Caetio v. Spirit Coach, LLC

• Decision Date: 17 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV–13–S–1634–NE.
• Citation: 992 F.Supp.2d 1199
• Parties: Jennifer CAETIO and Cecelia Thompson, Plaintiffs, v. SPIRIT COACH, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

992 F.Supp.2d 1199

Jennifer CAETIO and Cecelia Thompson, Plaintiffs,

v.SPIRIT COACH, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV–13–S–1634–NE.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Northeastern Division.

Jan. 17, 2014.

Patricia A. Gill, Patricia A. Gill PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.

Robert C. Lockwood, Wilmer & Lee PA, Huntsville, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERS

LYNWOOD SMITH, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, Jennifer Caetio and Cecelia Thompson, assert race and gender discrimination and retaliation claims against their former employer, Spirit Coach, LLC, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.¹ Plaintiffs also assert a claim for violations of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206.² The case presently is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.³

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), it does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S.] at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration supplied).

As always is the case in the context of ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court is required to assume that

the facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint are true. See Anza [ v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453,] 126 S.Ct. [1991,] 1994[, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006) ] (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”); Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir.2001) ( en banc ) (setting forth the facts in the case by “[a]ccepting all well-pleaded factual allegations (with reasonable inferences drawn favorably to Plaintiffs) in the complaint as true”).

Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1281 n. 1 (11th Cir.2006) (alterations supplied). Even so,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. [Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S.] at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (alteration supplied).

II. ALLEGATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

A. Plaintiffs' Employment with Defendant

Plaintiff, Jennifer Caetio (“Caetio”), who held a commercial driver's license (“CDL”), was employed as a tour bus driver at defendant's location in Madison, Alabama on January 11, 2009.⁴ Approximately one year later, on February 11, 2010, plaintiff, Cecelia Thompson (“Thompson”), was also hired as a CDL tour bus driver.⁵

B. Plaintiffs' Meetings with Robert Coates and Jamie Wilson

Plaintiffs allege that, during their employment with defendant, white, male drivers, holding their same positions, were assigned the more lucrative driving assignments—those requiring more work hours and, therefore, paying a greater amount to the driver.⁶ Because of this alleged disparate treatment, plaintiffs met with Robert “Clip” Coates, the CEO and their supervisor, on January 24, 2011, to voice those complaints.⁷ Buck Clemons, one of plaintiffs' co-workers, was also present at that meeting.⁸

The next day, plaintiffs met with Safety Manager, Jamie Wilson, to discuss the issues presented during their prior meeting with Coates.⁹ Plaintiffs allege that Wilson was angry that they had met with Coates, and that, in retaliation, he issued a written reprimand concerning accidents that had occurred months before, and placed them on probation.¹⁰ Plaintiffs contend that, at that time, defendant did not have a written policy governing accidents or discipline, and that this was the first disciplinary action defendant had taken against them.¹¹ Further, plaintiffs allege that male co-workers involved in similar accidents were not written up or placed on probation.

Caetio again complained of discrimination on January 26, 2011, when she voiced her concerns over the fact that new jobs were created for former co-workers of Safety Manager Wilson, that new male employees were assigned a greater number of work hours, and that different requirementswere demanded of plaintiffs than of their new male co-workers.¹² The complaint does not state to whom Caetio voiced those complaints. Plaintiffs allege that, following their complaints, they “became the target of threats and harassment” from Safety Manager Wilson.¹³

C. Thompson's Termination

There is conflicting evidence as to the date defendant terminated Cecelia Thompson's employment. The complaint states that “Thompson was wrongfully terminated in January, 2012,” ¹⁴ whereas Thompson's second EEOC charge states that “her employment was terminated on February 2, 2011....” ¹⁵ In plaintiffs' response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs state that Thompson was terminated on February 2, 2011.¹⁶ Thus, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, this court will assume Thompson's termination date was February 2, 2011.

D. Thompson's EEOC Charges

Thompson's first EEOC charge was filed on April 12, 2011.¹⁷ The boxes entitled “Sex” and “Other” were checked, but the boxes for “Race” and “Retaliation” were not.¹⁸ In that charge of discrimination, Thompson stated as follows:

I was hired by the above named employer on February 11, 2010 in the position of Driver. Since October 2010, there has been an ongoing issue concerning the job assignment of male drivers being assigned the most lucrative assignments, receiving more work hours, and disparate treatment in requirements in job performance, in lieu of female drivers. During a meeting that was held on January 24, 2011, I complained About [sic] the above mentioned issues to the CEO, Robert Coates. In retaliation for my complaining, I became the target of threats and harassment from the Safety Manager, Jamie Wilson.

No reason was given to me for the disparate treatment that I was receiving. I have twenty-two years experience as a driver.

I believe I am being discriminated against because of my sex, Female, in violation of Title VII of the 1964, Civil Rights Act, amended.¹⁹

Thompson filed a subsequent EEOC charge on June 16, 2011.²⁰ In this charge, only the box for “Retaliation” was checked.²¹ That second charge of discrimination read as follows:

I filed a complaint with the EEOC via letter dated January 28, 2011 because of retaliation I received after a meeting on January 24, 2011, wherein I complained of disparate treatment as it related to issues of job assignment, wage, work hours, and job requirement[s] between male and female drivers to the CEO of the company, Mr. Robert Coates. After my discussion with Mr. Coates, I was called into a meeting with Jamie Wilson, Safety Manager, where I was informed that he was instituting a new policy about having accidents on the buses. I was given a written warning for an accident I had over a year ago and told that I would be terminated if I had an accident during 2011. None of the males who had accidents were given warnings nor were they threatened with termination. My employment was terminated on February 2, 2011, by Jamie Wilson.

I was informed by Jamie Wilson that the decision to terminate my employment was made by the Safety Committee.

I believe I have been discriminated against in retaliation for filing a previous charge with the EEOC and in retaliation for complaining of disparate treatment between male and female drivers, I believe the conduct of my employer has violated my rights under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the 1964, Civil Rights Act, as amended.²²

E. Caetio's Allegations of Discrimination

Unlike Thompson, Caetio only filed a single charge of discrimination with the EEOC on April 15, 2011.²³ In her charge, Caetio checked the boxes for “Retaliation” and “Sex” but not the box for “Race.” ²⁴ In her charge of discrimination, Caetio stated as follows:

I was hired by the above named employer on January 11, 2009, in the position of Driver. Since October 2010, there had been an ongoing issue concerning the job assignment of male drivers being assigned the most lucrative assignments, receiving more work hours, and disparate treatment in requirements in job performance, in lieu of...