Cady v. Murphy, 3570.
Decision Date | 15 August 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 3570.,3570. |
Citation | 113 F.2d 988 |
Parties | CADY et al. v. MURPHY. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Richard Wait, of Boston, Mass., and Robert Hale, of Portland, Me., for appellants.
Richard S. Chapman, of Portland, Me. (Nathan W. Thompson, of Portland, Me., on the brief), for appellee.
Withington, Cross, Proctor & Park, Lothrop Withington, and Edward C. Park, all of Boston, Mass., amici curiæ for Boston Association of Stock Exchange Firms.
Before MAGRUDER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges, and McLELLAN, District Judge.
This appeal requires for its disposition an interpretation of § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,1 48 Stat. 74. The challenged judgment for plaintiff-appellee cannot stand if, as the defendants maintain, the liability imposed by § 12(2) applies only to owners of securities, selling their own property as principals.
The plaintiff is a small securities broker and dealer doing business in Portland, Maine, under the name of Clifford J. Murphy Co. For many years he had extensive dealings with the defendants, a firm of stock brokers carrying on a general brokerage business under the name of Rhoades & Company with offices in New York and Boston. Negotiation of the transaction out of which the present lawsuit arose was conducted by Murphy and Frank Lynch, the head trader of Rhoades & Company, by means of numerous telephone conversations between Boston and Portland. Early in March, 1937, Lynch persuaded Murphy to purchase voting trust certificates representing 1,700 common shares of South American Utilities Corporation (incorporated in Delaware), part of a block of 1,970 shares which had been held by E. E. Smith & Company, a small unlisted dealer in New York. The court below found that Lynch had effected the sale by misrepresentation of material facts, and further found that the defendants had not sustained the burden of proof that Lynch did not know, nor in the exercise of reasonable care could have known, of the untruth of the misrepresentations. These findings are amply sustained by the testimony and indeed are not assailed by appellants. The stock was actually without substantial value at any time. When Murphy learned the facts, he tendered back the securities to Rhoades & Company. Upon the refusal of the latter to take them back, Murphy sold the securities at a loss, and brought the present action. He has recovered a judgment for the amount he paid for the stock, with interest, less the amount realized upon the subsequent sale, with interest.
At the trial the plaintiff sought to prove that Rhoades & Company had acted as principal in the transaction; that Rhoades & Company on its own account had bought from E. E. Smith & Company the block of 1,970 shares of South American Utilities common a day or two before Lynch sold 1,700 of these shares to the plaintiff. Murphy testified that he had never heard of E. E. Smith & Company prior to his purchase of the securities. On the other hand Lynch, who was the main witness for the defendants, offered quite a different version. He testified on direct examination, as follows:
The District Court did not find it necessary to resolve the conflicting versions. It found, upon sufficient evidence, that the stock was "sold to the plaintiff by the defendants, acting either as brokers or owners". Though the evidence did not satisfy the court that Rhoades & Company acted as principals, it concluded that this was immaterial since "Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 applies to brokers when selling securities owned by other persons". The court found, as clearly warranted by the evidence, that Rhoades & Company, whether acting as brokers or owners, "solicited from the plaintiff an offer to buy the stock mentioned, and as a result of Lynch's solicitations and representations, the plaintiff bought the stock, paying the price named and a brokerage commission of four cents a share". This, the court thought, brought Rhoades & Company within the meaning of § 12(2) as a "person who sells a security", in view of the broad definition of "sell" in § 2(3) of the Act, which includes within the meaning of the word the "solicitation of an offer to buy". If Rhoades & Company, though not selling its own property, is a "person who sells a security" then it follows that Murphy is "the person purchasing such security from him" within the meaning of the corresponding phrase in § 12(2).
We agree with the court below that § 12(2) imposes a liability for misrepresentations not only upon principals, but also upon brokers when selling securities owned by other persons. This is not a strained interpretation of the statute, for a selling agent in common parlance would describe himself as a "person who sells", though title passes from his principal, not from him. This broader interpretation of § 12 (2) is warranted by the definition of "sell" in § 2(3) and is also supported by comparison with other sections of the statute. If the security in question had been a security required by law to be registered, but as to which no registration statement was in effect, Rhoades & Company under the facts of the present case would certainly have been guilty of selling a security in violation of § 5(a) (1), and would not have come within the exemption provided in § 4(2). As a person who "sells a security in violation of section 5", Rhoades & Company would have been under a civil liability to Murphy under § 12(1). But the phrase "any person who sells a security" occurs both in § 12(1) and in § 12(2), and would seem to mean the same thing in both subsections, one of which deals with selling an unregistered security and the other of which deals with selling a security by means of misrepresentation of material facts.
It is argued that the remedy provided in § 12(2) is basically rescission, which contemplates a restoration of the status quo as between the principals to the transaction; and that Congress could hardly have intended to give this remedy to the buyer as against an agent of the seller. But the section does not use the word "rescission" nor indicate that the remedy provided is limited to rescission in the narrower sense as between the principals to the transaction. The remedy provided...
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