Cain v. State, 8 Div. 543
Court | Alabama Court of Appeals |
Writing for the Court | PER CURIAM. |
Citation | 16 Ala.App. 303,77 So. 453 |
Docket Number | 8 Div. 543 |
Decision Date | 13 November 1917 |
Parties | CAIN v. STATE. |
77 So. 453
16 Ala.App. 303
CAIN
v.
STATE.
8 Div. 543
Court of Appeals of Alabama
November 13, 1917
Appeal from Circuit Court, Limestone County; Osceola Kyle, Judge.
Will Cain was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed and remanded.
The facts concerning the venire sufficiently appear. The following charges were refused to defendant:
(29) Before you can render a verdict in this case against defendant, you must be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that defendant used unnecessary force in repelling the assault or seeming assault upon his sister Lillie Cain unless from the evidence you are reasonably satisfied that Lillie Cain provoked or brought on the difficulty between defendant and Lucy Garrett, or was not free from fault in provoking, or bringing on the difficulty, or that there was a reasonable mode of retreat to said Lillie Cain, from which she could have escaped without increasing her danger, and you are reasonably satisfied that the situation of Lillie Cain was not such at the time he cut or stabbed Lucy Garrett to impress upon the mind of a reasonable man that Lillie Cain was in danger of suffering grievous bodily harm or death at the hands of Lucy Garrett, and defendant did not honestly entertain such belief as to the situation of his sister Lillie Cain
(35) Before you can render a verdict against defendant in this case, you must be reasonably from the evidence that Lillie Cain provoked or brought on the difficulty, or at least that she was not free from fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty between her and Lucy Garrett, and that she was not in such real or apparent present, impending danger of death or grievous bodily harm that a reasonable person would not have honestly entertained a reasonable belief that she was in such real or apparent peril, and that there was a convenient or reasonable mode of escape for her from such present, impending peril whether the same was real or only apparent, without increasing such real or apparent peril, or you must be reasonably satisfied from all of the evidence that defendant himself provoked or brought on the difficulty between his sister and Lucy Garrett, or that defendant could have relieved his sister from her apparent or real peril by resort to some other means less harmful than stabbing or cutting Lucy Garrett
(30) If you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that Lillie Cain was free from fault in provoking any difficulty between herself and Lucy Garrett, and if you are further satisfied reasonably from the evidence that Lillie Cain was in either apparent or real imminent danger of grievous bodily harm or death at the hands of Lucy Garrett, and you are further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Lillie Cain had no reasonable mode of escape without increasing her real or apparent danger, then her brother, the defendant, had the right to cut or stab Lucy Garrett, and your verdict should be for defendant, unless you are further reasonably satisfied from the evidence that Will Cain could have avoided the peril, whether apparent or real, by resort to some measure less dangerous than cutting or stabbing Lucy Garrett, and unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in the case that the apparent or real danger of Lillie Cain was not such as to reasonably impress upon the mind of a reasonable person that such danger was real or apparent, and Will Cain did not honestly entertain such belief.
(31) If Lillie Cain was free from all fault in bringing on the difficulty between her and Lucy Garrett, then she was under no duty to retreat unless you believe she could have retreated without increasing her danger, or with reasonable safety, and I further charge you that it is immaterial whether that danger was real or not, and Lillie Cain would be under no duty to retreat if she was free from fault in bringing on such difficulty.
(32) If Lillie Cain was free from fault in provoking or bringing on the difficulty between her and Lucy Garrett, and if there was a present, impending peril to her life or danger of great bodily harm to her, either real or apparent, as to create a bona fide belief of an existing necessity, and there was no convenient and reasonable mode of escape by retreat or declining the combat with safety, then defendant would have the right, and it was his duty, under the law, to cut or stab in defense of his sister Lillie Cain, to prevent the commission of a felony upon her, unless you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence in this case that defendant, Will Cain, provoked the difficulty, or could have saved his sister from such real or apparent danger by resort to measures less harsh.
(33) If defendant cut or stabbed under a bona fide belief that his sister's life was in danger, or that she was in danger of grievous bodily harm, and defendant had, under all the circumstances, reasonable cause to believe that his sister was in imminent danger of death or grievous bodily harm at the moment he cut or stabbed, then it would be immaterial whether such danger was real or not.
