Cal-Pac Rancho Cordova, LLC v. United States Dep't of Interior
| Decision Date | 06 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:16-cv-02982-TLN-AC |
| Parties | CAL-PAC RANCHO CORDOVA, LLC dba PARKWEST CORDOVA CASINO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Cal-Pac Rancho Cordova LLC, Capitol Casino, Inc., Lodi Cardroom, Inc., and Rogelio's Inc.'s (collectively “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 31.) Also before the Court is Defendants United States Department of the Interior, Secretary of the Interior Deb Haaland, and Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs Bryan Newland's[1] (collectively, “Defendants”) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 35.) Both motions have been fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion and GRANTS Defendants' motion.
This case involves a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to Defendants' issuance of Secretarial Procedures, which allow the Estom Yumeka Maidu Tribe of the Enterprise Rancheria (the “Tribe”) - a federally recognized Indian tribe - to conduct casino gambling on a parcel of newly acquired off-reservation land in Yuba County, California (the “Yuba Parcel”). (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
The facts of this case are undisputed. (See ECF No. 31-1 at 11; see also ECF No. 35 at 19-20.) In August 2002, the Tribe applied to the Department of the Interior (the “Department”) to have the Yuba Parcel taken into trust for the purpose of constructing a casino, hotel and related infrastructure pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”).[2] (ECF No. 35 at 16.) In 2006, the Tribe supplemented its application with a request that the Secretary also determine the Yuba Parcel's eligibility for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”).[3] (Id.)
In September 2011, the Assistant Secretary issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) concluding that once in trust, the Yuba Parcel would be eligible for gaming pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).[4] (Id. at 17.) The Governor concurred by letter in August 2012. (Id.) That same day, the Governor also signed a Class III gaming compact with the Tribe.[5] (Id. at 18.) The Governor's office forwarded the compact to the California legislature for ratification. (Id.)
The Yuba Parcel was taken into federal trust for the Tribe on May 15, 2013. (Id.) The California legislature took no action toward ratifying the gaming compact during 2013 or early 2014, and the compact became ineligible for legislative ratification by its own terms on July 1, 2014. (Id.) The Tribe then filed suit under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) of IGRA's remedial scheme. (Id. at 19.) In that action, this Court ordered the State and the Tribe to proceed under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) to conclude a gaming compact within 60 days. (Id.) The parties failed to do so, which triggered IGRA's requirement that the parties submit to a court-appointed mediator. (Id.) The mediator found the Tribe's proposed compact best comported with IGRA and forwarded it to the State for its consent. (Id.) The State failed to consent within the IGRA-mandated 60 days, and the Tribe's compact was then submitted to the Secretary. (Id.) On August 12, 2016, the Secretary issued Secretarial Procedures prescribing the parameters under which the Tribe may conduct Class III gaming activities on the Yuba Parcel.[6] (Id.)
Plaintiffs are four state-licensed card clubs located within the same area as the proposed casino site. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiffs contend they would be at a competitive disadvantage if the Tribe opens a Nevada-style casino and operates casino-style games in the area because Plaintiffs are more limited in the gaming they can offer. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiffs filed this action on December 21, 2016, seeking injunctive relief and declaratory relief based on: (1) violation of IGRA's jurisdiction requirement; (2) the unconstitutionality of IRA; (3) violation of IGRA due to inconsistency of Secretarial Procedures with state law; (4) and erroneous interpretation of IGRA. (Id. at 12-19.) Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2019, and Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on July 12, 2019. (ECF Nos. 31, 35.)
Summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism for reviewing agency decisions under the APA. Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 878 F.3d 725, 732 (9th Cir. 2017); City & Cnty. of S.F. v. United States (S.F.), 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1997); Occidental Eng'g Co. v. Immigr. & Naturalization Service, 753 F.2d 766, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1985). However, courts do not utilize the standard analysis for determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. See Occidental, 753 F.2d at 769-70; Acad. of Our Lady of Peace v. City of San Diego, 835 F.Supp.2d 895, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2011); Cal. RSA No. 4 v. Madera Cnty., 332 F.Supp.2d 1291, 1301 (E.D. Cal. 2003). A court “is not required to resolve any facts in a review of an administrative proceeding.” Occidental, 753 F.2d at 769; Cal. RSA, 332 F.Supp.2d at 1301. Instead, in reviewing an agency action, the relevant legal question for a court reviewing a factual determination is “whether the agency could reasonably have found the facts as it did.” S.F., 130 F.3d at 877; Occidental, 753 F.2d at 769.
The Court's review in resolving an APA challenge to an agency action is circumscribed: the Court will only set aside agency action if its “‘findings[ ] and conclusions [are] found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,' ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,' or ‘without observance of procedure required by law.'” Turtle Island, 878 F.3d at 732 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C)-(D)). Agency action is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law “only if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 856 F.3d 1248, 1256-1257 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (). This standard is “highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000)). Review under this standard is narrow, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 161 F.3d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, the Court must “engage in a substantial inquiry. . . a thorough, probing, in-depth review.” Native Ecosys. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 418 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
In moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs make two main arguments: (1) the Secretarial Procedures were issued in violation of IGRA, as the Tribe purportedly never acquired jurisdiction or exercised governmental power over the Yuba Parcel (ECF No. 31-1 at 21); and (2) assuming the Tribe acquired jurisdiction and exercised governmental power, IRA violates the Tenth Amendment by reducing the State's jurisdiction over land within its territory without its agreement (id. at 39).
Following the parties' full briefing on these issues, Defendants notified the Court of intervening authority that entirely disposes of Plaintiffs' main arguments. (ECF Nos. 41, 42.) More specifically, Defendant notified the Court of the Ninth Circuit's May 27, 2020 decision in Club One Casino, Inc. v. Bernhardt (“Club One II”), 959 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied sub nom. Club One Casino, Inc. v. Haaland, 141 S.Ct. 2792 (2021). As in the instant case, the plaintiffs in Club One II were cardrooms challenging a casino project on a parcel of off-reservation land taken into trust for a federally recognized Indian tribe. Id. at 1145. The plaintiffs in Club One II raised the same arguments Plaintiffs raise here, and the Ninth Circuit addressed those arguments in depth.[7] Id. at 1148. As to the jurisdiction issue, the Ninth Circuit held: (1) “the federal government confers tribal jurisdiction over lands it acquires in trust for the benefit of tribes as a matter of law”; (2) the Secretary was not legally required to consider whether the tribe possessed jurisdiction and exercised governmental power over the parcel (and both conditions were met in any event); and (3) the tribe's acquisition of any jurisdiction over the parcel did not require the State's consent or cession. Id. at 1150-52. As to the Tenth Amendment issue, the Ninth Circuit succinctly held “[b]ecause Congress has plenary authority to regulate Indian affairs, . . . IRA does not offend the Tenth Amendment.” Id. at 1152-53. Because Club One II is binding on this Court and squarely resolves the legal issues at hand, the Court need not and does not address those issues further.[8] As such, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' first two arguments.
Plaintiffs raise two alternative arguments. First, Plaintiffs argue the Governor's concurrence in the Secretary's two-part determination as to gaming...
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