Cain v. Providence Hosp., LLC
| Decision Date | 10 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | C/A No. 3:18-cv-2120-JFA-SVH |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Tanya Cain, Plaintiff, v. Providence Hospital, LLC d/b/a Providence Health, Defendant. |
In this employment discrimination case, Tanya Cain ("Plaintiff") sues her former employer, Providence Hospital, LLC d/b/a Providence Health ("Defendant"), based on her termination. Plaintiff alleges claims of (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. ("Title VII"); (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII; (3) defamation; and (4) tortious interference with prospective contractual relations. All pretrial proceedings in this case, including the instant motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) were referred to a Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.).
The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action1 prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation ("Report") and opines that this court should grant Defendant's motionfor summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination, retaliation, and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations and deny the motion as to the remaining defamation claim. (ECF No. 46). The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.
Both parties timely filed objections to the Report (ECF Nos. 49 & 50) along with responses to opposing objections (ECF Nos. 51 & 53). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those portions of theReport to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).
"An objection is specific if it 'enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute.'" Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at *5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. See Workman v. Perry, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must "direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
"Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object." Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions "not objected to—including those portions to which only 'general and conclusory' objections have been made—for clear error." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47).
The legal standard employed in a motion for summary judgment is well-settled and correctly stated within the Report. Accordingly, that standard is incorporated herein without a recitation.
As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report. However, a brief recitation of the factual background is necessary to analyze the various objections provided by each party.
Plaintiff (white) was hired by Defendant on February 18, 2008, as the Senior Charge Nurse in the endoscopy department. Prior to her termination, Plaintiff reported to Defendant's Director of Surgical Services, Greta Kennedy (black), who started working with Plaintiff in December 2016 and became her supervisor in April 20172. Prior to Kennedy, Plaintiff's supervisor was Holly Lewis (white). Kennedy reported to Stephanie Simmonds (white), Defendant's Chief Nursing Officer. Plaintiff did not receive any formal disciplinary action from Kennedy or any other supervisors prior to her termination.
In May 2017, Plaintiff complained that she was not getting full pay for the call hours she worked. Plaintiff first notified Kennedy and then advised Justin Lofurno in Human Resources, before finally contacting Simmonds. Lofurno eventually identified the issue and advised Plaintiff Defendant would resolve the issue, which affected several other employees.
The endoscopy department provides a variety of different services and procedures for the purpose of diagnosing patient illnesses such as colon cancer and gastric bleeding. As Senior Charge Nurse for endoscopy, Plaintiff was a working supervisor, performing endoscopy screenings in addition to her managerial responsibilities. Throughout Plaintiff'semployment, the endoscopy department was accredited by the nationally recognized Joint Commission and/or DNV GL-Healthcare ("DNV"). Achieving accreditation, which occurs only upon passing unannounced reviews by surveyors from the respective accrediting agency to determine whether the hospital is meeting established standards, can impact Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement. To prepare for the accreditation surveys, Defendant conducted periodic preparedness surveys of its various departments, the results of which were then shared with the department leader.
On June 15, 2015, Defendant conducted an internal audit that identified multiple deficiencies in the endoscopy department, including that it "lacks endoscopy-specific policies outlining processes and procedures such as equipment cleaning process and procedural processes." The audit also found the endoscopy department lacked proper procedures for cleaning equipment, including endoscopes, and procedure rooms. Defendant reviewed the audit findings with Plaintiff and instructed her to fix the deficiencies immediately.
On September 9, 2015, DNV conducted its 2015 audit and the auditor reported endoscopy staff, who were supervised by Plaintiff, were not properly transporting endoscopes from patients' rooms to the endoscopy department. Defendant reviewed the identified deficiencies with Plaintiff and instructed her to remedy the issues.
Approximately six months later, Defendant conducted an internal preparedness survey. The survey identified multiple deficiencies in the endoscopy department. Some of these deficiencies, such as issues with the temperature on the blanket warmers and maintaining a proper eyewash station, had been identified in previous audits but notremedied by Plaintiff. Other deficiencies were new, such as the discovery that the endoscopy staff was flushing used colonoscopes with water at patients' bedsides rather than the required enzyme solutions, which the report indicated violated the Society of Gastroenterology Nurses and Associates' ("SGNA") standards. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she was unsure if SGNA standards prohibited flushing with water at the bedsides at this time, but she believed she provided the SGNA standards in response to the audit, and Defendant agreed the policy should be to follow manufacturer guidelines, which allowed for washing at bedside with water only. As Chief Nurse for the endoscopy department, Plaintiff was tasked with correcting the items identified in the audit.
Later in 2016, Defendant conducted another internal audit. That audit identified deficiencies in the endoscopy department, some of which had been identified previously but not corrected by Plaintiff, such as improperly storing endoscopes while not in use. Plaintiff failed to correct this deficiency despite being instructed to do so. Based on the repeated and uncorrected issues in the endoscopy department, then-Director of Surgical Services Holly Lewis issued Plaintiff a "Growth Plan" on September 30, 2016. The Growth Plan identified Defendant's expectations for Plaintiff, specifically including preparedness for audits and ensuring compliance with DNV, the Joint Commission, and other applicable standards. Plaintiff acknowledged her understanding of these expectations.
On December 6, 2016, the Joint Commission conducted an audit. It identified several deficiencies in the endoscopy department, including that staff were improperly transporting sanitized endoscopes. Defendant reviewed the findings with Plaintiff, some of which had been identified in 2015 by DNV, and instructed her to correct them immediately.
Robin Yackell (white), Senior Director of Surgical Services for Defendant's corporate parent company, was responsible for overseeing the quality of operations of surgical services (including endoscopy) at LifePoint-affiliated facilities such as Providence. In June 2017, Yackell conducted an audit of Defendant's endoscopy department. Yackell found multiple deficiencies in the endoscopy department, several of which had been previously discussed with Plaintiff, including that employees were not properly sanitizing its equipment. Yackell communicated her concern with what she described...
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