Cain v. Com. of Virginia

• Decision Date: 03 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 3:96CV991.,CIV. A. 3:96CV991.
• Citation: 982 F.Supp. 1132
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Robert Lewis CAIN, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>, et al., Defendants

982 F.Supp. 1132

Robert Lewis CAIN, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA¹, et al., Defendants

No. CIV. A. 3:96CV991.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

October 3, 1997.

Robert Lewis Cain, State Farm, VA, for Plaintiff.

Jill Theresa Bowers, Office of Atty. Gen., Com. of Virginia, Richmond, VA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

SPENCER, District Judge.

Robert Lewis Cain, a Virginia state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Cain alleges R. Neely Owen, Robert Sykes, and J.A. Crawford, initiated and prosecuted charges against him which they knew were false. Sykes and Crawford have moved to dismiss.² Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).

I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

On November 1, 1994, Robert Sykes and J.A. Crawford, swore out a warrant against Cain before the Magistrate in Greensville County, Virginia. The warrant states that on September 3, 1994, Cain, "while a prisoner at Greensville Corr. Center knowingly and wilfully inflict[sic] bodily injury to Robert Sykes an employee thereof." On December 29, 1994, Cain was served with the warrant. R. Neely Owen prosecuted the case for the Commonwealth. On March 17, 1995, the General District Court for the County of Greenville convicted Cain of assault and sentenced him to an 8-month jail term. Cain appealed his conviction to the Circuit Court for the County of Greensville. At the Circuit Court, Gilbert Hudson, another Commonwealth Attorney, moved to nolle prosequi the action. In granting the motion the Circuit Court stated,

[i]t appearing to the Court that the failure of the former Commonwealth Attorney, R. Neely Owen, to obtain a plea agreement prior to agreeing to have the case reduced to a misdemeanor and tried in General District Court has caused the Commonwealth great inconvenience and expense in transporting witnesses, paying jurors, issuing subpoena, entering transportation orders, etc., and ... this case be and hereby is Nolle Porsequied.

Circuit Court Order entered December 14, 1995.

Cain alleges Sykes and Crawford initiated and prosecuted charges against him which they knew were false in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Cain's claim against Owen is far from lucid. Cain asserts Owen obtained his March 17, 1995 conviction without due process of law. Specifically, Cain alleges that: at the arraignment, "after the charge against the plaintiff had been reduced to a misdemeanor, plaintiff states that, he was not allowed to plead guilty or not guilty to the charge against him before the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney, defendant had already obtained a conviction for assault and battery, in violation of the Virginia Code Ann. 18.2-57. ... Va.Code Ann. 19.2-254." Cain alleges that the prosecution and conviction caused him a great deal of emotional distress. Cain seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. EVALUATION UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT(PLRA)

Under the PLRA the Court is required to dismiss an action filed by a prisoner that is "frivolous or malicious", "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted", or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief". 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2); see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

A. Absolute Immunity

Generally, prosecutors are absolutely immune from monetary damages for acts taken in "the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including presentation of the state's case at trial." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2613, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). However, prosecutors do not enjoy absolute immunity for "investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a prosecution." Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615. Cain's claim against Owen concerns the manner in which Owen prosecuted the assault charge before the general district court. Owen is entitled to absolute immunity for such conduct. Id. at 269, 113 S.Ct. at 2613-14. Accordingly, Cain's claim against Owen will be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2).

B. Failure to State a Claim

Section 1983, "is not itself a source of substantive rights but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 811, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). Thus, the first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Id. Cain alleges the defendants' actions violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.

While the Court liberally construes Cain's pro se complaint, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 431 (1978), the Court is "under no obligation to sua sponte raise and address any and every claim that might arguably be presented by the facts as presented." Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 242 (4th Cir.1997) (Luttig, J., concurring) (citing Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir.1996)). Here, Cain has failed to properly identify a constitutional right which was infringed by the defendants' conduct. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. at 811.

In Albright, the plaintiff brought an action for malicious prosecution under § 1983. The Court noted that "the extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one `on which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion'" Id. at 270 n. 4, 114 S.Ct. at 811 n. 4 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir.1992)). Although the Court's plurality opinion reflects much of the same diversity, a majority of the justices concluded that where the state provides a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the Fourteenth Amendment will "not furnish not constitutional peg on which to hang such a `tort'." Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n. 4, 114 S.Ct. at 811 n. 4 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion); 510 U.S. at 285-86, 114 S.Ct. at 819-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Holt v. Medical College of Virginia, No. 95-2009, 1996 WL 132106 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 1996); Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d 1362, 1365 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1151, 115 S.Ct. 1103, 130 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1995). Thus, to the extent § 1983 provides a remedy for wrongful or malicious prosecution, "the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a deprivation of the liberty interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." Rhodes v. Smithers, 939 F.Supp. 1256, 1273 (S.D.W.Va.1995); Wilkes v. Young, 28 F.3d at 1365; see Albright, 510 U.S. at 274-75, 114 S.Ct. at 813-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1812, 108 L.Ed.2d 942 (1990); Amato v. City of Richmond, 875 F.Supp. 1124, 1147 (E.D.Va.1994). Therefore, Cain has not alleged a viable claim that the defendants violated his rights secured by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. And, even if the Court were to assume Cain has raised a claim for a violation of his rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the absence of a cognizable injury and his abuse of the judicial process foreclose relief on such a claim in the present action.

C. Lack of Injury

In Goodwin v. Metts, the Fourth Circuit described the injurious consequences that may flow from a wrongful prosecution. Such a prosecution may "seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends." Goodwin, 885 F.2d at 157. Cain was already incarcerated and serving a long prison term when he was charged and convicted of the September 4, 1994 assault. Cain's sentence on the assault was set aside and Cain fails to allege he suffered any loss of liberty because of the assault conviction. Cain's assertion that he suffered a compensable emotional injury is frivolous.

Under the PLRA, "no Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner ... for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see, Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir.1997) (finding a sore, bruised ear lasting for three days not a sufficient physical injury to support a claim for emotional or mental suffering under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). In an attempt to diminish the number of frivolous lawsuits by inmates, "Congress took a page from the common law by limiting claims for mental and emotional injuries, which can easily be feigned or exaggerated, in the absence of physical injury." Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F.Supp. 354, 362 (E.D.Wis.1997) (citing Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1250 (4th Cir.1996)). The propriety of such an approach is apparent when one views Cain's current allegations of injury in light of his prior testimony and litigation.³ See infra at 1137-38.

D. Maliciousness of the Current Complaint

Congress recognized that a litigant "whose filing fees are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious or repetitive lawsuits." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

It is quite clear that Congress, while intending to extend to poor and meritorious suitors the privilege of having their wrongs redressed without the ordinary burdens of litigation, at the same time intended to safeguard members of the public against an abuse of the privilege by evil-minded persons who might avail themselves of the shield of immunity from costs for the purpose of harassing those with whom they were not in accord, by subjecting them to vexatious and frivolous legal proceedings.

O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir.1904). Thus, the courts are charged with dismissing an action proceeding in forma pauperis at any time during the...