Caesar v. De Vault

• Decision Date: 03 April 1957
• Docket Number: No. 29410,29410
• Citation: 236 Ind. 487,141 N.E.2d 338
• Parties: Victoria CAESAR, Appellant, v. Harold DE VAULT, Township Trustee of Calumet Township of Indiana and Metro Holovachka, as Prosecuting Attorney of Lake County, and Metro Holovachka, Individually, and Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 338

141 N.E.2d 338

236 Ind. 487

Victoria CAESAR, Appellant, v. Harold DE VAULT, Township Trustee of Calumet Township of Indiana and Metro Holovachka, as Prosecuting Attorney of Lake County, and Metro Holovachka, Individually, and Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General of the State of Indiana, Appellees.

No. 29410.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

April 3, 1957.

Robert H. Moore, Gary, for appellant.

Spangler, Jennings & Spangler, William S. Spangler, Gary, for appellees.

LANDIS, Judge.

The question presented in this case is whether Calumet Township, Lake County, Indiana, is entitled to more than one justice of the peace.

This was an action for declaratory judgment brought by appellees DeVault and Holovachka, as township trustee of Calumet Township and prosecuting attorney of Lake County, respectively, and by Holovachka individually against appellant, asking that appellant's appointment as justice of the peace be declared null and void and that it be declared that said Calumet Township under the laws of Indiana is entitled only to one justice of the peace.

The action below was also brought against appellee Steers as Attorney General of the State of Indiana, but no service of process was had upon him nor did he appear to the action, and he is named an appellee as he was listed a defendant in the cause below.

Appellant filed answer to the complaint and a cross complaint, and after change of venue to Porter County, the lower court found that at the time of appellant's appointment there was a duly elected, qualified, and acting justice of the peace in said Calumet Township, and that appellant's appointment as a second justice of the peace therein was unlawful and void.

The parties to this action tried the cause below upon stipulations of fact which were in substance that one Paul Dudak is a duly elected and acting justice of peace since January 1, 1955. That on March 28, 1955, the board of county commissioners of Lake County, Indiana, appointed appellant as an additional justice of peace for the balance of a term expiring December 31, 1958. That on March 29, 1955, George N. Craig, Governor of the State of Indiana, issued to appellant her commission and certificate of appointment, and on March 30, 1955, appellant posted her bond and was sworn in as justice of the peace.

It was further stipulated that Calumet Township is located in Lake County, Indiana, and that the city of Gary, having a population of 133,911, is situated in said Calumet Township, that the city of Gary has a city court and is not a county-seat; that the city of Gary is a second class city in Lake County, Indiana, as are Hammond and East Chicago.

The determination of this appeal requires an examination of the Indiana Constitution and the statutes applicable to the case.

Article 7, § 14 of the Constitution of Indiana provides: 'A competent number of Justices of the Peace shall be elected, by the voters in each township in the several counties. * * *' thereby leaving undetermined the number of justices of the peace, which is a matter for the determination of the legislature. ¹

Pursuant to the legislative authority to prescribe what is a 'competent number' of justices of the peace, general laws have been placed on the statute books making general provision for the number of justices of the peace ² throughout the state.

Numerous perticular statutes have also been enacted attempting to limit the foregoing general statutes and we are called upon to determine their effect as they are applicable to the case before us.

The Act of 1921 ³ provides in substance that there shall be only one justice of the peace in townships in which is situated a city of the second class, which is not a county seat. Such statute, however, was to a large extent superseded by the Act of 1927 ⁴ providing in substance that in townships containing a city of the second class of a population of more than 55,000 and less than 300,000, and in which exists a city court, there shall be a limitation of two justices of peace.

Subsequently thereto statutes were passed in 1943, ⁵ in 1945, ⁶ and two additional statutes were passed in 1949, ⁷ and ⁸ and we shall consider such statutes to determine what, if any, application they have to the case at bar.

The 1943 statute provides in substance that there shall be only one justice of peace in townships located in counties which contain two or more cities of the second class.

The 1945 statute provides in substance there shall be only one justice of peace in townships in counsties which townships contain two or more cities of the second class and contain the greater portion of a city of such class having a population of from 110,000 to 115,000.

The 1949 statute mentioned in Note 7 is a technical amendment to the 1945 Statute above mentioned, and strikes out the words 'the greater portion of' before 'city.'

