Cain v. New York State Bd. of Elections
| Decision Date | 05 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 85-1924.,CV 85-1924. |
| Citation | 630 F. Supp. 221 |
| Parties | John T. CAIN and Michael J. Fahy, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, George T. Salerno, R. Wells Stout, Donald A. Rettaliata and Thomas J. Sullivan, Commissioners and Denis Dillon, District Attorney of Nassau County, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
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A. Lawrence Washburn Jr., New York City, for plaintiffs.
Stanley L. Zalen, Albany, N.Y., for defendant Board of Elections.
Edward G. McCabe, Nassau County Atty. by Howard Y. Taylor, Mineola, N.Y., for defendant Dillon.
Plaintiffs John T. Cain ("Cain") and Michael J. Fahy ("Fahy") bring this action against the New York State Board of Elections and its Commissioners ("Board"), and Denis Dillon, District Attorney of Nassau County ("Dillon"), asserting wrongdoing in the administration and application of state election laws. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutionally preventing insurgent candidates in New York's major political parties from challenging incumbents by, among other methods, the selective prosecution of insurgent candidates under the Election and Penal Laws of New York. Plaintiffs seek legal and equitable relief for themselves and for all other persons similarly situated. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Board moves the Court for an order dismissing the action for improper venue or, in the alternative, transferring the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. Dillon cross-moves for dismissal of all claims against him on the ground that prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits such as plaintiffs seek to bring.1 Dillon further requests that if the Court denies his motion and determines that a change of venue is proper, the action against him be severed and allowed to remain in the Eastern District of New York.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the action against Dillon insofar as damages are sought, severs the surviving claims for equitable relief against Dillon from the claims against the Board, and orders that plaintiffs' action against the Board be transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York.
Plaintiff Cain is a resident of the Town of Oyster Bay, Nassau County, New York. Cain alleges that he challenged the incumbent, Ralph J. Marino, in the 1980 Republican Primary for State Senator, Fifth Senatorial District. Cain claims that Dillon, in his capacity as Nassau County District Attorney, prosecuted Cain under the Election Law of New York for using signatures signed not by the actual person, but by his or her husband, wife, or other family member.
A jury trial in the Nassau County Court resulted in Cain's conviction under New York Election Law § 17-122(7) for misconduct in relation to his designating or nominating petition. The Appellate Division reduced the sentence but otherwise unanimously affirmed the judgment, and Judge Meyer of the New York State Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal under N.Y. Crim.P. § 460.20.
Cain asserts that his prosecution was discriminatory. He alleges that Dillon had actual notice that all the challenged signatures on Cain's petition were authorized and that Dillon generally refuses to prosecute cases in which the widespread practice of using authorized signatures had been employed. Cain claims that Dillon singled out Cain and other similarly situated insurgent candidates for different treatment under the New York Election Law, with a resulting foreseeable, and intentional, discriminatory effect.
Plaintiff Fahy is a resident of the Town of Paris, in Oneida County, New York. He alleges that he challenged incumbent Congressman Sherwood L. Boehlert in the 1984 Republican primary. The Board, however, invalidated his designating petition and denied him a place on the ballot. Fahy asserts that his designating petitions were in proper form, except for technical irregularities which did not affect the integrity or efficiency of the electoral process, and that evidence that these irregularities could be cured and that the petition contained sufficient valid signatures was presented to the Board on the date of its review at Fahy's candidacy. This evidence, however, did not appear on the face of his designating petitions at the time they were witnessed.
Fahy challenged the Board's decision in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Albany County. The Court dismissed on the merits his petition that his candidacy be validated. The dismissal was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Department. The New York Court of Appeals denied his leave to appeal and dismissed his appeal as of right for lack of a substantial state constitutional question.
In the state court proceedings, Fahy expressly reserved any federal constitutional or statutory rights for litigation in federal court. He now alleges that as a result of the Board's decision, he was disenfranchised in violation of his right to substantive due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dillon argues that plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim against him upon which relief can be granted since prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity from civil suits such as that brought by plaintiffs. Insofar as plaintiffs seek an award of damages, Dillon is completely correct: Prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties are absolutely immune from actions for money damages based upon their prosecutorial actions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).2 Plaintiff's action against Dillon, therefore, must be dismissed to the extent that it seeks relief by way of a damages award.
Prosecutors, however, are not similarly protected from requests for declaratory or injunctive relief. Immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). While prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability, they are still subject to injunctive suits. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736-37, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). In fact, in Morano v. Dillon, 746 F.2d 942, 944 (2d Cir.1984), the Second Circuit admonished parties who insisted on briefing and arguing the issue despite the Supreme Court's "pointed" remarks in Consumer's Union.
In their action, plaintiffs seek both legal and equitable relief. As the Imbler rule of prosecutorial immunity attaches only to claims for damages, Dillon's motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that plaintiffs seek relief by way of a damages award but is denied insofar as plaintiffs seek relief other than money damages.
The Board asserts that plaintiffs' case cannot go forward in this Court because venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which states:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
The Board points out that the Board's principal office is located in Albany, New York and that the action by the Board about which Fahy complains was taken in Albany. Albany lies within the boundaries of the Northern District of New York.
The Board fails to take cognizance, however, of 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a), which provides:
Any civil action, not of a local nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same state, may be brought in any such districts.
In a suit against a public agency and its officials, "residence," for venue purposes, is where the officials involved perform their duties. Andrew H. v. Ambach, 579 F.Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y.1984); Procario v. Ambach, 466 F.Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y.1979). The Board and its Commissioners, therefore, are deemed to reside in the Northern District of New York. Dillon, on the other hand, uncontestedly resides in the Eastern District. Since the defendants live in different districts, under § 1392(a), venue in the Eastern District is proper in this lawsuit.
The fact that venue in the Eastern District is not improper under the applicable venue statute, however, does not necessarily dispose of the issues that confront the Court. Even when venue is proper, a court may determine that, in the interest of justice, an action between multiple defendants should be severed and certain claims transferred to a more convenient forum. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 provides, "Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately." A decision to sever lies within the discretion of the Court, and an order of severance is interlocutory, and thus not ordinarily appealable. Garber v. Randall, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.1973); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F.Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.1981). Severance is not limited to situations where there has been a finding of improper joinder. Spencer, White, and Prentis Inc. of Connecticut v. Pfizer, Inc., 498 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.1974); Wyndham Associates v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977, 89 S.Ct. 444, 21 L.Ed.2d 438 (1968).
A claim may be severed based upon lack of a significant relationship between defendants or solely for the purpose of facilitating transfer. Where the administration of justice would be materially advanced by severance and transfer, a court may properly sever the claims against one or more defendants for the purpose of permitting the transfer of the action against other defendants. Wyndham Associates, 398 F.2d at 618; General Tire and Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chemical Co., 50 F.R.D. 112 (S.D.N.Y.1970); see also C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1689 (...
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