Cafferty v. State, Dept. of Transp., 32818.

• Citation: 160 P.3d 763,144 Idaho 324
• Decision Date: 31 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 32818.,32818.
• Parties: Camilla CAFFERTY, individually and as natural parent and guardian of Allan Cafferty, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

160 P.3d 763

144 Idaho 324

Camilla CAFFERTY, individually and as natural parent and guardian of Allan Cafferty, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICES, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 32818.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, May 2007 Term.

May 31, 2007.

Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, Chtd., Twin Falls, for appellant. Robyn Maddox Brody argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Barbara Ann Beehner-Kane, Deputy Attorney General, argued.

BURDICK, Justice.

Appellant Camilla Cafferty appeals the district court's dismissal of her claims for negligence and wrongful death against Respondent State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, Division of Motor Vehicle Services (DMV) based on immunity under the Idaho Torts Claims Act (ITCA). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are undisputed. On April 14, 2004, Timothy Hedges was released from prison after serving his entire five-year sentence for felony DUI, his eighth DUI. Only four months later, on August 18, 2004, Hedges, driving drunk, crossed the centerline of Highway 21 in Ada County and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Patrick Cafferty. Patrick Cafferty was killed in the accident, and his wife, Camilla, and son, Allan, were injured. Hedges had a long history of DUI convictions; the accident resulted in Hedges's tenth DUI conviction.¹ Although Hedges's driver's license had been suspended as part of his latest felony DUI conviction, prior to the collision he had applied to have it reinstated, and his license had been reinstated by DMV.

In addition to the aggregate five-year sentence on Hedges's eighth felony DUI in 1999, the sentencing judge, The Honorable James C. Morfitt, suspended Hedges's license for five years. The judgment, however, did not indicate when the suspension started, stating: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants driving privileges are suspended for a period of five (5) years." After initially receiving the judgment suspending Hedges's license, DMV inputted a suspension start date of July 25, 2001 (five years from Hedges's earliest possible release date). The DMV notified Hedges that his suspension would last through April 26, 2005.² Subsequently, however, Danny E. Reed, a records specialist of the DMV, reviewed the file and changed the start date of the suspension to July 20, 1999, the date the order was signed; this change was based upon the silence in the district court order as to the start date and the DMV's policy regarding such silence.

On May 12, 2004, the district judge issued Hedges a temporary restricted license. The temporary restricted driver's license stated that Hedges's five-year suspension began on July 9, 1999. DMV received a copy of the temporary restricted license on July 9, 2004. Once again, DMV records were changed, this time to reflect that the suspension began on July 9, 1999, and expired on July 9, 2004. Less than three months after his release from prison, on July 13, 2004, after Hedges applied for a license and passed the relevant tests, DMV issued him an unrestricted license.

After the accident, Camilla Cafferty filed a complaint alleging gross negligence against DMV. Prior to trial, the parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court then orally granted DMV's motion for summary judgment, and Cafferty appeals this decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regl. Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997). "[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" summary judgment is proper. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997). In addition, this Court views the facts and inferences in the record in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. See, e.g., Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 246, 61 P.3d 601, 603 (2002).

III. ANALYSIS

In addition to the "strong line" of authority setting out the standards under which this Court reviews a motion for summary judgment, Harris v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992), when reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity and its employees under ITCA, this Court must engage in a three step analysis. Coonse ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803, 805, 979 P.2d 1161, 1163 (1999); Harris, 123 Idaho at 298 n. 1, 847 P.2d at 1159 n. 1; Olguin v. City of Burley, 119 Idaho 721, 723, 810 P.2d 255, 257 (1991); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 330, 775 P.2d 640, 644 (1989). First, we must determine whether "tort recovery is allowed under the laws of Idaho." Harris, 123 Idaho at 298 n. 1, 847 P.2d at 1159 n. 1. Second, this Court determines if "an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from liability." Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805, 979 P.2d at 1163. Finally, "if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle the moving party to dismissal." Id.

Here, the parties concede that a cause of action for negligence exists under the laws of Idaho. They disagree, however, on whether an exception to the liability of ITCA provides DMV with immunity from Cafferty's suit. Cafferty recognizes that DMV is only liable for issuing Hedges a license if its actions were grossly negligent or reckless, willful and wanton. See I.C. § 6-904B(3).³ Importantly, the parties do not argue that there is a question of fact; instead they argue as to whether the facts show that DMV's actions rose to a level of gross negligence so as to open DMV to liability. Cafferty maintains that because DMV failed to follow its statutory obligations when it issued the license it cannot claim immunity under ITCA.

First, Cafferty asserts that I.C. § 18-8005(5)(d) governs this situation, and DMV's failure to follow its mandates amounts to gross negligence or reckless, willful or wanton conduct. Moreover, Cafferty asserts that DMV's failure to use the procedures set out in I.C. § 49-326A also amount to gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. Finally, Cafferty argues that DMV's failure to refuse Hedges a license under I.C. § 49-303(6) or (10) amounts to gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct, and that the district court incorrectly concluded that she did not adequately plead a cause of action based on these statutes. We will turn first, then, to the issue of whether the district court correctly determined that Cafferty had not pleaded a cause of action based on I.C. § 49-303(6) or (10) since resolution of this issue affects the immunity analysis. We will then address the question of whether DMV is entitled to immunity.

A. Did Cafferty adequately plead a cause of action based on I.C. § 49-303(6) and (10)?

Cafferty argues that because her complaint alleges that DMV improperly issued a license to Hedges, that the issuance of that license proximately caused the death of Patrick Cafferty and the injuries to Camilla and Allan Cafferty, and that DMV's conduct was grossly negligent or reckless, she has met the requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). In its briefing, DMV argued that it was entitled to rely on Cafferty's pleadings, which did not put it on notice that she was claiming a cause of action based on I.C. § 49-303(6) or (10), and since she failed to timely amend her pleadings, the district court correctly held that Cafferty had not raised the issue and granted DMV summary judgment. However, at oral argument DMV conceded that broadly read, Cafferty's pleadings raised the issue of negligence under I.C. § 49-303(6) or (10).

Our Rules of Civil Procedure establish a system of notice pleading. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 864 (2000). A complaint need only contain a concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for relief. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986). "A party's pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a `just, speedy and inexpensive' resolution of the case." Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 30, 56 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2002) (citing Christensen v. Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 931, 763 P.2d 302, 304 (Ct.App.1988) (citing I.R.C.P. 1(a)); M.T. Deaton & Co. v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614, 759 P.2d 905 (Ct.App.1988)). "[I]ssues considered on summary judgment are those raised by the pleadings." Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925, 939, 719 P.2d 1185, 1199 (1986) (quoting Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 669, 691 P.2d 1283, 1284 (Ct.App.1984)). While courts may allow parties to amend their pleadings to conform to proof offered at trial, I.R.C.P. 15(b), "[a] cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment...." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d 849, 855 (2003) (citing Beco Const. Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (1993)).

Cafferty's amended complaint alleges that Hedges's license should have been suspended until at least April 14, 2005, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5)(d), and that by issuing Hedges a license "during a period of time when his driving privileges should have remained suspended" DMV acted with gross negligence or recklessly, willfully and wantonly. Additionally, it also alleges:

The conduct of [DMV] involved...