Cady v. State

Decision Date20 March 1984
Docket Number4 Div. 160
Citation455 So.2d 101
PartiesDon Lamar CADY v. STATE.
CourtAlabama Court of Criminal Appeals

L. Merrill Shirley, Elba, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen. and Fred F. Bell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

LEIGH M. CLARK, Retired Circuit Judge.

The following STATEMENT OF THE CASE is found in appellant's brief and is adopted in appellee's brief:

"The December 1982, term grand jury for the Circuit Court of Coffee County, Alabama, Elba Division, returned an indictment against the Appellant, Don Lamar Cady, charging the Appellant with engaging in sexual intercourse with [a named individual, whose name we omit], a female, by forcible compulsion in violation of Section 13A-6-61 of the Code of Alabama, against the peace and dignity of the State of Alabama.

"On December 13, 1982, the undersigned attorney was appointed to represent the Defendant and arraignment was conducted. The defendant pled not guilty and the matter was placed on the jury docket.

"Motion for Discovery was filed, granted, and discovery furnished by the District Attorney's Office of Coffee County, Alabama.

"On March 24, 1983, the case was brought to trial and on March 25, 1983, a jury returned a verdict of guilty against the Defendant as charged. The Defendant served oral notice of a working appeal and requested a sentence hearing. The sentence hearing was conducted on April 8, 1983, wherein, the Defendant was adjudged guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary of the State of Alabama. Defendant again gave notice of appeal seeking a working appeal and the undersigned attorney was then appointed to represent the Defendant on his appeal.

"On April 26, 1983, a Motion for New Trial was filed by the Defendant. On May 9, 1983, a hearing was conducted and Motion for New Trial was denied. After the denial of the Motion for New Trial, appellant has prosecuted this appeal."

The alleged victim testified that she was 17 years old at the time of the trial. Her last birthday was during the month before the trial. The incident involved occurred approximately fourteen months before the trial, which means that the victim was 15 years of age, lacking a month or two of being sixteen years of age, at the time of the incident. The alleged victim was the only eyewitness who testified as to what occurred at the time and place of the incident. She testified that on the night of January 19, 1982, she and a girl friend had been to a ball game at the gym at Elba High School, and that after the game a friend of the two drove them to a house, and thereafter to another home. Continuing in her testimony, the alleged victim said that she went from home to home and after calling her mother she realized she had dropped her sock and she "went back to find it." Her testimony continued as follows:

"Q. And what path did you follow when you went back to find it?

"A. The same one that--

"Q. All right. Will you show us that?

"A. All right. I walked back around and I was looking down, and then I walked and cut through here and that's when the man--who was parked in the car--blue car.

"Q. All right. You say blue car.

"A. Right here.

"Q. And you also stated earlier in your testimony you had seen a blue car. Does this appear to you to be the same blue car?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Okay. What happened then?

"A. And then he got out of the car and asked me did I know somebody and I "Q. With regard to where you were standing and with regard to that distance--and I realize it's not drawn to scale--but with reference to that diagram, approximately where were you standing?

didn't know the name, but he pointed away and I looked that way and about the time I looked he grabbed my neck.

"A. About right here [evidently pointing to a diagram] in the driveway--

"....

"Q. What if anything occurred at that point?

"A. He grabbed my neck and then he told me not to make any noise and not to scream or he would kill me or something like that. I don't remember exactly what words it was said. Then I told him not to hurt me. I would do almost anything.

"Q. Go ahead.

"A. At this time he still had my neck and he had pressure on it. And then he pulled me back sort of behind the house but it wasn't exactly behind, like if somebody walked by he probably would have saw us. And he told me to take my pants down and so I did--and he still had me by the neck--

"....

"Q. What happened after he drug you back to this other area?

"A. He told me to take my britches--my pants down.

"Q. What if anything did you do?

"A. I took them down.

"Q. Why?

"A. Because I didn't want to get hurt and killed.

"Q. Were you afraid?

"A. Yes, sir."

The victim's testimony continued for several more pages of the transcript. We quote therefrom only such portions as are pertinent and perhaps material to the issues presented on appeal:

"Q. Then what happened?

