Cady v. Schroll
| Decision Date | 24 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 103,499.,103,499. |
| Citation | 317 P.3d 90,298 Kan. 731 |
| Parties | Angela CADY, Appellant, v. John SCHROLL, M.D., Defendant, Women's Care, P.A., Appellee, Cristine Carriker, M.D., Maureen King, M.D., Michael Magee, M.D., Julie Martin, M.D., Brendan Mitchell, M.D., Angela Piquard, M.D., and Robert Sugar, M.D., Defendants. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. By enacting K.S.A. 40–3403(h), which provides that a health care provider “shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury ... arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services ... by any other health care provider,” the Kansas Legislature clearly abrogated vicarious liability where both health care providers, as defined in K.S.A. 40–3401(f), are qualified for coverage under the Health Care Stabilization Fund created by the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act, K.S.A. 40–3401 et seq.
2. K.S.A. 40–3403(h) absolves a health care provider not just from vicarious liability but from any responsibility, including independent liability, if the injured party's damages are derivative of and dependent upon the rendering of or the failure to render professional services by another health care provider.
3. K.S.A. 40–3403(h) bars a professional corporation's liability for negligent supervision of a health care provider employed by the corporation if the employee is qualified for coverage under the Health Care Stabilization Fund created by the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act, K.S.A. 40–3401 et seq., the plaintiff's injuries are derivative of and dependent upon the employee's actions in rendering professional services to the plaintiff, and no employee of the professional corporation who is not qualified for coverage provided negligent care and treatment to the plaintiff.
Roger P. Wright, of Wright, Green & Baughman, L.L.C., of Lee's Summit, Missouri, argued the cause, and Lance V. Baughman and Theodore M. Green, of the same firm, were with him on the briefs for appellant.
BK Christopher, of Horn Aylward & Bandy, LLC, of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause, and Jessica J. Shaw and John B. McEntee, Jr., of the same firm, were with her on the briefs for appellee.
K.S.A. 40–3403(h) provides that a health care provider qualified for coverage under the Health Care Stabilization Fund created by the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act (HCPIAA), K.S.A. 40–3401 et seq., “shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury ... arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services ... by any other health care provider who is also qualified for coverage under the fund.” Past decisions of this court have interpreted this provision broadly, concluding it bars a covered health care provider's vicarious liability and any other responsibility, including independent or direct liability, for claims caused by the professional services of another health care provider. Angela Cady argues these cases were wrongly decided, are distinguishable, or have been effectively overruled. Consequently, Cady contends the district court and Court of Appeals in Cady v. Schroll, No. 103,499, 2011 WL 2535004 (Kan.App.2011) (unpublished opinion), erred in relying on those cases and holding that her action against Women's Care, P.A., the health care provider that employed her physician, was barred by K.S.A. 40–3403(h). We disagree and affirm the district court and the Court of Appeals.
Cady filed suit against her obstetrician, John Schroll, M.D., and Schroll's employer, Women's Care, P.A., after Schroll provided Cady's prenatal care during her pregnancy in 2004. Cady alleges that Schroll touched her inappropriately and made sexually charged comments during her office visits. Unbeknown to Cady, Schroll had previously been disciplined by the Kansas State Board of Healing Arts (Board) for his inappropriate and unprofessional behavior with two other patients.
In Cady's petition, she named Schroll, Women's Care, and seven other physicians as defendants. Schroll and the other physicians were employed by and shareholders of Women's Care, a professional corporation. She asserted four claims against the defendants: medical negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In her petition, Cady alleged Women's Care was (1) vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of Schroll and (2) independently liable because it failed to supervise Schroll, failed to prevent him from engaging in inappropriate conduct with her, failed to inform her of Schroll's prior disciplinary record, and failed to institute safeguards to prevent Schroll's conduct.
Cady made several factual allegations to support these claims. Specifically, she alleged that before she became Schroll's patient, Women's Care knew about Schroll's prior inappropriate conduct and knew he had been disciplined by the Board. Cady further alleged that Women's Care had documented this knowledge in a “letter of concern” sent to Schroll in which Women's Care indicated that Schroll's inappropriate conduct had continued despite Women's Care's concerns having been discussed with Schroll, suggested Schroll be evaluated by a psychologist, and requested that a nurse be present during all of Schroll's patient examinations. Despite these concerns and requests, Cady asserted that Schroll was the only Women's Care employee present when the inappropriate conduct occurred.
As legal proceedings progressed, Cady entered into a separate settlement agreement with Schroll, and the district court dismissed the case against him with prejudice. The district court also dismissed with prejudice all of Cady's claims against the other physicians named in the lawsuit. Cady does not appeal any claims involving Schroll or the other physicians. Consequently, this appeal focuses solely on the liability, or lack thereof, of Women's Care.
Women's Care's potential for liability was ruled upon by the district court after Women's Care filed a motion to dismiss and, subsequently, a motion for summary judgment. The district court, treating both motions as ones for summary judgment, held that Cady's claims against Women's Care were barred by K.S.A. 40–3403(h). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Cady, 2011 WL 2535004, at *5. This court granted Cady's petition for review under K.S.A. 20–3018(b) and has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60–2101(b).
If a district court considers uncontroverted facts not contained in the pleadings when ruling on a motion to dismiss, the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment. “Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Law v. Law Company Building Assocs., 295 Kan. 551, 561, 289 P.3d 1066 (2012). An appellate court reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment applies the same legal standard and, because the motion is considered on uncontroverted facts and under the same standard as the district court, reviews the matter de novo as a question of law, granting no deference to the district court's judgment. Law, 295 Kan. at 561, 289 P.3d 1066;Adams v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 577, 584, 214 P.3d 1173 (2009).
In this case, resolution of the motions for summary judgment depends on an interpretation of K.S.A. 40–3403(h). Interpretation of a statute is also a question of law. As under the summary judgment standard, an appellate court exercises unlimited review and does not grant deference to the district court's interpretation of a statute. See Stewart Title of the Midwest v. Reece & Nichols Realtors, 294 Kan. 553, 557, 276 P.3d 188 (2012).
Applying these standards to Cady's first claim that Women's Care is vicariously liable for Schroll's actions simply because Women's Care was Schroll's employer, the district court and the Court of Appeals concluded the claim was barred by K.S.A. 40–3403(h). Cady, 2011 WL 2535004, at *5. Before us, Cady does not dispute that the legislature clearly “abrogate [d] vicarious liability where both health care providers, as defined by K.S.A. 40–3401(f), are covered by the Health Care Stabilization Fund.” Glassman v. Costello, 267 Kan. 509, 523, 986 P.2d 1050 (1999). And Cady does not dispute that both Schroll and Women's Care are health care providers who are qualified for coverage under the Health Care Stabilization Fund created by the HCPIAA.
Cady did raise some alternative arguments before the Court of Appeals regarding whether K.S.A. 40–3403(h) applies under the facts of this case because of an exception provided for in K.S.A. 40–3403(q) (). But those arguments have not been raised before this court, and, consequently, any argument that there was error in granting summary judgment to Women's Care on Cady's claim of vicarious liability based on K.S.A. 40–3403(q) has been waived. See Martin v. Naik, 297 Kan. 241, 245, 300 P.3d 625 (2013) ().
Exceptions placed aside, we have no qualms concluding that under K.S.A. 40–3403(h) Women's Care has no vicarious liability simply because it was Schroll's employer. See Black's Law Dictionary 998 (9th ed.2009) (defining “vicarious liability” as “[l]iability that a supervisory party [such as an employer] bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate [such as an employee] based on the relationship between the two parties”).
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