Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court In and For Salt Lake County
Decision Date | 21 July 1954 |
Docket Number | 8159,Nos. 8155,s. 8155 |
Parties | d 309, 46 A.L.R.2d 887 . MERRILL, v. CALDER et al. Supreme Court of Utah |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Elias Hansen, Salt Lake City, George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for appellants.
Grant Macfarlane, Salt Lake City, for respondents. WADE, Justice.
These two cases were ordered consolidated by this Court upon stipulation of the parties because about the same issues are involved in both. One is an appeal and the other is a petition for a writ of mandamus.
Charles S. Merrill brought an action in Salt Lake County, Utah, seeking rescission on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation made in that county of a contract to purchase from the Calders 200 acres of land situated in Davis County, Utah. A part of this land was definitely described but the larger portion was to be selected in one tract by the buyer within 60 days from a larger tract described in the contract and belonging to the sellers. The Calders filed a motion in this action for a change of venue to Davis County, where they resided and where the subject matter of the contract is situated, and where the obligations thereunder were to be performed. This motion was denied. The Calders then answered the complaint and filed counterclaims seeking specific performance of the contract or damages for its breach. They also filed a motion for an order requiring Merrill to make a selection of the property involved as provided in the contract, or in lieu thereof, if Merrill refused to do so, to appoint three referees to make the selection for him. This motion was not acted upon by the court, but a motion to dismiss the counterclaims on the grounds that they did not state facts sufficient to constitute a claim against Merrill was granted. The appeal and the petition for the writ of mandamus were brought by the Calders to determine whether the court erred in refusing to change the venue and in dismissing their counterclaims.
We shall first consider whether the court erred in dismissing the counterclaims. It is the contention of Merrill that because he failed to make the selection, the description of the greater portion of the property was so vague and uncertain as to render the contract unenforceable under the provisions of Section 25-5-3, U.C.A.1953, which is a part of the Statute of Frauds, which provides that a contract or a memorandum thereof for the sale of land is void unless it is in writing.
There is no question here but that the tract from which the selection was to be made by Merrill was sufficiently described in the contract. The question is whether under the statute of frauds the description is sufficient so that there is a valid contract which can be enforced either by specific performance or for damages for the breach thereof where the contract provides that one of the parties is to make the selection. On that question there are cases to be found going both ways. As stated in 49 Am.Jur., Sec. 350, pages 660-661:
To the same effect see Annotations in 34 L.R.A.,N.S., pages 147 to 150.
It is Merrill's contention that by its holding in Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39, 29 P. 740, this Court has aligned itself with those jurisdictions whose cases hold that a contract such as is involved in the instant case is unenforceable under the statute of frauds for uncertainty in the description. In that case the parties did not agree to have one of them make the selection; although the court states the selection was to be made 'at the option of the purchaser', the contract, which is set out in full in the opinion, does not contain any such provision. As stated in Scanlon v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 N.W. 1031 on page 1032, in distinguishing cases where the contract gave one of the parties thereto a right of selection from the one it held unenforceable because it provided that the particular piece to be conveyed was to be mutually agreed upon between the parties:
* * *'
In the Reed v. Lowe case the mode to be used in definitely locating and describing the land was not provided for in the written agreement of the parties. In the instant case the contract specifically provides that Merrill was to select the land within a given time. As far as the contract was concerned, nothing more had to be agreed upon between the parties nor was it uncertain in that respect. As stated in Peckham v. Lane, 81 Kan. 489, 106 P. 464 on page 466, 25 L.R.A.,N.S., 967:
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