Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin School Dist. 23J

Citation262 F.Supp.2d 1120
Decision Date08 January 2003
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 01-1278-HU.,CIV. 01-1278-HU.
PartiesLewis CAIN, Vicki Cain, and Joshua Cain, Plaintiffs, v. TIGARD-TUALATIN SCHOOL DISTRICT 23J, Frank Geske, and John Does 1-10, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Michael R. Seidl, Seidl Law Office, Portland, for Plaintiffs.

Karen M. Vickers, Bullivant Houser Bailey, Portland, for Defendant Tigard-Tualatin School District 23J.

Peter R. Mersereau, Mersereau & Shannon, Portland, for Defendant Geske.

OPINION AND ORDER

HAGGERTY, Chief Judge.

In his second Findings and Recommendation (doc. # 40) in this action, Magistrate Judge Hubel recommended granting defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first amended complaint (doc. # 28, 30). Plaintiffs filed objections, and the case was referred to this court on November 29, 2002.

The matter is now before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(b). When either party objects to a Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation on a dispositive motion, the district court makes a de novo determination of the Magistrate Judge's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir.1981). Because the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation is based on a dispositive motion, the court reviews the Magistrate Judge's decision de novo. For the reasons stated below, the court adopts in part and declines to adopt in part the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation.

BACKGROUND

Joshua Cain ("Joshua") and Lewis and Vicki Cain ("Joshua's parents") bring this action against Joshua's former school district and football coach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

Plaintiffs allege defendant Geske, the Tigard High School football coach, engaged in verbal tirades and emotionally abusive conduct toward Joshua and other high school football players during a summer football training camp in 1999. Plaintiffs lodged a complaint with the defendant school district at the beginning of Joshua's sophomore year. They asserted that Geske had been abusive toward players and covered up a party involving players and the use of alcohol. Prior to this complaint, Geske allegedly struck a player with a metal trash can. Plaintiffs allege that in response to plaintiffs' assertions, the defendant school district decided to terminate Geske's employment, but that a school board member overrode the decision because his son played on Geske's football team. Geske received a "two strikes" disciplinary order in response to the complaint. Plaintiffs do not further describe the details of this disciplinary order.

Plaintiffs allege that Geske retaliated against Joshua for his parents' complaints. Namely, Geske gathered all of the football players and informed them that a small group of parents were "out to get rid of him" based on charges of racism. Joshua was one of five African-American football players on a team of 120 students. Although Joshua's parents never alleged that Geske's conduct was race-based, Geske made the comment in front of the team in order to identify and to isolate Joshua and his parents, according to the first amended complaint. Geske encouraged a group of parents to approach plaintiffs and verbally attack them for filing the charges with the school district.

During Joshua's sophomore year, Geske frequently confronted Joshua and intimidated him. This interaction was particularly inappropriate because Joshua played on the junior varsity team and Geske's primary responsibility was to the varsity football team. Geske also confronted Joshua on numerous occasions during school hours in front of Joshua's friends.

Plaintiffs lodged a second set of charges with the district in response to Geske's harassing and retaliatory conduct. Plaintiffs allege that Geske's attacks on Joshua only grew worse following the filing of the second set of charges. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Geske approached Joshua during class time, led him to an equipment room, closed the door, and locked it. Plaintiffs further allege that Geske verbally attacked Joshua in the locked equipment room..

According to plaintiffs, the defendant school district never responded to plaintiffs' second set of charges. In addition to Geske's direct verbal intimidation and physical sequestration of Joshua, other football players chastised and isolated Joshua. As a results the hostile environment created by. Geske's retaliatory conduct, Joshua transferred to a rival high school for his junior year. Notwithstanding this transfer, Joshua remained at his former school for one period each day in order to attend a special integrated math class that was only offered there. While attending this class, Joshua was threatened with physical harm by his former teammates. Plaintiffs reported the incident to the defendant school district, and according to plaintiffs, the district failed to respond. Despite his desire to attend the integrated math class at his former school during his senior year, Joshua could no longer tolerate his former teammates' harassment. He therefore did not attend the integrated math class during his senior year.

