aside the verdict.

The defendant's attack on the charge is premised by one on the finding by which we test it. Mavrides v. Lyon, 123 Conn. 173, 174, 193 A. 605. The finding in a jury case is ‘but a narrative of the facts claimed to have been proven by the parties, made for the purpose of presenting any claimed errors in the charge or rulings of the court.’ Voronelis v. White Line Bus Corporation, 123 Conn. 25, 27, 192 A. 265, 266. Reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are proper bases for claims of proof. See Carlson v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 724, 728, 112 A. 646; Marley v. New England Transportation Co., 133 Conn. 586, 591, 53 A.2d 296. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs' claims ‘are so highly colored as not to reflect the evidence.’ His specific contention is that the evidence did not justify claims of proof that Freeman was primarily engaged in his master's business and had created an unusual hazard while so engaged. They were justifiable claims and we find no error in including them in the finding.

The attack on the charge, as pursued in the defendant's brief, in substance is that, contrary to his requests, the trial court failed to point out to the jury that it was proper on the evidence for them to find that Freeman had temporarily suspended his activities as a servant of the defendant...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Loughery v. Future Century Limousine, LLC, 11 Civ. 5108 (PGG)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • September 24, 2013
    ...v Town of Manchester, No. X04HHDCV095034624S, 2010 WL 5158252, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 24, 2010) (quoting Cadwell v. Watson, 134 Conn. 640, 646 (1948)). Citing no law, however, Future argues that "it is questionable whether Future's special duties as a common carrier are even implicate......
  • State v. Buteau.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • August 16, 1949
    ......Cadwell v. Watson, 134 Conn. 640, 644, 60 A.2d 168; Conn.App.Proc. § 85. None of the corrections sought could materially affect such claims as the defendant ......
  • Titan Indem. Co. v. School Dist. No. 1
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • December 1, 2005
    ......Page 1079. have been held, or properly found, negligent in connection with the pushing operation. See, e.g., Cadwell v. Watson, 134 Conn. 640, 60 A.2d 168 (1948); Rees v. Spillane, 341 Ill.App. 647, 94 N.E.2d 686 (1950); Duffy v. Harden, supra; Kohler v. Sheffert, ......
  • Culetsu v. Dix
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • April 24, 1962
    ...... Callahan v. Grady, 125 Conn. 733, 734, 7 A.2d 225; Cadwell v. Watson, 134 Conn. 640, 646, 60 A.2d 168; Yu v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 145 Conn. 451, 455, 144 A.2d ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT