Cagle v. Southeastern Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:99CV121-P-D (N.D. Miss.), Civil Action No. 1:99CV121-P-D
| Decision Date | 01 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:99CV121-P-D |
| Parties | TERRY WAYNE CAGLE, PLAINTIFF v. SOUTHEASTERN BOLL WEEVIL ERADICATION FOUNDATION, INC. and GREG BISHOP, DEFENDANTS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
W. ALLEN PEPPER, JR., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the defendant Southeastern Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having reviewed the motion, the briefs of the parties, the authorities cited and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as follows, to-wit:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
Terry Cagle began his employment with the Southeastern Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation (Southeastern) in June 1994 as a field unit supervisor. He continued in the position until the Mississippi program was discontinued in early 1996. Thereafter, he accepted employment with a "volunteer" program operated by Southeastern in Alabama. When the Mississippi program went back into operation in the spring of 1997, the executive director of the foundation, Jim Brumley, offered him a promotion to the position as an assistant officer in charge at the Aberdeen, Mississippi office. Cagle accepted the position and worked in that capacity until his termination on July 28, 1998.
During the course of his employment, Cagle always received above average performance evaluations and received regular salary increases. He had a good relationship with the farmers for whose acreage he was responsible. From spring 1997 until the time of his termination, Cagle received one Employee Disciplinary Report concerning his failure to report to work/failure to call in and a Warning Notice regarding his alleged involvement in remarks which his supervisor, Greg Bishop, believed to have a negative effect on the morale of workers on the growers' confidence in the program. Both were dated January 16, 1998 and were signed by Cagle.
Following his termination, Cagle applied for unemployment benefits. In response to a request by the Mississippi Employment Security Commission, Southeastern forwarded copies of the disciplinary reports contained in Cagle's personnel file. In addition to the two forms described above, Southeastern submitted nine other disciplinary reports, including the one completed by Greg Bishop on the date of Cagle's termination.2 Cagle professes never to have seen the additional reports and further asserts that he never received verbal counseling about the problems identified therein. He contends that the reports were falsified in an effort to provide a basis for his discharge. Notwithstanding the Commission's investigation, Cagle ultimately received an award of unemployment benefits.
In the months following his discharge, Cagle retained an attorney and brought suit against Southeastern and his immediate supervisor, Greg Bishop. His Complaint asserts causes of action grounded in breach of contract, defamation and malicious interference with contract.3 Southeastern filed a responsive pleading denying Cagle's right to recovery. After adequate time for discovery, Southeastern filed its motion for summary judgment. The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), authorizes summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The existence of a material question of fact is itself a question of law that the district court is bound to consider before granting summary judgment. John v. State of La. (Bd. Of T. for State C. & U., 757 F.2d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1985).
A judge's function at the summary judgment stage is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
Although Rule 56 is peculiarly adapted to the disposition of legal questions, it is not limited to that role. Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1986). Id. "With regard to `materiality', only those disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law will preclude summary judgment. Phillips Oil Company, v. OKC Corporation, 812 F.2d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 1987). Where "the summary judgment evidence establishes that one of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action does not exist as a matter of law, . . . all other contested issues of fact are rendered immaterial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992).
In making its determinations of fact on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1984).
The moving party has the duty to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of material fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law to prevail on his motion. Union Planters Nat. Leasing v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982). The movant accomplishes this by informing the court of the basis of its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine factual issues. Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131.
"Rule 56 contemplates a shifting burden: the nonmovant is under no obligation to respond unless the movant discharges [its] initial burden of demonstrating [entitlement to summary judgment]." John, 757 F.2d at 708. "Summary judgment cannot be supported solely on the ground that [plaintiff] failed to respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment, " even in light of a Local Rule of the court mandating such for failure to respond to an opposed motion. Id. at 709.
However, once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the nonmoving party must rebut with "significant probative" evidence. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978). In other words, "the nonmoving litigant is required to bring forward `significant probative evidence' demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." In Re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Lit., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982). To defend against a proper summary judgment motion, one may not rely on mere denial of material facts nor on unsworn allegations in the pleadings or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda. The nonmoving party's response, by affidavit or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. See also Union Planters Nat. Leasing v. Woods, 687 F.2d at 119.
While generally "[t]he burden to discover a genuine issue of fact is not on [the] court, (Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1137), "Rule 56 does not distinguish between documents merely filed and those singled out by counsel for special attention—the court must consider both before granting a summary judgment." John, 757 F.2d at 712, quoting Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406, 410 (5th Cir. 1980).
A. Contract Claim
The defendant Southeastern seeks summary judgment based on the "at will" employment doctrine and asserts that there are no facts which support plaintiff's right to recovery on this basis. The plaintiff asserts he has a right to recover for breach of his employment contract, arguing that the terms of his employment only permitted him to be fired "for cause." He bases his claim on an employee handbook provided to him after he began working for the foundation. The handbook detailed certain conditions and benefits of employment. Among its provisions was a section detailing the categories of employment with the foundation. It read as follows:
V — Appointment
A. General: All regular appointments shall be approved by the Executive director and/or the Board of Directors.
B. Regular Appointment:
1. A regular appointment is a full time and year long appointment working no less than 30 hours per week.
C. Temporary Appointment:
1. A temporary appointment may be a full time position, working no more than 30 hours per week or a part time position, working from 0-40 hours per week.
2. A temporary assignment shall recur on a seasonal or intermittent basis or as determined by the Executive Director or his representatives.
While Cagle admits he was never given a formal contract of employment, nor was he extended verbal promises concerning the duration of his employment, he contends that the above-quoted language transformed his employment relationship with Southeastern to one that permitted his discharge only "for cause."
Mississippi adheres to the doctrine of "at will" employment. In an at will employment state, both the employer and the employee are at liberty to terminate the employment relation at any time, with or without reason. Thus, under the at will doctrine, an employer may discharge an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, so long as the relationship is not...
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