Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co.
| Decision Date | 22 May 1928 |
| Docket Number | 18079. |
| Citation | 267 P. 641,131 Okla. 25,1928 OK 334 |
| Parties | CAIN et al. v. QUANNAH LIGHT & ICE CO. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where several persons jointly commit a wrong resulting in injury to another, the liability against such joint wrongdoers to the person injured is joint and several, and a compromise of the claim and a release as to one will not operate to release the others unless such was the intention; and in such case the injured party may sue all or any of them in a single action or he may sue them separately; but, although several judgments may be thus obtained, there can be but one satisfaction and the acceptance of payment in full upon the judgment obtained against one of such persons will operate as a bar to the further prosecution of actions for the same injury against any of the others.
Although several separate suits may be brought for a joint liability yet, where the injury is an entirety, the damage resulting therefrom cannot be apportioned among the wrongdoers, nor divided into separate demands; and, where the injured party sues one of the wrongdoers, and demands only a part of the damage which he suffered by the injury, a recovery and satisfaction therein will operate as a bar to any further claim of damages against the others.
Where the concurring active negligence of two persons causes injury to a third, and one of the wrongdoers is sued and judgment obtained, and by reason of such judgment is compelled to discharge the liability thereby incurred, no contribution or indemnity can be had by the person so discharging such liability.
Commissioners' Opinion.
Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.
Action by Frances Cain and others against the Quannah Light & Ice Company for damages. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
W. C Austin, of Altus, and L. P. Oldham, Adelbert Brown, and Gordon Stater, all of Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.
Ross & Thurman, of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.
This is an action originally brought in the district court of Oklahoma county by Frances Cain, widow of C. H. Cain deceased, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children, against the Quannah Light & Ice Company, to recover damages because of the death of her husband. The Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company was also made a party plaintiff.
The deceased met his death at Eldorado July 6, 1923, while engaged as an employee of the United States Gypsum Company in pulling a switch to cut off the electric current at a transformer and substation owned and operated by the said gypsum company, in connection with its business.
This station was constructed by the defendant under a contract with the gypsum company. The plaintiff alleges that this substation was negligently constructed and constructed in such manner as to become highly dangerous to third persons.
It is alleged by the plaintiff Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company that it paid plaintiff the sum of $5,000 on her claim by reason of its liability on an indemnity policy carried by the gypsum company, for the benefit of its employees; that by reason of having made such payment it is entitled, under the law and the terms of its policy, to subrogation, and on this theory entitled to recover from the defendant the sum so paid.
The defendant denies liability, and pleads that the plant was constructed under contract with the gypsum company, and constructed, in all respects, in accordance with the contract and as demanded by the gypsum company; that the same was completed and accepted by the gypsum company several weeks prior to the accident; that, if liability exists, the said gypsum company is alone liable.
The defendant further pleads that, prior to the filing of this suit against it, the plaintiff filed her suit in the district court of Jackson county against the gypsum company, in which suit she claimed her entire damage to be the sum of $7,500; that in said suit she recovered judgment against the said company in the said sum, and has received payment in full thereon and satisfied the judgment; that by reason thereof she cannot maintain this action.
As to the claim of plaintiff the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, this defendant says that, even though liability exists against it, it could only be held to be jointly liable with the gypsum company, and, being jointly liable and under the law joint tort-feasors, recovery over against it could not be had by the gypsum company, and therefore the plaintiff Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company has no cause of action against it.
The evidence discloses: That this substation was constructed by the defendant for the gypsum company under contract with said company. The station was about 8 feet high, 4 feet wide, 10 feet long, and was inclosed by a high board fence; entrance thereto being made through a door at the end of the fence. On the inside was a mass of wires carrying electricity, and near the end of these wires, opposite the door, was located a switch, which was used in turning on and cutting off the current. That one of these wires carried 13,000 volts of electricity. That the handle or lever to this switch was placed within 15 inches of this high-voltage wire. That the wires, in said station, to and from said switch, were so constructed as to leave a space of only 6 inches on each side of a person entering to pull the switch. That the deceased, at the time of the accident, was attempting to pull this switch in order to cut off the current. That the switch stuck and was difficult to open, and, in attempting to release the same, deceased became overbalanced, and his left hand came in contact with this high-voltage wire, causing his electrocution.
The plaintiff introduced testimony tending to show that the switch was defective in several particulars and improperly constructed. Testimony was also introduced showing that the wires were not properly insulated. The evidence discloses that no wooden platform was provided for a person to stand on while pulling the switch; that no sufficient space was allowed between the wires to permit safe entrance for the purpose of disengaging the switch.
The evidence further discloses that defendant was furnishing, for hire to the gypsum company, the electricity carried over these wires. It is also disclosed that the station was constructed according to plans approved by Mr. Birdseye, chief engineer of the gypsum company. Testimony also developed that the defendant recommended a different switch than the one installed, but that the chief engineer of the gypsum company refused to follow such recommendation.
It was also established by the evidence that plaintiff, prior to the institution of this suit, filed suit on this identical cause of action against the gypsum company in the district court of Jackson county, for damages in the sum of $7,500; that judgment for said sum was rendered in her favor; that said judgment has been fully paid and by her satisfied. The judgment, however, contains the provision that the same should be without prejudice to plaintiff's rights against the Quannah Light & Ice Company.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
As to the plaintiff Mrs. Cain, it appears from the record, that the court based its ruling on the theory that the satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the gypsum company operated as a bar to this suit.
As to the plaintiff Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, the ruling was based on the theory that the defendant and the gypsum company were joint tort-feasors, and that, as between joint tort-feasors, there can be neither contribution nor indemnity; that the gypsum company, not being entitled to indemnity, no right of subrogation exists in favor of the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, and it could not, therefore, maintain its cause of action against the defendant.
We are of the opinion that the court ruled correctly in directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. The satisfaction of the prior judgment against the gypsum company, in our opinion, is a bar to this action. In volume 34 C.J. 983, it is said: "As a plaintiff can have but one satisfaction for a joint wrong, if he recovers a judgment against one of the tort-feasors and obtains satisfaction, this operates as a discharge of the others."
See also, the following authorities: Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U.S. 347, 24 L.Ed. 596; Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa, 575, 79 N.W. 344; Savage v. Stevens, 128 Mass. 254; Blackman v....
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