Calautti v. Mass. Port Auth.

• Decision Date: 18 October 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-cv-10930-ADB
• Parties: DOMENIC CALAUTTI, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY and JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

DOMENIC CALAUTTI, Plaintiff,
v.
MASSACHUSETTS PORT AUTHORITY and JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-10930-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

October 18, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Domenic Calautti (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against the Massachusetts Port Authority and JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”) (together, “Defendants”) asserting personal injury claims stemming from an incident on April 14, 2019 where Plaintiff suffered injury while disembarking from a JetBlue aircraft flight from Aruba to Boston, Massachusetts. Currently before the Court is JetBlue's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [ECF No. 7]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 7], is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following relevant facts are alleged in Plaintiff's complaint and taken as true for the purpose of resolving JetBlue's motion. Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014).

1

On April 14, 2019, a JetBlue flight carrying Plaintiff landed at Logan International Airport, which is owned and operated by the Massachusetts Port Authority. [ECF No. 1-3 ¶11 (“Compl.”)]. To allow passengers onboard the flight to disembark, Defendants docked the aircraft on the jetway, which is the moving bridge connecting aircrafts to the airport gates. [Id. ¶ 12]. While docking, Defendants left a gap between the aircraft and the jetway. [Id. ¶ 14]. Defendants did not warn Plaintiff about the gap. [Id. ¶ 18]. In the process of disembarking from the aircraft, Plaintiff “tripped and fell,” sustaining bodily injury. [Id. ¶ 19]. He asserts that he was injured as a result of the gap. [Id.]

On April 12, 2022, almost three years after the incident, Plaintiff filed his complaint. [Compl.]. The complaint asserts four counts against Defendants under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act and for negligence and failure to warn, against the Massachusetts Port Authority (Counts I and II) and against JetBlue (Counts III and IV). [Id. ¶¶ 22-33]. On July 24, 2022, JetBlue moved to dismiss Plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because the action is time-barred. [ECF No. 7]. Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss on August 5, 2022, [ECF No. 9], and JetBlue replied on August 11, 2022, [ECF No. 12].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To evaluate a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most hospitable to the plaintiff's theory, and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 383 (1st Cir. 2001). And in doing so, the Court may consider “only the complaint, documents attached to it, and documents expressly incorporated into it.” Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2014).

2

Although “[d]etailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must set forth “more than labels and conclusions . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not enough. Id. To avoid dismissal, a complaint must “set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Further, the facts alleged, when taken together, must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. DISCUSSION

In its motion to dismiss, JetBlue asserts that Plaintiff's action should be dismissed in its entirety because it is time-barred under Article 35 of the Montreal Convention. See [ECF No. 8 at 6]. “The Montreal Convention is a multilateral treaty governing the liability of air carriers for certain injuries and damages that occur during international air carriage.” Moore v. Brit. Airways PLC, 32 F.4th 110, 114 (1st Cir. 2022); see also Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, Treaty Doc. No. 106-145, ch. I, art. 1 § 1 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 (the “Montreal Convention”). Local law claims are preempted when they fall within the scope of the Montreal Convention. See Moore, 32 F.4th at 115; El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999). The parties agree that the Montreal Convention governs Plaintiff's rights and remedies in this case. See [ECF No. 8 at 7; ECF No. 9 at 2].

Relevant here, Article 35 of the Montreal Convention states that a damages action must be brought within two years from the date of arrival of the aircraft at the destination. See

3

Montreal Convention, ch. III, art. 35, § 1; Dagi v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 961 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 2020). Massachusetts law, on the other hand, provides that the statute of limitations for personal injuries is three years from the date the cause of action accrues. Mass. Gen. L. ch...