Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. City of Long Beach

• Decision Date: 25 February 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:21-cv-00524-ODW (ASx)
• Citation: 521 F.Supp.3d 902
• Parties: CALIFORNIA GROCERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 324, Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

521 F.Supp.3d 902

CALIFORNIA GROCERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant.

United Food & Commercial Workers Local 324, Intervenor.

Case No. 2:21-cv-00524-ODW (ASx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed February 25, 2021

William F. Tarantino, Byung-Kwan Park, Robert Santos Sandoval, Morrison and Foerster LLP, San Francisco, CA, Tritia M. Murata, Morrison and Foerster LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Christopher M. Pisano, Best Best and Krieger LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Jeffrey V. Dunn, Best Best and Krieger LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant.

Paul L. More, Luke Noah Dowling, McCracken Stemerman and Holsberry LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Intervenor.

ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [18]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic has been awful. In an effort to avoid illness, permanent health damage, and death, we have lived in a state of quarantine for an entire year and counting. Meanwhile, certain workers deemed "essential" have continued to work in roles that do not practically permit quarantining from others. For example, grocery workers have served an essential function by keeping stores open, stocked, and sanitized, despite the perils of working frequently within six feet of the general public.

This case concerns the Premium Pay for Grocery Workers Ordinance ("Ordinance"), recently enacted by Defendant City of Long Beach ("City"), which mandates that all grocery workers in the area must be paid four dollars ($4.00) more than their hourly wage, for a period of at least 120 days. (See Compl. Ex. A ("Ordinance"), ECF No. 2.) The Ordinance also prohibits employers from reducing compensation or limiting a worker's earning capacity, so employers cannot directly circumvent the Ordinance's effect by lowering the dials on wages or hours.

Plaintiff California Grocers Association ("CGA") brings this action against the City, arguing that the Ordinance is invalid under federal and constitutional law. (See Compl., ECF No. 2.) Presently before the Court is CGA's request for a preliminary injunction stopping the enforcement of the Ordinance. (See Ex Parte Appl. for Temp. Restraining Order ("Application" or "Appl."), ECF No. 18; Min. Order Denying Appl. ("Min. Order"), ECF No. 22 (denying ex parte application for a TRO but setting hearing to consider a preliminary injunction).) The preliminary injunction issue has been fully, if not excessively, briefed. (See Appl.; Opp'n to Appl. ("Opp'n"), ECF No. 20; Suppl. Opp'n to Mot. Prelim. Inj. ("Suppl. Opp'n"), ECF No. 24; Reply ISO Mot. Prelim. Inj. ("Reply"), ECF No. 26.) On February 23, 2021, the Court took the matter under submission after thorough oral arguments. (Minutes, ECF No. 40.) For the reasons that follow, CGA's motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED . (ECF No. 18.)

II. BACKGROUND

The City enacted the Ordinance on January 19, 2021. (See Compl. ¶ 5.) The Ordinance "aims to protect and promote the public health, safety, and welfare during the new coronavirus 19 (COVID-19) emergency by requiring grocery stores to provide premium pay for grocery workers performing work in Long Beach." (Ordinance § 5.91.005.) It also acknowledges that "[g]rocery workers face magnified risks of catching or spreading the COVID-19 disease because the nature of their work involves close contact with the public, including members of the public who are not showing symptoms of COVID-19 but who can spread the disease." (Id. ) Thus, the Ordinance contemplates that "premium pay better ensures the retention of these essential workers who are on the frontlines of this pandemic," and that grocery workers "are deserving of fair and equitable compensation for their work." (Id. )

In pertinent part, the Ordinance provides:

• "Hiring entities shall provide each grocery worker with premium pay consisting of an additional Four Dollars ($4.00) per hour for each hour worked." (Id. § 5.91.050(A).)

• "Hiring entities shall provide the [$4.00 premium pay] for a minimum of one hundred twenty (120) days from the effective date of th[e] Ordinance." (Id. § 5.91.050(B); see also id. § 5.91.050(C) ("Unless extended by City Council, this ordinance shall expire in one hundred twenty (120) days.").)

