Caldwell v. Commonwealth
| Citation | 840 S.E.2d 343 |
| Decision Date | 09 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 190541 |
| Parties | Candace Rene CALDWELL v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia |
| Court | Supreme Court of Virginia |
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
In this appeal we consider whether the circuit court, and the Court of Appeals in affirming the circuit court’s judgment, erred as a matter of law in convicting appellant of defrauding a hotel restaurant when she obtained food from the restaurant without paying. For the reasons stated herein we are of the opinion that there was error and will reverse the conviction.
Candace Rene Caldwell ("Caldwell") was indicted pursuant to Code § 18.2-188, which, under subsection (b)(2), makes it unlawful for any person who "without paying therefor, and with the intent to cheat or defraud the owner or keeper to ... obtain food from a restaurant or other eating house." Caldwell was tried without a jury and found guilty as charged by the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County of the Class 1 misdemeanor. The circuit court sentenced Caldwell to thirty days in jail with all but four days suspended, imposed eight dollars of restitution plus court costs, and ordered that Caldwell shall not go onto the property of the innkeeper at any time.
The evidence at trial established that in March 2017 Caldwell gave a ride to two hikers emerging from the Appalachian Trail to escape an approaching storm.* The hikers asked Caldwell if she would drive them to a nearby hotel. She obliged and took them to the Country Inn & Suites of Lexington (the "hotel") because she had a discount coupon for that business, which she gave to the hikers to use. During the drive to the hotel, the hikers agreed that they would help Caldwell move some items from her home to a storage unit the next day. The hikers registered as guests at the hotel, which included a complimentary breakfast. Caldwell and one of the hikers, Mark Arnn, agreed they would meet at the hotel the following morning. When Arnn went downstairs from his hotel room the next morning he saw Caldwell waiting in the restaurant area and they ate breakfast together. Arnn stated that he "may have specifically invited her to eat breakfast," but he was "not sure exactly what [he] said to her." While they ate breakfast, it was agreed that the two hikers would walk to Caldwell’s house later that morning to help her move some items and, in return, she would drive them to Waynesboro so they could resume hiking the trail from there. When Arnn finished eating, he left Caldwell at the table and returned to his room.
Thereafter, a member of the hotel’s kitchen staff approached Caldwell and asked her to stop by the front desk to pay eight dollars for her meal. Caldwell did not pay, but approached the hotel’s desk manager, who testified that Caldwell demanded to know why she had to pay for her breakfast. The manager informed Caldwell that "if you are not a guest in the hotel then this is what we require." She described that Caldwell began screaming that "it didn’t matter because they were going to throw the food out anyways." The manager again asked Caldwell to pay the eight dollars. Caldwell refused to pay and asked the manager for the telephone number to the hotel’s corporate office. The manager agreed that she could give Caldwell the corporate number, but told Caldwell that she still needed to pay for the meal or the manager would have to call the police. Caldwell did not pay, but started backing out of the hotel while continuing to yell at the manager. Another person noted Caldwell’s license plate number as she drove away from the hotel.
The hotel manager further testified, when asked whether someone who was not a registered guest could eat breakfast at the hotel, that She added that the hotel discourages non-overnight guests from eating breakfast but will serve them if they pay the cost of breakfast.
Deputy Dylan Welsh of the Rockbridge County Sheriff’s Office testified that he received a call from the hotel about an "unpaying customer who had eaten breakfast and then fled the scene." Deputy Welsh located Caldwell’s home through DMV records associated with the license plate number. He testified that Caldwell did not deny eating the breakfast but did not believe that she needed to pay for it.
Caldwell testified that Arnn, who was a guest of the hotel, did "in fact" invite her to have breakfast with him in the hotel restaurant. The court allowed Caldwell’s testimony as evidence of her state of mind with regard to her intent, but sustained the Commonwealth’s hearsay objection to what Arnn said. The court limited the defense to Arnn’s stipulated statement, which was that he may have invited her to breakfast, but was not sure. Continuing, Caldwell explained that after the staff member told her she had to pay for the breakfast, she engaged in conversation with the desk manager in an effort to resolve the dispute. Caldwell said that she told Deputy Welsh that she offered to pay for the meal and that a surveillance video of her conversation with the manager would confirm that.
