Cady v. Sheahan, 04-3518.

• Citation: 467 F.3d 1057
• Decision Date: 03 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-3518.,04-3518.
• Parties: Davy CADY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael F. SHEAHAN, Cook County Sheriff, William G. Barbat, Sheriff's sergeant, William Margalus, Sheriff's sergeant, Gonzalo Lucio, Sheriff's deputy, and William Jacoby, Sheriff's deputy, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

467 F.3d 1057 Davy CADY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Michael F. SHEAHAN, Cook County Sheriff, William G. Barbat, Sheriff's sergeant, William Margalus, Sheriff's sergeant, Gonzalo Lucio, Sheriff's deputy, and William Jacoby, Sheriff's deputy, Defendants-Appellees. No. 04-3518. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Argued September 11, 2006. Decided November 3, 2006. Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied December 5, 2006.

[467 F.3d 1058]

William P. Ferranti (argued), Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, Donald J. Pechous, Dominick L. Lanzito (argued), Office of the Cook County State's Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

[467 F.3d 1059]

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

At issue in this case are claims brought by Davy Cady pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County, Illinois, Sheriff Michael Sheahan and four other sheriff's officers, Gonzolo Lucio, William Barbat, William Jacoby, and William Margalus (collectively "officers"), alleging violations of his civil and constitutional rights. The claims arise from an encounter that took place between Cady and the officers outside a Cook County courthouse on August 22, 2001. After completion of discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the officers. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Background

On the morning of August 22, 2001, Cady arrived at a Cook County courthouse in Bridgeview, Illinois sometime between 6:15 and 6:30 a.m. Cady knew that the courthouse did not open until 8:30 a.m., but was attempting to serve a summons on a Cook County Sheriff's police officer during a shift change.¹ Cady was dressed in dirty, wrinkled clothing, wore a beard, carried a briefcase with him, and emanated a strong body odor. Cady walked back and forth between the outer and inner sidewalks on the east side of the courthouse, the latter of which was obscured by bushes and was not often used by the public. Defendant Lucio approached Cady at approximately 6:40 a. m.² Officer Lucio asked Cady why he was at the courthouse, to which Cady responded that he was a federal process server. Officer Lucio requested identification, but Cady refused. The conversation proceeded with officer Lucio under the impression that Cady was claiming to be a federal officer, Cady refusing to present identification, and Cady engaging officer Lucio in a dialog about whether individuals, especially servers of federal process, are required to carry identification.

Cady requested to speak with a supervisor, and officer Lucio summoned sergeant Barbat who also asked Cady what his business was at the courthouse and to present identification. The encounter continued in the same evasive manner that it had with officer Lucio, with Cady inquiring as to whether sergeant Barbat was making a Terry stop, and if so, what crime he suspected Cady was committing, was about to commit, or had committed.³ Cady further stated that he would not reveal his identity unless he was assured that it would not be used against him in a future criminal prosecution. During the course of this encounter, defendants officers Margalus and Jacoby arrived upon the scene and remained there to ensure the safety of all involved.

Throughout the encounter, Cady reached into his briefcase to reference his Sullivan's Law Directory, and point out certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the officers. After Cady had reached into his briefcase several times, one of the officers present took the briefcase from Cady, placed it on the hood of a squad car, and, along with another officer, searched the contents for weapons. A Sullivan's Law Directory, a Bible, an address book, and a pen were found in the briefcase; no

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weapons were found. The officers closed the briefcase and placed it in a squad car until the end of the encounter. Cady was also frisked at this time, and no weapons were discovered.

The officers, still under the impression that Cady was claiming to be a federal officer, ran the name that appeared in Cady's Bible in their squad car computer. Finding that a name was not enough to identify Cady, the officers pressed Cady for more information. Officer Margalus stated that if Cady did not comply, he could be arrested for obstructing a police officer. Officer Jacoby took out his handcuffs and told Cady to put his hands behind his back, but never actually `cuffed Cady. Cady gave his full name and date of birth. The officers found that there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest. Cady's briefcase was returned to him and he was sent off with information regarding the correct procedures for serving a summons on a Cook County Sheriff's officer. The entire incident lasted between twenty and thirty minutes.

Cady filed his pro se complaint on December 20, 2002, including federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false imprisonment, false arrest, unlawful search and seizure, a Monell claim against Sheriff Sheahan in his official capacity and state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After nearly two years of discovery disputes and borderline frivolous motions, the parties made cross motions for summary judgment. The officers correctly pointed out that Cady had not complied with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 in his statement of material facts,⁴ and the district court struck Cady's statement and ordered him to submit a statement in compliance with Rule 56.1. Cady's resubmitted statement of material facts also did not comply with Rule 56.1 as it failed to adequately cite the record and was filled with irrelevant information, legal arguments, and conjecture. In light of this failure to comply with the Local Rules, the district court exercised its discretion to use the officers' statement of material facts in deciding whether, and to which party, to grant summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims.⁵

II. Analysis

Cady presents three issues on appeal: (1) whether his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officers searched the contents of his briefcase; (2) whether the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop; and (3) whether the officers exceeded the permissible scope and duration of the investigatory stop.

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the record, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

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law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "When the non-moving party fails to establish `the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,' Rule 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment against that party because `a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'" Massey, 457 F.3d at 716 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).

"A district court does not abuse its discretion when, in imposing a penalty for a litigant's non-compliance with Local Rule 56.1, the court chooses to ignore and not consider the additional facts that a litigant has proposed." Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co.,...