The 1949 statute mentioned in Note 8 is an attempted limitation of the 1927 statute referred to in Note 4, to change such statute's application to townships having cities of from 55,000 to 300,000 to townships having cities of from 55,000 to 70,000.

In determining whether the various statutes we are concerned with in this case comply with sections 22 ⁹ and 23 OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIANA¹⁰, it is of interest to note this Court stated in School City of Rushville v. Hayes, 1904, 162 Ind. 193, 200, 70 N.E. 134, 137;

'Under the Constitution of this State, cities and towns may be classified upon the basis of differences in population, and laws applicable to a single class may be regarded as general in their character, and not local or special. But the classification must be natural and reasonable, and not arbitrary. It must be founded upon real and substantial differences in the local situation and necessities of the class of cities and towns to which it applies. Where such a classification excludes from its operation cities and towns differing in no material particular from those included in a class, the statute cannot be upheld. It is obvious that cities having a population of 100,000 or more may require larger and more varied powers than such as contain a population of 10,000 or less. The political needs of the larger community may be of a different nature, and the forms and methods by which its affairs must be administered may be more extensive, complicated, and elaborate than those required in a municipality of smaller population.

'But can it be said that cities and towns having substantially the same population should be placed in different classes, and each class governed by a different set of laws? What reason requires that such distinctions should be made? Why should cities having a population not exceeding 4,545 nor less than 4,540 be placed in a separate class from cities having a population of not more than 5,000 nor less than 4,000? It is not possible that the political necessities of one of these classes founded on population alone could be different from those of the other. * * * It consists solely in a trifling difference in population. The requirements of the statute serve no other purpose than to identify the particular city to which the statute shall apply. * * * Its legal foundation is not more secure than if it had been declared to apply to all cities and towns bearing the name of Rushville as shown by the last preceding census. The classification is entirely arbitrary and artificial, and the plain command of the Constitution cannot be evaded by so weak and transparent a device.

'* * * If cities and towns may be classified according to trifling differences in population, so may counties and townships. By means of statutes, general in form, but local and special differences in population, every provision differences in population, every providsion of article 4, § 22, of the Constitution may be successfully evaded.

'* * * Attempted evasions of the Constitution, the object of which is to meet and overcome such local and special conditions, cannot be tolerated. A due regard for the highest interests of the citizens of the State requires that all constitutional limitations and restrictions shall be firmly and constantly enforced.'

In Bullock v. Robison, 1911, 176 Ind. 198, 204, 93 N.E. 998, 1000, this Court said:

'* * * a valid classification must not conflict with well-recognized rules, some of which are as follows: The classification must embrace a class of subjects or places, and not omit any one naturally belonging to the class. It must be based on some reasonable ground, that bears a just and proper relation to it, and not be a mere arbitrary selection. More is required than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify; the characteristics serving as a basis must be of such substantial nature as to mark the objects so designated as particularly requiring exclusive legislation. There must be a substantial distinction, having reference to the subject-matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places embraced in the enactment, and the objects or places excluded. Whether a law is general or special depends on its subject-matter, and not on its form. Town of Longview v. City of Crawfordsville (1905), 164 Ind. 117, , 68 L.R.A. 622; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough (1907), 168 Ind. 671, [80 N.E. 529, 14 L.R.A.,N.S., 418]; Board, etc. v. Johnson (1909), 173 Ind. 76, ; Bumb v. City of Evansville (1907), 168 Ind. 272, ; School City of Rushville v. Hayes (1904), 162 Ind. 193, ; Board, etc., v. State ex rel. [Bringham] (1904), 161 Ind. 616, ; Nichols v. Walter, (1887), 37 Minn. 264, 33 N.W. 800; Hetland v. Board, etc. (1903), 89 Minn. 492, 95 N.W. 305; State v. Ellet (1890), 47 Ohio St. 90, 23 N.E. 931, 21 Am.St.Rep. 772, and notes; Wanser v. Hoos, supra [60 N.J.L. 482, 38 A. 449]; State, etc. v. Hammer (1880), 42 N.J.L. 435; State v. Jones (1902), 66 Ohio St. 453, 64 N.E. 424, 90 Am.St.Rep. 592; People v. Martin (1899), 178 Ill. 611, 53 N.E. 309.' See also ...