Caffrey v. Alcorn

• Decision Date: 08 November 1932
• Citation: 162 A. 840,115 Conn. 605
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CAFFREY v. ALCORN.

162 A. 840

115 Conn. 605

CAFFREY v. ALCORN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 8, 1932

Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesax County; John Richards Booth John A. Cornell, and Earnest C. Simpson, Judges.

Action by James T. Caffrey against Hugh M. Alcorn, administrator, on certain claims against the estate of John B. Hall, brought to the superior court where, upon motion of the defendant, the court gave judgment upon the record in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

Error and case remanded.

Leonard O. Ryan, of Middletown, for appellant.

Cornelius J. Danaher, of Meriden (Hugh M. Alcorn, of Hartford, on the brief), for appellee.

HAINES, J.

The court of probate for the district of Meriden, in which the solvent estate of John B. Hall was in process of settlement limited a period of six months from and after September 29, 1930, for the presentation of claims against the estate. The plaintiff presented his claim to the administrator in writing, November 10, 1930, which the latter disallowed December 10, 1930, and so notified the plaintiff. Under the provisions of General Statutes, § 4918, appearing in the footnote,^[1] the plaintiff thereupon became entitled to begin suit upon his claim within four months from December 10, 1930, i. e., before April 10, 1931. The plaintiff did not bring suit within that period, and it is the contention of the defendant that the claim was thus forever barred by the provisions of that statute.

So far as this particular statute is concerned, that result would necessarily follow, since the statute explicitly so provides. It was enacted in 1817 and clearly intended to facilitate the early settlement of solvent estates by enabling the administrator to set in motion a four months limitation by his notice of disallowance. Robbins v. Coffing, 52 Conn. 118, 143. As the language of the statute indicates, this procedure applied to solvent estates only. Before 1907 this was the usual statutory method for the determination of claims against such estates. Chapter 27, § § 326-330, General Statutes, Rev. 1902. Where the estate was insolvent, however, a different procedure was provided. Claims against insolvent estate were to be passed upon by commissioners. Chapter 28, § § 331-340. General Statutes, Rev. 1902. They determined the amounts due on all the claims and the aggregate sum due to claimants, thus ensuring a fair and equitable division of the assets of the estate pro rata among the creditors. Nowell's Appeal, 51 Conn. 107, 111; First National Bank v. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 22, 39; Bailey v. Bussing, 37 Conn. 349, 353. There were, however, further statutory provisions which permitted a possibly solvent estate to be settled as an insolvent one, when the court of probate deemed it " expedient." General Statutes, Rev. 1902, § 341.

The expedition and economy of settlement furnished by the action of commissioners, and perhaps the advantage of action by disinterested men having no bias for or against the estate, led to the practice of representing estates which were in fact solvent, to be insolvent, so as to obtain action by commissioners. This practice, however, was criticized by this court. Bacon v. Thorp, 27 Conn. 251, 262. It was held that every estate should be presumed solvent until fairly represented otherwise, and so soon as it came to the knowledge of the court of probate that an estate being settled as insolvent was in fact solvent, it must not be treated as insolvent, though so represented. Tweedy v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 276, 278: Bacon v. Thorp, supra; Sacket v. Mead, 1 Conn. 13, 17.

In 1907 the Legislature, with the apparent purpose of extending the use of commissioners in passing upon claims, enacted a statute by which, when the administrator of a solvent estate disallowed a claim which had been duly presented, the claimant could apply to the court of probate for the appointment of commissioners and thus submit his claim for further consideration, and such appointment was in the discretion of that court. Public Acts, 1907, c. 169, now General Statutes, § 4920, appearing in the footnote. ^[2]

A claimant who sought this method of relief, was required by the terms of the statute to make his application " within one month after notice of such disallowance or the expiration of the time limited for presenting claims." We read this as giving the claimant the alternative to make the application within one month after notice of the decision of the administrator, or one month after the expiration of the time for presenting claims to the administrator.

In the present case the claimant received notice of the disallowance by the administrator December 10, 1930, while the time limited for presenting claims expired March 29, 1931. On the latter date suit had not been brought, but before the end of the month following, viz. on April 7, 1931, he acted under the provisions of General Statutes, § 4920, and made application for the appointment of commissioners, and three days after the denial of his request on April 18, 1931, he brought suit.

The defendant contends that the claim was nevertheless barred on March 29, 1931, and that the claimant was not permitted to avail himself of the provisions of section 4920 because he says that statute only applies to cases " where the administrator has taken no action to disallow a claim during the time limited by the Court of Probate."

We are unable to find sufficient warrant for this contention. At first reading, these statutes may seem to contain inconsistent...