Caffrey v. Caffrey

• Decision Date: 06 April 1925
• Docket Number: No. 4172.,4172.
• Citation: 55 App. DC 285,4 F.2d 952
• Parties: CAFFREY v. CAFFREY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

55 App. DC 285, 4 F.2d 952 (1925)

CAFFREY v. CAFFREY.

No. 4172.

Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.

Submitted March 5, 1925.

Decided April 6, 1925.

T. F. Cullen, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mark Stearman and Henry Stearman, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.

ROBB, Associate Justice.

Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District remitting $90 of alimony that had accrued under a prior decree of the court in favor of the appellant. On March 3, 1923, a decree of divorce was awarded appellee, and appellant directed to pay $30 per month as alimony. Becoming in arrears, he was cited to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt. Answering, he alleged that he had sustained personal injuries, and for a time had been unable to work. He acknowledged the indebtedness, and averred that he was desirous of paying and would pay the amount as soon as able to earn the necessary money. Thereupon the court entered an order remitting part of the amount due, and from that order this appeal was noted.

Under section 976 of the Code, authority is expressly conferred upon the court below to decree a wife permanent alimony for her support and that of any minor children, upon the granting of a divorce to her. Section 978 provides that, after a decree of divorce in any case granting alimony, for the purposes above mentioned, "the case shall still be considered open for any future orders in those respects." The question, therefore, is whether this reservation is prospective or retroactive.

We think this question is determined by our decision in Phillips v. Kepler, 47 App. D. C. 384, 387. In that case a divorce had been granted a wife by a Nebraska court of competent jurisdiction, the decree to be in force only "until the further order" of the court. In this court it was contended that the decree as to past installments was not final, but we said: "The contention against the finality of the decree is based upon the provision which says that the requirement touching the alimony is to endure only `until the further order' of the court. But this does not disprove its finality as to installments past due. The decree may no doubt be altered by the court as to future payments, but there is no suggestion in it that, as to the installments which have matured, it is not final. In the Sistare Case, pages 13, 17, it was held that a decree like the one before us ...