(34) If Lillie Cain was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty between her and Lucy Garrett, then she was under no duty to retreat unless you believe she could have retreated without increasing her danger, or with reasonable safety.
(36) If you are reasonably satisfied from all the evidence in this case that neither defendant nor his sister Lillie Cain did anything to provoke or bring on the difficulty between Lillie Cain and Lucy Garrett, and if you are also reasonably satisfied from a consideration of all the evidence in the case that at the time defendant cut or stabbed Lucy Garrett there was present, impending peril to the life of Lillie Cain, or said Lillie Cain was in danger
of grievous bodily harm at the hands of Lucy Garrett, and if you are also reasonably satisfied that there was no mode of escape open to Lillie Cain without increasing her danger, and also that there was no reasonable mode by which defendant could have prevented such present, impending peril to his said sister, it is immaterial whether the danger was real or only so apparent as to create a bona fide belief in the mind of defendant of an existing necessity, except by stabbing or cutting Lucy Garrett, then your verdict should be for defendant.
Charges 37, 39, and 43 were but variations of charges 33 and 36.
(38) A brother will not be held responsible either civilly or criminally, if he acts in defense of his sister, if that sister is in a position of danger, either apparent or real.
(40) You must find defendant not guilty unless the evidence is such as to exclude to a marked certainty every supposition but that of his guilt.
(41) A reasonable doubt is...
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Johnson v. State, 6 Div. 800
...issuing in said case from this court. Gen.Acts 1909, p. 319, § 32; Cosby v. State, 80 So. 803; White v. State, 78 So. 449; Cain v. State, 77 So. 453. Defendant's motion to quash the venire was properly overruled. The slips of paper on which were written the names of special jurors duly draw......
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Walker v. State, 8 Div. 142.
...v. Marks, Fitzpatrick & Co., 51 Ala. 566; Alexander v. Alexander, 71 Ala. 295; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 581, 8 So. 380; Cain v. State, 16 Ala. App. 303, 77 So. 453. In Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 336, the court in treating the duty to decline combat or retreat in "cases of mere assault, or of ......
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Lawson v. State, 6 Div. 652
...authority that such evidence is immaterial and inadmissible, Allsup v. State, 15 Ala.App. 121, 124, 72 So. 599 (1916); Cain v. State, 16 Ala.App. 303, 308, 77 So. 453 (1917); Killen v. State, 16 Ala.App. 31, 75 So. 176, cert. denied, 200 Ala. 474, 76 So. 568 (1917), those cases can be disti......
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Hardaman v. State, 6 Div. 528
...from the solicitor that he would offer further proof showing silence, the court no doubt would have granted the motion. Cain v. State, 77 So. 453; Johnson v. State, 74 So. 972. In the showing made for the absent witness, Zuma Hardaman, no predicate was laid to impeach her testimony by contr......
Request a trial to view additional results
14 cases
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Johnson v. State, 6 Div. 800
...issuing in said case from this court. Gen.Acts 1909, p. 319, § 32; Cosby v. State, 80 So. 803; White v. State, 78 So. 449; Cain v. State, 77 So. 453. Defendant's motion to quash the venire was properly overruled. The slips of paper on which were written the names of special jurors duly draw......
-
Lawson v. State, 6 Div. 652
...authority that such evidence is immaterial and inadmissible, Allsup v. State, 15 Ala.App. 121, 124, 72 So. 599 (1916); Cain v. State, 16 Ala.App. 303, 308, 77 So. 453 (1917); Killen v. State, 16 Ala.App. 31, 75 So. 176, cert. denied, 200 Ala. 474, 76 So. 568 (1917), those cases can be disti......
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Walker v. State, 8 Div. 142.
...v. Marks, Fitzpatrick & Co., 51 Ala. 566; Alexander v. Alexander, 71 Ala. 295; Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 581, 8 So. 380; Cain v. State, 16 Ala. App. 303, 77 So. 453. In Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 336, the court in treating the duty to decline combat or retreat in "cases of mere assault, or of ......
-
Hardaman v. State, 6 Div. 528
...from the solicitor that he would offer further proof showing silence, the court no doubt would have granted the motion. Cain v. State, 77 So. 453; Johnson v. State, 74 So. 972. In the showing made for the absent witness, Zuma Hardaman, no predicate was laid to impeach her testimony by contr......
Request a trial to view additional results