During its rebuttal, the Commonwealth recalled the hotel manager and the deputy, both of whom testified that they had no recollection that Caldwell either offered to pay for the meal or said that she had made the offer. Deputy Welsh further testified that although there was no audio to the surveillance video of Caldwell and the manager, one could clearly see Caldwell "being aggressive, very inappropriate, and ‘shaking her hand at [the manager].’ " The Commonwealth argued that this testimony rebutted Caldwell’s testimony that she calmly and politely addressed the manager and offered to pay for her meal.
In closing arguments, Caldwell contended that there was no evidence that she intended to defraud the hotel at the time she ate the breakfast . She added that seeking out the manager at the front desk rather than simply leaving the premises indicated a lack of the requisite intent to defraud the hotel.
The Commonwealth argued there was no evidence that Caldwell was invited to breakfast and that Caldwell’s "causing a scene" and leaving the hotel when the manager stated that she would call the police was evidence from which the court could infer Caldwell’s intent to defraud. The Commonwealth further argued that Caldwell was not a guest and could not expect to eat a free breakfast. The judge found Caldwell guilty, stating:
If you had paid that eight-dollar bill, when they said, ‘Ma’am, you’re not supposed to be eating here,’ this would’ve been done and gone away. And I think that’s the point at which the evidence turns against you, is that maybe you really didn’t understand, although I believe any reasonable person would have, but maybe you didn’t understand exactly that you couldn’t just be invited by a guest. But once you were told, and you still didn’t pay, I think it’s clear at that point. You got the benefit of breakfast and refused to pay for it.
Caldwell appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the plain language of Code § 18.2-188(b)(2) requires proof of specific intent to defraud at the time the benefit is received; that is, when she ate the breakfast, not after. She submitted that the Court of Appeals had previously considered the import of the specific intent requirement of Code § 18.2-188 in its unpublished opinion in Morton v. Commonwealth , Record No. 0864-98-4, 1999 WL 1129728 (July 20, 1999), which, by implication, adopted this Court’s construction in Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 399, 402, 247 S.E.2d 683 (1978), of the phrase "intent to defraud" as used in a larceny by false pretenses statute, to require a finding of intent at the moment of obtaining the benefit. Caldwell argued that not only was the Commonwealth’s evidence insufficient to prove she possessed the intent to defraud at the time she obtained the breakfast, but the circuit court’s ruling also demonstrated that the court did not conclude that Caldwell possessed the intent to defraud at that requisite time. Therefore, argued Caldwell, the circuit court erred as a matter of law and her conviction should be overturned.
The Commonwealth argued that it was proper for the circuit court to infer the requisite intent from all of Caldwell’s actions and statements. The Court of Appeals agreed, reciting that Johnson v. Commonwealth , 53 Va. App. 79, 100, 669 S.E.2d 368 (2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor , 256 Va. 514, 519, 506 S.E.2d 312 (1998) ). The court further stated that "[t]he statements and conduct of an accused after the events that constitute the charged crime may also be relevant circumstantial evidence of intent." Simon v. Commonwealth , 58 Va. App. 194, 206, 708 S.E.2d 245 (2011). The Court of Appeals denied Caldwell’s appeal by unpublished per curiam order, holding that:
The trial court’s comments reflect that it did not think it reasonable for appellant to believe that she could partake in the hotel breakfast for free. However, even if appellant believed she could enjoy breakfast at the hotel for free, the trial court concluded that appellant possessed the requisite intent because appellant was informed by hotel staff that she was required to pay for the breakfast as she ate yet refused to do so. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant obtained the benefit, breakfast, without paying, and acted with the requisite intent. The Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently incredible, and was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of defrauding an innkeeper.
Caldwell v. Commonwealth , Record No. 0827-18-3 (January 17, 2019). A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals upheld the per curiam ruling "for...
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