Caffee v. Schweiker, 84-5266
| Decision Date | 04 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-5266,84-5266 |
| Citation | 752 F.2d 63 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 15,786 Edward CAFFEE, Appellant, v. The Honorable Richard SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee. . Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit Rule 12(6) |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Constance J. Kosuda, Joel Solow, Freeman & Bass, Newark, N.J., for appellant.
W. Hunt Dumont, U.S. Atty., Edward G. Spell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Newark, N.J., for appellee.
Before ALDISERT, Chief Judge, BECKER, Circuit Judge, and CAHN, District Judge. *
This is an appeal from an order of the district court granting judgment for the Secretary of Health and Human Services, thereby affirming the Secretary's order denying Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security income to appellant Edward L. Caffee. 1 For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand, directing an award of benefits.
Appellant is a 46 year-old former attendant in a New Jersey state mental hospital where he worked for over 20 years. Appellant's duties required him, inter alia, to perform physical work, including washing, positioning and sometimes lifting patients, occasionally violent ones. Appellant is a high school graduate with only a borderline I.Q.; 2 he has been unable to work since 1979 due to psychiatric and orthopedic problems.
The Secretary concedes that appellant cannot perform his former work, that he cannot engage in even moderate lifting, and that he cannot perform work involving stress or extensive contact with others. Therefore our inquiry focuses upon whether the Secretary has met her burden of proof, see Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.1979), that appellant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work that is available in sufficient numbers in the national economy. Because the case-dispositive analysis lies in the area of the evidence pertaining to appellant's psychiatric condition and, more specifically, his ability to work in potentially competitive situations, we will confine our discussion to that evidence. 3
Appellant's mental problems first surfaced in 1975 when he was admitted to a Veteran's Hospital. He showed paranoid delusions and was released with a diagnosis of psychotic depressive reaction. For the next few years appellant was treated as an outpatient and was found consistently to be depressed and to have flat affect. He was found to be in contact with reality, but also to be paranoid, and often delusional. The diagnosis was post-psychotic depressive reaction.
Moving ahead to the period 1979 to 1982, the record reflects that appellant was treated and/or evaluated by a number of physicians. Because their reports form an important part of the record considered by the ALJ, we briefly summarize their salient conclusions.
Dr. Malcolm Hermele, a specialist in internal medicine, examined appellant in June 1979. He concluded that appellant had chronic bronchitis and fibrosis from which he was thirty percent disabled but that he was probably totally disabled from the psychiatric standpoint.
Dr. Robert Latimer, a psychiatrist, examined appellant on September 25, 1979, concluding that he was still suffering a psychotic episode. Dr. Latimer was unable to tell on one examination whether appellant suffered from a psychotic depression or a schizophrenic process but concluded that he was seriously disabled and could not function. Dr. Latimer thought that appellant might have been hallucinating during the interview.
In May of 1980 appellant was seen at the Harrison S. Martland Hospital of the College of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey on an emergency basis as a result of an injury to his elbow. See supra note 3. While hospitalized, a psychiatric consultation was requested because of appellant's mood and abnormal behavior. The psychiatric evaluator concluded that appellant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and prescribed thorazine.
Appellant was seen by another psychiatrist, Dr. Berkelhammer, on March 9, 1981, at the request of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, Division of Disability Determinations. Dr. Berkelhammer concluded that appellant was suffering from residual schizophrenia. He opined that appellant conceivably could be employable in situations in which he would not feel any pressure. Dr. Berkelhammer added that any type of job in which there was going to be a large amount of interaction with other people would be beyond appellant's capacity to handle.