• "No hiring entity shall, as a result of this Ordinance going into effect ... [1] Reduce a grocery worker's compensation; [or 2] Limit a grocery worker's earning capacity." (Id. § 5.91.060(A).)

• " ‘Grocery worker’ means a worker employed directly by a hiring entity at a grocery store. Grocery worker does not include managers, supervisors[,] or confidential employees." (Id. § 5.91.020.)

• " ‘Grocery store’ means a store that devotes seventy percent (70%) or more of its business to retailing a general range of food products, which may be fresh or packaged." (Id. § 5.91.020.)

• " ‘Hiring entity’ means a grocery store that employs over three hundred (300) grocery workers nationally and employs more than fifteen (15) employees per grocery store in the City of Long Beach." (Id. § 5.91.020.)

• "The provisions of this Ordinance are declared to be separate and severable. If any clause, sentence, paragraph, subdivision, section, subsection, or portion ..., or the application thereof ... is held to be invalid, it shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Ordinance, or the validity of its application to other persons or circumstances." (Id. § 5.91.150.)

The day after the Ordinance was enacted, CGA brought this action "on behalf of its members who are grocery store employers." (Compl. ¶ 12.) CGA's members "operate grocery stores in the City that employ members of a specific labor union, United Commercial Food Workers International, Local 324 (‘UCFW 324’), and those employees are parties to collective bargaining agreements that govern the terms of their employment, including wage scales."¹ (Compl. ¶ 13.) Now, CGA seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinance. (See Appl.; Reply.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions). "An injunction is an exercise of a court's equitable authority," which should not be invoked as a matter of course, but "only after taking into account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief." Salazar v. Buono , 559 U.S. 700, 714, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 176 L.Ed.2d 634 (2010).

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party's favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles , 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter , 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365 ).

IV. DISCUSSION

A preliminary injunction is not warranted because CGA fails to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. CGA asserts five causes of action, each for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Ordinance, based on: (1) NLRA preemption, (2) the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, (3) the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution, (4) the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and (5) the Contracts Clause of the California Constitution, respectively. (See Compl.)

A. NLRA Preemption (First Cause of Action)

First, the Court considers whether CGA has established a likelihood of success on its preemption claim, whereby it alleges the Ordinance is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 – 69 ("NLRA"). (See Compl. ¶¶ 22–30.)

"The NLRA—the federal architecture that governs relations between labor and management, for example, union organizing, collective bargaining, and conduct of labor disputes—has no express preemption provision." Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles , 834 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter AHLA ] (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 – 69 ; Chamber of Commerce v. Brown , 554 U.S. 60, 65, 128 S.Ct. 2408, 171 L.Ed.2d 264 (2008) ). "Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized two implicit preemption mandates: Garmon preemption and Machinists preemption." Id. (citing Brown , 554 U.S. at 65, 128 S.Ct. 2408 ). In this case, CGA relies solely on a theory of Machinists preemption, which "prohibits states from restricting a ‘weapon of self-help,’ such as a strike or lock-out." AHLA , 834 F.3d at 963 (quoting Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp't Rels. Comm'n , 427 U.S. 132, 146, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976) [ Machinists ]). The policy underlying the Machinists preemption is that "Congress left these self-help tools unregulated to allow tactical bargaining decisions ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ " Id. (quoting Machinists , 427 U.S. at 140, 96 S.Ct. 2548 ).

Generally, "the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process , not with the substantive terms that may emerge from such bargaining." Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne , 482 U.S. 1, 20, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (emphasis added) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts , 471 U.S. 724, 754, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985) ). "Thus, the mere fact that a state statute pertains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of pre-emption ...." Id. at 21, 107 S.Ct. 2211 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp. , 435 U.S. 497, 504–05, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) ) (rejecting preemption argument for statute requiring a severance payment for employees who lacked express severance contracts); see also Metro. Life Ins. , 471 U.S. at 754, 105 S.Ct. 2380 (rejecting preemption argument for law...