Calderon v. City of Los Angeles

Decision Date02 March 1971
Citation4 Cal.3d 251,93 Cal.Rptr. 361,481 P.2d 489
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 481 P.2d 489 Richard M. CALDERON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. L.A. 29752.

Lawrence William Steinberg, Beverly Hills, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence R. Sperber, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Mario G. Obledo and Joe C. Ortega, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, James A. Doherty, Asst. City Attys., and Thomas C. Bonaventura, Deputy City Atty., for defendant and respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

We are called upon to decide whether the 'one man, one vote' command of the equal protection clause requires that councilmanic voting districts be apportioned according to population or whether it is satisfied if each district contains a substantially equal number of registered voters. In short, is the constitutional imperative fulfilled by a standard of 'one voter, one vote,' rather than 'one person, one vote'? 1 As we explain Infra, we have concluded that an apportionment plan based on registered voters will satisfy the equal protection clause only if it produces districts containing roughly equal numbers of people. Since, in the circumstances before us, the 'registered voter' standard deviates sharply from population equality, it is constitutionally defective and must fall.

At issue is article II, section 6, subdivision 2(a) of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles (City) which provides, in pertinent part: 'Between the dates of July 1 and September 15 of each fourth year, commencing with the year 1964, the Council shall * * * redistrict the City into fifteen (15) districts and such districts shall be used for all elections of councilmen. * * * Districts so formed shall not deviate in the number of Voters by more than ten percent above or below one-fifteenth of the total number of registered Voters in the City of Los Angeles at the close of registration for the direct primary state elections held during the year in which such districts are to be established, and as nearly as practicable such districts shall be bounded by natural boundaries or street lines.' (Italics added.)

Plaintiffs, Los Angeles residents and voters, brought this class action in separate counts for mandate and declaratory relief on behalf of themselves and all other Los Angeles citizens. They contended that the use of registered voters, rather than total population, as the standard for councilmanic apportionment is a direct violation of the equal representation principles established by such cases as Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 and Avery v. Midland County (1968) 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45. They argued that the 'registered voter' basis results in substantial inequities, including overrepresentation of some districts and severe underrepresentation of others, particularly those populated largely by racial and ethnic minorities. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the present apportionment scheme is unconstitutional and a writ of mandate commanding the City of Los Angeles to cease using voter registration as the basis for its councilmanic districting and to substitute population as the standard therefor. The trial court issued an alternative writ of mandate.

The City's answer to the petition and complaint (which also appears to be a return to the alternative writ) asserted in essence that while population is a valid apportionment basis, voter registration is also a constitutionally permissible standard. At the same time, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that plaintiffs had stated no cause of action. Pursuant to stipulation of the parties, the court ordered off calendar the hearing on the return to the alternative writ and heard argument on the City's motion, which was granted. Judgment on the pleadings was entered in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.

I

The genesis of the present controversy lies in a seeming looseness in the language of the myriad United States Supreme Court decisions which have sought to interpret the 'one man, one vote' principle since the issue of electoral apportionment was first held justiciable nine years ago. (Baker v. Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663.) Over the years the court has 'used the words 'inhabitant,' 'citizen,' 'resident,' and 'voter' almost interchangeably in describing those who deserve representation, without indicating which of these bases for measuring substantial equality is most appropriate.' 2 (Note, Reapportionment (1966) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1226, 1254.) In particular, the court has tended to treat as fungible two quite distinct concepts: first, that each district should contain equal numbers of people--a 'population' standard; and second, that each voter is entitled to have his ballot carry an equal impact--a 'voter' standard. (See Note, Reapportionment on the Sub-State Level of Government: Equal Representation or Equal Vote? (1970) 50 B.U.L.Rev. 231, 238--247.)

Thus, in Reynolds v. Sims, Supra, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, the seminal decision in defining the 'one man, one vote' doctrine, the high court stated, at one point, that 'the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of People, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State.' (Id. at pp. 560--561, 84 S.Ct. at p. 1381.) (Italics added.) Yet a few pages later the court declared: 'Simply stated, an individual's Right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared with Votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.' 3 (Id. at p. 568, 84 S.Ct. at p. 1385.) (Italics added.) Later in the opinion the two concepts were fused and treated as indistinguishable: 'Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be substantial equality of Population among the various districts, so that the Vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.' (Id. at p. 579, 84 S.Ct. at p. 1390.) (Italics added.)

Although these principles present a surface similarity, their operative effect is quite different. 'Equal representation for equal numbers of people' implies that a districting plan must count every resident, voter or not. By contrast, the doctrine that each voter's ballot should carry equal weight is satisfied so long as all districts contain the same number of registered voters, regardless of total population. Where the percentage of registered voters varies among districts, these two standards will produce dissimilar results.

This dichotomy was recognized and resolved in Burns v. Richardson (1966) 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376, where the court was confronted with a Hawaii apportionment scheme based on registered voters. Because of the large number of military personnel stationed in Hawaii and the sizable influx of tourists, many of the people physically present in the state were not permanent residents and hence ineligible for Hawaiian citizenship. The court began by asserting that the state was free to limit its apportionment base solely to state citizens, rather than using total population figures, thus excluding 'aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of crime * * *.' (Id. at p. 92, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1296.)

However, the court reached a different conclusion on the validity of the registered voter standard. 'Such a basis,' it stated, 'depends not only upon criteria such as govern state citizenship, but also upon the extent of political activity of those eligible to register and vote. Each is thus susceptible to improper influences by which those in political power might be able to perpetuate underrepresentation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process, or perpetuate a 'ghost of prior malapportionment. " (Fn. omitted.) (Id. at pp. 92--93, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1297.) In addition, the court pointed out that the number of registered voters might fluctuate considerably in a given election depending on "such fortuitous factors as a peculiarly controversial election issue, a particularly popular candidate, or even weather conditions.' (Citation.)' (Fn. omitted.) (Id. at p. 93, 86 S.Ct. at p. 1297.) 'In view of these considerations,' the court declared, 'we hold that the present apportionment satisfies the Equal Protection Clause Only because on this record it was found to have produced a distribution of legislators not substantially different from that which would have resulted from the use of a permissible population basis.' (Id.) (Italics added.)

We have no doubt that the holding of Burns binds local government entities like the Los Angeles City Council. Although decided after Burns, Avery v. Midland County, Supra, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45, and Hadley v. Junior College District, Supra, 397 U.S. 50, 93 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45, have established beyond dispute that the 'one man, one vote' principle and its subsequent interpretations are fully applicable to local units exercising general governmental powers. 4 The Los Angeles City Council exercises far more comprehensive powers than did the Midland County Commissioners Court, which was largely concerned with building rural roads, or the Kansas City Junior College District, whose authority was confined to financing and operating an educational institution.

Even more compelling evidence of the applicability of Burns to the Los Angeles City Council is the fact that in Burns the Supreme Court cited approvingly Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (4th Cir. 1965) 352 F.2d 123. That decision invalidated the Baltimore councilmanic districting scheme, which utilized...

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