The plaintiff parents joined with other parents to lodge formal complaints with the defendant school district about Geske's conduct, alleging that he had violated his "two strikes" reprimand. According to plaintiffs, the district failed to inform plaintiffs of the results of the investigation.

STANDARDS

Defendants moves to dismiss the entire complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering motions to dismiss, the court must determine whether it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims that would entitle them to relief. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Steckman v Hart Brewing, Inc., 148 F.3d 1293, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1997); Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1997). The reviewing court must treat all facts alleged in the Complaint as true, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Gilligan, 108 F.3d at 248; NL Indus., Inc.Kaplan. 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.1986); Experimental Eng'g Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 614 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir.1980).

DISCUSSION
A. Joshua's First Amendment Claim

Joshua asserts direct and derivative First Amendment claims based on Geske's retaliatory conduct. The government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Plaintiffs contend that Geske punished Joshua for his parents' complaints. Specifically, Geske singled Joshua out in front of the football team and ridiculed him for the complaints. Geske also physically restrained Joshua in a locked equipment room and verbally attacked him.

Under the general framework of First Amendment retaliation claims,1 plaintiffs must show: (1) a loss of a benefit or privilege caused by the retaliatory conduct; (2) plaintiffs were engaged in constitutionally protected speech; and (3) the protected speech was a substantial motivating factor for the adverse action. Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir.2002).

1. Loss of a Benefit or Privilege

The court must determine whether the alleged retaliatory conduct denied Joshua a cognizable benefit. Joshua alleges that as a result of Geske's conduct, he was denied the following benefits: (1) his freedom of movement by being locked in an equipment room; (2) his choice of schools by having to transfer to Tualatin High School, which offered inferior academic and athletic opportunities; and (3) the benefit of attending the integrated math class during his senior year of high school. Defendants contend that the Constitution does not guarantee Joshua the right to any of these benefits. According to defendants, because the Constitution does not guarantee Joshua the right to attend the public school of his choice, for example, Geske's retaliatory conduct did not result in the denial of a constitutionally cognizable benefit.

Defendants mischaracterize the inquiry. For over fifty years the Supreme Court has made clear:

[E]ven though a person has no `right' to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694.

Therefore, the First Amendment is offended not only when a speaker is denied an "entitlement" but also when a lesser interest is effected in such a way that an actor's right to free speech is impaired. See id. (even though a teacher is not entitled to the renewal of his contract, he is still denied a benefit when the decision not to renew the contract is made in retaliation for the teacher's exercise of his right to free speech); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1236-37 (10th Cir.1996) (high school football player who has no constitutional right to play on the football team is still denied a cognizable benefit when the decision to bar him from playing was made in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment rights); Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir.1992) (plaintiff who is not entitled to serve as a juvenile volunteer worker nevertheless...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Patrick v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 17–CV–6846 (PKC)(RLM)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • 14 Diciembre 2018
    ...continues to attend school and thus is not deprived of access to education, even temporarily.").20) Cain v. Tigard–Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J , 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1135 (D. Or. 2003) (holding that where a student was forced to transfer to another school due to bullying, plaintiff was not depri......
  • Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, CIV. 03-0507 JB/ACT.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of New Mexico
    • 30 Diciembre 2004
    ...Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. at 566, 120 S.Ct. 1073)(emphasis in the original). Similarly, in Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin School Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120 (D.Or.2003), the District Court for the District of Oregon expressed reservation about applying the class-of-one theory in ......
  • Benjamin v. Schuller, 2:02-CV-668.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • 1 Diciembre 2005
    ...sue his or her employer under the Fourteenth Amendment for a violation of equal protection.")); see also Cain v. Tigard-Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120 (D.Or.2003) (expressing reservation about allowing plaintiffs to use a "class of one" theory in an employment 27. Though the pl......
  • C.T. v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist., 14-CV-3473 (JFB)(AKT)
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • 16 Agosto 2016
    ...from any criticism by swiftly punishing any student who is the child of a critical parent." Cain v. Tigard – Tualatin Sch. Dist. 23J, 262 F.Supp.2d 1120, 1128–29 (D.Or.2003) ; see also Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 947 F.Supp.2d 270, 276 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (father could maintain Fir......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT