Cain v. Christine Valmy Int'l Sch. of Esthetics

• Decision Date: 20 October 2016
• Docket Number: 1:16–cv–170–GHW
• Parties: Ilene CAIN, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTINE VALMY INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF ESTHETICS, SKIN CARE, AND MAKEUP, Morina Valmy, Karol Ross, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

216 F.Supp.3d 328

Ilene CAIN, Plaintiff,

v.CHRISTINE VALMY INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF ESTHETICS, SKIN CARE, AND MAKEUP, Morina Valmy, Karol Ross, Defendants.

1:16–cv–170–GHW

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed October 20, 2016

Ileen Cain, Brooklyn, NY, pro se.

Michael Scott Hanan, Gordon & Rees LLP, Florham Park, NJ, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY H. WOODS, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ileen Cain, proceeding pro se , was a student at Christine Valmy Inc. ("CVI"), a for-profit vocational school that offers classes in, among other things, skin care, cosmetology, hairstyling, makeup, nail artistry, waxing, and spa treatments. Plaintiff alleges that, while attending CVI, she was the victim of recurring harassment and false accusations of misconduct by students and staff, all of which created a hostile environment at the school and ultimately caused Plaintiff to abandon her studies there. Plaintiff brings this action against CVI, CVI's president and owner Morina Valmy, and CVI instructor Karol Ross, asserting claims for violations of her federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims of cyberstalking under federal law, and various state law claims. Since Defendants are not state actors, Plaintiff's constitutional claims under § 1983 must be dismissed with prejudice, and because the statutes relied upon by Plaintiff for her cyberstalking claims do not supply a private right of action, those claims must also be dismissed with prejudice. In light of the dismissal of all of Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims, and those claims will be dismissed without prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff began taking courses at CVI in June 2014. Amended Complaint ("AC"), Dkt. No. 21, at 16. Prior to beginning her studies at CVI, Plaintiff had a meeting with Morina Valmy, the president and owner of CVI during which Plaintiff "confided" to Ms. Valmy that she "is a victim of cyberstalking and that she was terminated from two different schools after complaining to school administrators, [that] students were participating in cyberstalking." Id. at 13, ¶ 2. Ms. Valmy assured Plaintiff that, if "the cyberstalking followed her to [CVI]," Ms. Valmy would "investigate the situation." Id. at 14, ¶ 5.

Plaintiff alleges that one day after starting courses at CVI, students "began the rant, gang mock her kook her kook her kook kook her." Id. at 14, ¶ 8. "The rant was consistent throughout ... esthetic theory class," and the instructor of that class, Ms. Ross, "did nothing to stop the rant." Id.

Plaintiff also alleges that she was called to Ms. Valmy's office multiple times during the course of her studies and confronted with allegations of inappropriate conduct. On one occasion, Plaintiff "was chastised and accused of making ethnic comments while talking on her phone" and was "advised ... to stay off her phone." Id. at 10, ¶¶ 1–2. Subsequently, Plaintiff was called to Ms. Valmy's office "about an alleged video of Plaintiff sticking her middle finger up." Id. at 10, ¶ 4. At this meeting, both Ms. Valmy and Ms. Ross "badgered [her] relentlessly about the alleged video" but they "did not produce any video of Plaintiff ... sticking her middle finger up." Id. at 10, ¶¶ 4–5. Before one meeting in Ms. Valmy's office, Ms. Ross told Plaintiff that the school was "thinking of terminating [Plaintiff] from the program, and that this is a serious matter." Id. at 11, ¶ 6. On another occasion, Plaintiff was called to Ms. Valmy's office "for allegedly pushing a student." Id. at 11, ¶¶ 8–9. Similarly, Plaintiff was called to Ms. Valmy's office a final time "for allegedly using the F word." Id. at 11, ¶ 13.

Although it is not clear when, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Ross also told Plaintiff that she "has heard a lot of chatter in the hallway pertaining to Plaintiff," and told Plaintiff that "she was concerned about Plaintiff moving on to the second phase of the program, esthetic lab where students would be required to apply chemical product on students." Id. at 11, ¶ 14. Ms. Ross allegedly told Plaintiff that she was concerned that Plaintiff "could be sabotaged." Id. at 15, ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that, although she "was humiliated and emotionally wrecked" at this point, she decided to begin the lab portion of the course. Id. at 15, ¶ 14.

Plaintiff alleges that during the first week of esthetic lab courses, "the rant kook coo coo kook her kook her coo coo" began again. Id. at 15, ¶ 15. Apparently during the course of esthetic lab instruction, a receptionist at the school named Gabriella was "yelling at the top of her lungs keep coo coo kooking her keep kook kook kooing her." Id. at 15, ¶ 16. Specifically, Gabriella was "holding the sides of her skirt dancing from side to side" and saying "keep mocking her keep kook kook koocking her." Id. at 16, ¶ 17.

At some point in time, Plaintiff told Ms. Valmy that "the cyberstalking had followed her" to CVI, as had the "consistent and insistent rant of referring to Plaintiff as a kook, coo coo cooc coo coo coo coo." Id. at 12, ¶ 17. On July 9, 2015, Ms. Valmy addressed Plaintiff's class "regarding alleged complaints students had made against Plaintiff." Id. at 11, ¶ 15. Ms. Valmy "instructed the class to tell Plaintiff ... what they wanted to say about her." Id. at 12, ¶ 19. One student stated that Plaintiff had "told her she stinks." Id. at 12, ¶ 21. While Ms. Valmy was speaking to the class, "Plaintiff sat with her head down and did not say a word."Id. at 12, ¶ 23. The discussion eventually became "emotionally unbearable" for Plaintiff and she decided to leave the class. Id. at 12, ¶ 24. As Plaintiff left the room, "the entire class roared in laughter." Id. at 12, ¶ 25.

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Bureau of Proprietary School Supervision ("BPSS"). Id. at 17, ¶ 1. On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence from CVI. Id. at 17. On August 8, 2015, "BPSS concluded it could not substantiate any violations" stated by Plaintiff and "closed Plaintiff's case." Id. at 18, ¶ 6. Plaintiff appealed this decision, but "BPSS refused to reverse their decision." Id. Plaintiff withdrew from CVI on October 13, 2015. Id. at 16.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 7, 2016. Construed as raising the strongest claims it suggests, the complaint arguably asserts claims for violation of her federal constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims for cyberstalking under federal law, and a host of state law claims, including claims under the New York City Human Rights law and claims for defamation and slander. Id. at 1. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on May 12, 2016. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 16, 2016, Dkt. No. 21, which Defendants moved to dismiss on July 7, 2016, Dkt. No. 23.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege facts that are consistent with liability; the complaint must "nudge" claims "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The court must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Legal conclusions, unlike facts, are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A complaint that offers "labels and conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]" without "further factual enhancement" will not survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

Furthermore, "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed ... and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). Courts are to "liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants ... reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." Bertin v. United States , 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff's papers indicate that she intends to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her federal constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes state action." Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. and Loan Ass'n, FA , 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 941 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to show state action." Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003).

"For...