Appellant was also seen, at the request of the Division of Disability Determinations, by a clinical psychologist, Dr. Norman Hymowitz. Dr. Hymowitz administered a full range of psychological testing and concluded that appellant was of borderline intelligence, was somewhat depressed. He also found it difficult to determine how appellant would react to the pressures of work in the future. Dr. Hymowitz observed that appellant was "lucent [sic] and coherent," that he was capable of managing funds, and that "[w]ith supportive counselling and treatment, [he] may be able to return to the work setting and live a productive life." Explaining further, in a supplemental assessment, Dr. Hymowitz stated that appellant was "capable of functioning adequately in a setting which is not too demanding or competitive." Dr. Hymowitz also stressed the necessity of support from a therapist or social agency to enable appellant to adjust adequately.
Appellant was also subjected to psychological testing by Dr. Frank J. Dyer, who concluded that appellant's prospect for success would be limited because of his low academic, verbal, and mathematical achievement and that he could not perform the majority of administrative, secretarial, clerical, or computer-related jobs. Dr. Dyer also noted that appellant's total testing time was extremely high, reflecting a compulsive and anxious approach to tasks. Dr. Dyer found appellant to be in the borderline intelligence range.
Finally, appellant was evaluated for the Division of Disability Determinations by Dr. Talaxi Shah, a psychiatrist; the ALJ's opinion depends a good deal upon Dr. Shah's report. Dr. Shah noted that appellant was suffering from mild depression but was not suicidal. He noted no paranoia. He observed that appellant's contact with reality was good, that he had "partial insight into his difficulties," that his judgment was by and large "normal" and that he did not demonstrate any bizarre behavior but rather was able to relate fairly well to the doctor. He did find that appellant's responses were slow. He diagnosed appellant as suffering from a "dysthymic disorder," and opined that appellant was able to handle his own funds. However, qualifying his other opinions, Dr. Shah concluded with the following statement:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing medical survey that appellant has in the past suffered from a severe psychiatric disorder and that, at minimum, he still suffers from its residual effects. It is also beyond question that appellant can function in a work environment only if that environment is free from all stress and competition. Apparently recognizing this, the ALJ called a vocational expert, Ana Mooney, whose critical conclusions we now will summarize.
Mrs. Mooney opined that at most appellant could work on a sedentary unskilled level. She then listed four jobs that she believed he could perform: ampoule sealer, frame coverer, lens insert worker, and acetone button paster. Mrs. Mooney added that these jobs exist in substantial numbers in the national and local economy. She was then asked:
"Q. Would you say that there's pressure in these jobs?
A. There's no job without pressure." 294a.
The examination continued on this line as follows:
"Q. Is there a production level that is generally required for employees who have those jobs?
A. Even employees who work at a bench in a factory on straight time have production quotas." 295a.
Appellant's counsel attempted to pursue this line of questioning but was cut off by the ALJ. However, after the hearing was concluded, in order to "further clarify the case," the ALJ submitted a written interrogatory to Mrs. Mooney referring to the jobs that she had enumerated during her testimony. 4 Mrs. Mooney's answers were as follows:
Q. 1. Assume that the claimant was capable of fine and gross manipulations of both hands and his right arm was minimally limited in extension, could he still perform the jobs enumerated by you?
A. Yes.
Q. 2. Assume that the claimant was totally unable to use his right hand/arm. Are there sedentary, unskilled jobs he could perform which exist in significant numbers in the national economy? If so, please enumerate them.
A. Yes. They are as follows:
a. grinding machine operator, automatic
b. stringing machine tender (textile & bag industry)
c. laminator (leather industry)
d. label pinker (fabrics)
e. umbrella tipper, machine.
Q. 3. Assume that the claimant cannot engage in work activity where he must be in frequent contact with others. Do the jobs enumerated by you above exist in settings where only minimal contact with others is required? If so, please enumerate which of the jobs fall into this category. Do they exist in significant numbers in the national economy? Does this also include the one handed jobs enumerated by you above? Again, please indicate if these exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
A. Yes. All of them. Yes. Yes. Yes.
In his opinion denying benefits, the ALJ reviewed the medical history, and concluded that, because appellant's basic work-related functions were restricted, his impairment must...
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