"A. And then I know he was choking me and I guess I passed out because the next thing I remember I was laying down and a bunch of sticks was around me and he was on me.

"....

"Q. You say you think you must have blacked out?

"A. Yes.

"Q. But you did awaken?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And you say he was on top of you?

"A. Yes.

"....

"Q. Did this individual have his penis in your vagina?

"MR. SHIRLEY [Defendant's attorney]: Again, Your Honor, we object to leading the witness. And object to the improper form.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"MR. SHIRLEY: We except."

ISSUES I AND II

The first two issues presented by appellant are as follows:

"I. The trial court committed reversible error when permitting the State over timely objection of Defendant, to elicit testimony from the Prosecutrix through improper, leading questions concerning a material element of the charge.

"II. The failure to establish penetration by Defendant upon the Prosecutrix in a charge of rape results in a failure of the State of Alabama to establish a crime has been committed."

The two issues presented as applied to this case are in conflict with each other. As shown in appellant's brief, the two issues pertain to the testimony of the alleged victim on direct examination which we have quoted above. By the first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony by the victim that penetration, "a material element of the charge," occurred. By the second issue, it is contended that the evidence fails to show a penetration. As to the first issue, we would have no difficulty in disposing of it adversely to appellant, if the witness had been a few years younger, as were the witnesses, fourteen years of age or younger in cases cited by Judge McElroy in the footnote to Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 121.05(8) (3d ed. 1977):

"A child should, as far as possible, be permitted to tell, in his own language, what he saw and heard before resort is made to leading questions. It is, however, within the discretion of the trial court to permit leading questions asked of an immature witness on direct examination by the party who called him."

Even though the witness was older than the witnesses in the cases cited, we believe the nearness of the age of the witness in the instant case to the ages of the witnesses in the cited cases, whose answers to leading questions on direct examination were authoritatively approved, is a proper factor to be considered in this case; especially so, we think, because of the delicacy of the subject matter. Furthermore, we note that the question could have been definitely answered by "Yes" or by "No." Although the "yes" or "no" answer test is not a conclusive test, we are assisted by it, when applied to all the circumstances herein, in our effort to resolve appellant's first issue, i.e., whether the question under consideration was leading. As stated by Judge Harwood, afterwards Justice Harwood, in Williams v. State, 34 Ala.App. 603, 42 So.2d 500, 503 (1949), cert. denied, 252 Ala. 602, 42 So.2d 504:

"... The 'yes' or 'no' answer test may furnish assistance in many cases in determining the leading character of a question, but it is uncertain and inconclusive, and the ends of justice cannot be served by its mechanical application."

We conclude that the trial court was not in error in overruling defendant's objection to the question. We further conclude that, as the answer disclosed clearly that there was penetration, there is no merit to appellant's contention that there was a "failure to establish penetration."

III.

Appellant asserts, as his third contention for a reversal, the following:

"The trial court committed reversible error when it permitted, over objection of Defendant, the introduction of the details of the complaint given by the Prosecutrix to the investigating police officer."

The issue is complex, and we are not in full agreement with the argument of either the appellant or the appellee on the question. The investigating police officer referred to in the foregoing quotation was Officer Kenneth R. Paul, who, at the time of the trial, was a police officer with the Greenville Police Department; at the time of the alleged crime in this case, he was "the investigating officer" of the Elba Police Department. Upon being called as a witness by the State, he testified for about two pages of the court reporter's transcript until there was a colloquy among the attorneys, the trial judge, and the witness, out of the hearing of the jury. Soon after the hearing in the presence of the jury resumed, the following occurred during the direct examination of Officer Paul:

"Q. Did she tell you any details of the alleged rape itself?

"....

"Q. What did she tell you?

"MR. SHIRLEY: We would object.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"MR. SHIRLEY: And we would move to exclude the previous testimony.

"THE COURT: Overruled.

"A. She said that her and some of her friends were walking home from a basketball game and they were going to Kennedy Estates. She said there was a trail along through the...

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  • State v. Fontenot
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • April 23, 2021
    ...calculated to reflect upon her credibility as a witness." Lee v. State , 565 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Cady v. State , 455 So. 2d 101, 105 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) ) (allowing witnesses to testify to conversations with child after defense counsel's cross-examination had the "appa......
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