Cahn v. the Mich. Cent. R.R. Co..

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 71 Ill. 96,1873 WL 8689
• Parties: AARON CAHN et al.v.THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

71 Ill. 96

1873 WL 8689 (Ill.)

AARON CAHN et al.

v.THE MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH E. GARY, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, by Aaron Cahn, Louis Wampold, Bernard Cahn, Charles Cahn and David Wallach, against the Michigan Central Railroad Company, to recover damages for the loss of goods shipped. The opinion of the court states the necessary facts.

Messrs. ROSENTHAL & PENCE, for the appellants.

Messrs. WALKER, DEXTER & SMITH, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

It is insisted that the liability of appellee as a common carrier had not terminated, in the present case, when the goods were destroyed, for two reasons: first, because no opportunity was afforded appellants to receive or examine their goods after their arrival at the Chicago depot, and second, because it was, by custom or usage, the duty of appellee to deliver the goods at appellants' place of business, and not at its warehouse.

In support of the first position, it is argued that the facts in the present case are different from those in the case of The Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Company v. Hallock, 64 Ill. 284, and that the rule there announced, consequently, does not apply.

We are unable to concur in this view of the case. There is, it is true, some difference in the facts between the two cases, but the difference is unimportant, and does not affect the principle of law involved. The goods were, in both cases, shipped by appellee's road. They arrived at the Chicago depot at or near the same time--about half past seven o'clock, on Saturday evening, October 7, 1871--and they were all destroyed by the memorable fire, commencing the following evening, which consumed the greater portion of the business part of the city. In both cases, there was urgent need for the immediate use of the cars in which the goods were shipped. In the present case, the goods were unloaded the same evening that they arrived, directly into appellee's warehouse, and, in the other case, they were unloaded into the warehouse of the transportation company, on the following morning. It is shown, in the present case, that, on account of the way in which appellee's tracks are laid, and its freight business is conducted at this depot, it is impossible for consignees to receive goods which it conveys, until after they have been unloaded from the car into the warehouse. In Hallock's case, it did not appear but that goods arriving during business hours might be received directly from the car, or from an open platform accessible to the public. It is not shown that a delivery from appellee's warehouse is necessarily, as its business is conducted, less expeditious, or convenient to consignees, than a delivery of the same goods would be if made from the car or an open platform. In no event could a delivery at such a depot be instantaneous with the arrival of the goods, nor could consignees be allowed, before goods are separated, to intermeddle with the contents of cars, or indiscriminate masses of freight unloaded upon a platform. The interests of both carrier and consignees would, obviously, require, especially at depots where such vast quantities of goods are being constantly received for consignees as at that of appellee, at Chicago, that the servants of the carrier should be free from outside annoyance or interference in the arrangement and delivery of the various consignments, as they are received at the depot. It is the carrier's duty,...